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MORAL INJURY IN CF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN

Abstract
Moral injury is a relatively new area of study within military mental health care,
as such, prevalence estimates for both moral injury and exposure to potentially morally
injurious events (PMIE; a moral injury precursor) are unknown for many of the world’s
militaries. PMIE is commonly defined as the perpetrating, failing to prevent, witnessing,
or learning about acts or events that transgress an individual’s deeply held moral
belief(s). The primary purpose of this study was to estimate the prevalence of PMIE in a
population of Canadian Armed Forces (CF) members who served in support of the recent
mission to Afghanistan. How exposure to PMIE may affect these individuals’ selfreported rates positive mental health served as a secondary research question. To this
end, a secondary data analysis was conducted using the results of the 2013 Canadian
Forces Mental Health Survey, a cross-sectional survey of over 8,000 active-duty CF
members conducted by Statistics Canada for the Department of National Defence and the
CF.
Statistical analysis revealed that over 65% of CF members reported exposure to at
least one event that would be considered a PMIE. The most commonly reported PMIE
types included seeing ill or injured women and children that they were unable to help
(48%), being unable to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants (44%), and
finding themselves in a threatening situation where they were unable to respond due to
the rules of engagement they were required to operate under (35%). Results of the
second research question revealed that the positive mental health status of CF members
overall differed slightly from the Canadian population as a whole. However, when CF
members’ positive mental health statuses were compared according to PMIE exposure
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status those exposed were found to be 37% less likely to be flourishing, and 138% more
likely to be languishing when compared to those who were not exposed.
These findings provide support for both the presence of exposure to PMIE in CF
members who were deployed in support of the mission to Afghanistan, and the
detrimental effect that such exposure has on their mental health. The implications and
limitations of these findings and potential directions for future research into moral injury
and PMIE are also discussed.

Keywords: moral injury, trauma, ethics, military, prevalence rate, Afghanistan, positive
mental health, secondary data analysis
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Chapter 1
Moral Injury in the Military: A conceptual review
The psychological impacts of war on those involved, be they civilians or soldiers,
have been known almost as long as there has been war. Our understanding of these
sequalae, however, has evolved over the years through direct observation of the
behaviour of combatants, clinical work conducted with veterans, and focussed research in
the area. As a consequence of this changing knowledge, the terminology used to describe
these impacts has also changed (for review see Ray, 2008). In the 19th century, for
example, field doctors observed that soldiers sometimes experienced episodes of extreme
fatigue, tremors, shortness of breath, sweating, heart palpitations, and occasionally even
fainting spells. Believing the cause to be a disruption in heart function, they referred to
the symptoms collectively as soldier’s heart, and prescribed removing the soldiers from
the battle until the symptoms passed, after which they would return to the frontlines.
During and after World War I, the understanding of combat stress reactions changed to
include symptoms of hysteria (now called a “conversion disorder”) such as paralysis,
tremors, spasms, and disordered gait, and nervous exhaustion (fatigue, headaches,
depressed mood, and nightmares). Following the prevailing theories of psychiatry of the
time, professionals began referring to the syndrome as war neurosis, or more commonly,
shell shock. By the start of World War II, these terms had begun to fall out of use as it
became apparent that individuals not exposed to war or shelling were experiencing
symptoms similar to those soldiers that were exposed. This discovery lead to a
broadening of the area of inquiry to include investigations into the characteristics of the
trauma(s) experienced and how these might be related to the symptoms that were
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experienced; specifically, investigations into how individuals react both physically and
psychologically to stressful events. Included in the newly written Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM, American Psychiatric Association, 1952)
as stress response syndrome, the diagnosis recognized that when confronted with extreme
physical or psychological stress, otherwise normal people could exhibit similar symptoms
as those experienced by those exposed to combat. By the 1980s, clinical understanding of
the syndrome had further advanced and the name was changed to post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) with formal diagnostic criteria being included in both the DSM-III
(American Psychiatric Association, 1980) and the International Classification of Diseases
and Related Health Problems, 10th Revision (ICD-10, World Health Organization, 1992).
Refinements to the diagnostic criteria over successive versions of the DSM, including
changes in the categorization of PTSD as an anxiety disorder (American Psychiatric
Association, 1980, 1994, 2000) to a newly formed category of “Traumatic and stress
related disorders” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The change in
categorization in the DSM-5 stemmed in part from the new requirement that symptom
onset must have been preceded by a traumatic or otherwise adverse environmental event
(Friedman, 2017).
Changes in understanding about causation and symptomatology are not the only
sources for change with regards to military mental health. Rather changes in the nature
and style of conflict can lead to completely new forms of military trauma. Until recently,
wars were fought by means of “conventional warfare” between state actors of
approximately equal size, strength, and technical ability. Combatants wore uniforms that
clearly identified which state they belonged to, and physical targets in battle were
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primarily opposing military forces (e.g., bases, airfields, ship yards), military-supportive
structures (e.g., factories producing items for the war effort), critical infrastructure (e.g.,
roads, bridges, rail lines), or communications related (e.g., radio and television stations,
telephone, and telegraph lines). As well, the signing of the Geneva Conventions after
World War II made hospitals, places of worship, and places of cultural importance
protected sites under international law (de Preux, 1990). These wars would generally
continue until either one party capitulated, or a truce was reached by either political or
other means. For the most part, both parties knew, understood, and fought according to
an agreed upon set of rules - the Geneva Conventions (de Preux, 1990), the Law of
Armed Conflict, International Humanitarian Law, and Just War Theory (D.-P. Baker,
2015), and both parties knew that the punishments could be severe (e.g., act could be
considered a war crime) if these rules were violated. (See Table 1.1 for fundamental
rules underlying the Geneva Conventions.)
This type of state-on-state warfare, however, has been on the decline (van
Creveld, 2006) and has given way to a rise in more unconventional, asymmetric forms of
fighting where the parties involved often differ significantly in military power.
Asymmetric warfare (also called guerrilla warfare, insurgency/counter-insurgency,
terrorism/counter-terrorism) has existed in some form for as long as there has been war;
be it “resistance forces” fighting alongside traditional combatants in a conventional war,
or civilians taking up arms against an oppressive government or invading force. For the
most part, this type of asymmetric fighting was more of an adjunct form of warfighting,
done on a small scale, for the purposes of disrupting one of the parties in the larger war so
that their opposition could gain the advantage.

MORAL INJURY IN CF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN

4

Table 1.1
Fundamental rules forming the basis of the Geneva Conventions (adapted from de Preux,
1990)
1.
Distinction between civilians and combatants
Distinction must always be made between the civilian population and combatants
so as to spare both civilian population and property. Neither the civilian
population as such nor civilian persons shall be the object of attack. Attacks shall
be directed solely against military objectives.
2.
Perfidy is prohibited
Intentionally deceiving an adversary into believing that the attacker is deserving
of immunity from harm with the intent of betraying that confidence for military
gain (ex., a combatant dressing as a civilian to get close to a checkpoint and
detonate an IED; feigning surrender to draw adversary in closer so they can be
killed) is prohibited.
3.
Proportionality of force/action
The amount of force used must be proportional to the expected military gain
achieved. Any action that could be foreseen as having the potential to cause
excessive incidental loss of civilian life, civilian injury, or damage to civilian
property is prohibited if alternatives are available.
4.
Infliction of unnecessary suffering is prohibited (personal)
No person, combatant or civilian, shall be subjected to acts that lead to
unnecessary suffering. This includes corporal punishment, cruel or degrading
treatment, and physical or psychological torture.
5.
Infliction of unnecessary suffering is prohibited (means and methods)
The use of means and methods of warfare that will cause unnecessary losses or
physical suffering (ex., use of expanding/hollow-point bullets) is prohibited.
6.
Hors de combat are to be protected
Combatants considered to be hors de combat [“out of the fight” due to injury or
disability; no longer a threat] are entitled to respect for their lives and physical
integrity, be protected and treated humanely.
7.
Injury or killing of hors de combat or those that surrender is forbidden
The injury or killing of combatants who have surrendered or are no longer able to
fight is forbidden.
8.
Treatment of the sick and wounded
The sick and wounded shall be collected and cared for by the party which has
them in its power. This protection also covers medical personnel, establishments
(ex., hospitals, medical facilities), transports (ex. ambulances), and equipment.
9.
Treatment of “prisoners of war” (POWs)
Any captured combatants or civilians are to have their lives, dignity, personal
rights, and convictions respected. This includes protection from any acts of
violence or reprisals from the party detaining them.
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Asymmetric warfare, almost by its very nature, is prone to violating some of the
typical or accepted rules of engagement. Van Creveld (2006) uses the example of an
adult fighting against a child as an analogy for asymmetric warfare: no matter what their
motivation or reasoning, if an adult fights a child, the adult is seen to be in the wrong and
their behaviour is considered to be unjust (due to the difference in power between them
and the child); it does not matter if the child started the fight, or if they were wrong by
doing so. By extension, because the child is a child, they need to worry less about the
“rightness” of their actions and are entitled to more leeway in terms of how they behave
and what techniques they use in the fight to “level the playing field” (e.g., they are
“allowed” to bite, kick, spit, pull hair, etc., which an adult would not be allowed to do),
since to fight according to the same rules as the adult would put them at a distinct
disadvantage (van Creveld, 2006). While this reasoning does not serve to justify the
child’s behaviour (kicking, biting, and spitting are still wrong), it does make it a little
more understandable. When this reasoning is applied to real-world conflicts, like the
recent war in Afghanistan, the larger problems it can create for those fighting become
more apparent.
In late 2001, in response to the attacks on September 11, the United States of
America led a NATO invasion of Afghanistan that caused the overthrow of the Taliban, a
group that held de facto political control over the majority of Afghanistan at the time.
This NATO force would eventually grow and become the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF), a force composed of trained service members predominantly
from western countries, who, as part of their training, would have received instruction in
the aforementioned rules of war and Just War Theory (D.-P. Baker, 2015), as well as
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been provided with specific rules of engagement (ROE) that they would be bound to
during this deployment. This invasion and overthrow would effectively make the Taliban
into an insurgent group within Afghanistan who, along with the members of Al-Qaida
believed to be hiding there, would fight against the newly established Islamic
Government of Afghanistan and its coalition allies. (See Table 1.2 for primary
belligerents in the war in Afghanistan.)
Were the Taliban, Al-Qaida, and their associated off-shoot groups (“antigovernment forces”) to fight according to the same internationally agreed upon rules of
war that bound the “pro-government forces,” they would likely have quickly lost due to
the superior weaponry, training, strategy, and technology of their opponents, in particular,
the ISAF. As a result, the anti-government forces disregarded these rules and in doing so,
effectively turned those rules against pro-government forces. For example, antigovernment forces would routinely dress like civilians, hide amongst the civilian
population, and use buildings as staging areas for their attacks that were considered to be
protected sites (e.g., hospitals, schools, places of worship) (United Nations Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan, 2017a; United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan &
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2016); many of
these actions would be in violation of international law. Compounding these acts of
perfidy, anti-government forces were known to use civilians and children, often gaining
their cooperation by threatening them or their loved ones, to plant/detonate improvised
explosive devices (IEDs), as suicide bombers, and act as distractions believing that
civilians would be less likely to be seen as a threat by the ISAF forces and thereby be
fired upon (Fowler, 2016). The use of indiscriminate weapons and tactics as IEDs,
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Table 1.2
Primary belligerents in the war in Afghanistan
Anti-government forces
• Taliban a
• Al-Qaida and its offshoot groups (including the Islamic State in Syria and Levant;
ISIS/ISIL)
Pro-government forces
• Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
o Afghan National Army (ANA)
o Afghan National Police (ANP)
o Afghan Local Police (ALP)
o National Directorate of Security (NDS)
• International Security Assistance Force [ISAF] (coalition force)
o United States
o United Kingdom
o Canada
o Other NATO member states to varying degrees
• Various local militias and armed groups b
Note: a Taliban was the de facto government of Afghanistan from 1996 until 2001 when
it was overthrown in the US-led NATO invasion of Afghanistan conducted in response to
the September 11, 2001 terror attacks by Al-Qaida.
b
While these groups may not technically be “pro-government,” as they were often
headed by various tribal warlords (Fowler, 2016), they were anti-Taliban/anti-al-Qaida as
they opposed these groups’ role in the production of illicit drugs such as opium and
cannabis (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007); the Taliban/al-Qaida were a
common enemy.

rockets, and mortars, as well as undirected shooting during clashes with pro-government
forces in populated areas, also put civilians and other innocents at undue risk of harm and
made it increasingly difficult for ISAF to engage them without also risking civilians’
lives.
Unfortunately, such disregard of the rules of war was not limited to the antigovernment forces. United Nations reports on the protection of civilians in Afghanistan
(United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2017a) reported that members of the
Afghan National Security Force, specifically the Afghan National Army, were
responsible for an estimated 2,728 civilian casualties (deaths and injuries) in 2016 alone.
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According to the writers of this report, just over half (53%) of the civilian causalities
caused by pro-government forces resulted from the use of mortars, artillery, or other
indirect or explosive ordnance during ground engagements with insurgents. The various
local militias and assorted other armed groups who also took part were believed to be
responsible for an additional estimated 185 civilian casualties (deaths and injuries) in
2016, also mainly during ground engagements (United Nations Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan, 2017a). Of particular note, the deaths attributed to these “pro-government
armed groups” did not only occur during engagements with anti-government forces, but
also during engagements with other pro-government armed groups, usually when either
members of rival political parties, rival warlords, or rivals based on old tribal hatreds
encountered each other on the battlefield (Fowler, 2016; United Nations Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan, 2017a; United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan &
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2016). (See Figure
1.1 for Civilian deaths by belligerent group, 2007-2017).
Compounding the circumstances further, the rules of engagement (ROE) under
which the ISAF were required to fight, could occasionally put ISAF troops into situations
where they might need to make life or death decisions based on little or no available
information. For example, a soldier guarding a checkpoint sees what appears to be a
civilian with a bundle in his arms running towards the checkpoint. Not knowing if the
individual has hostile intent, since insurgents have been known to use suicide bombers to
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Figure 1.1 Civilian Deaths by Belligerent Group, 2007 to 2017 (mid-year).
AGF = Anti-Government Forces, PGF = Pro-Government Forces, “Joint AGF and PGF”
means that the civilian deaths could not be conclusively attributed by the UN to one
specific party (e.g., deaths in a cross-fire), Other = deaths caused by neither party (e.g.,
cross-border shelling, unexploded ordinance from current or prior conflicts). (United
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014,
2015, 2017a, 2017b; United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan & United
Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2016)

attack checkpoints, the soldier follows the ROE for the situation, giving the requisite
verbal warnings for the individual to stop, which are ignored, and shoots and kills the
individual, neutralizing the potential threat to himself, his unit, and the civilians nearby.
Upon further investigation, it becomes known that the civilian was attempting to get help
for the injured child they were carrying and had no ill intent; following the ROE led to
the shooting of an innocent man.
Taken together, at any given time, members of the ISAF could be both fighting
against and alongside individuals for whom the established rules of war do not apply or
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are not enforced, while they themselves (i.e., the ISAF) have their actions and decisions
bound by these very rules. As well, they could be put into situations where they need to
take actions without the benefit of having all the information available to determine what
the correct action might be. Events such as these can put service members into positions
that can violate their own deeply held beliefs about the world (e.g., what is right/wrong,
just/unjust) and their role in it. The inner conflict that can follow these sorts of
transgressive events can lead service members to experience what has recently been
termed a “moral injury.”
Moral Injury
Shay (Shay, 1991) first used the term moral injury to describe the internal
conflicts he witnessed while treating Vietnam veterans. Many of the psychological
conflicts these veterans appeared to be experiencing did not conform to the understanding
of post-combat stress of the time, rather they appeared to be of a more
philosophical/existential nature, according to Shay, consistent with a shattering of
assumptions about the self, the world, and how the two relate. Basing his interpretations
on a comparison between the behaviours reported by combat veterans experiencing
severe post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and the story of the warrior Achilles during
the Trojan War, as told in the Iliad by Homer, Shay postulated the following seven signs
clinicians should take note of as they may be indicative of a moral injury:
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1. Having experienced a betrayal of what is right, often by someone in power or a
position of authority;
2. Loss of social and moral horizon; individuals report no longer fighting for a greater
goal or their country, but rather fighting instead for their comrades in arms;
3. A sense of numbness after the battle replacing the usual grief and mourning following
the loss of comrades;
4. Feelings of failure when a comrade dies and a desire to change places with them
(“Why couldn’t I have saved him? It should have been me”);
5. The desire to switch places with their fallen comrades may escalate to feeling that
they are already dead;
6. Similarly, in battle the feelings of grief and loss are sublimated into a rage state that
may fuel increasingly risky behaviours, temporary loss of fear, and on occasion,
increased cruelty (berserking);
7. Dishonouring or dehumanizing of the enemy through either the use of derogatory
terms or through their actions (e.g., taking of “trophies”) (Shay, 2014).

Interestingly, while Shay defined moral injury as “a betrayal of what is right by someone
who holds legitimate authority” in both in his original and later refinements of the
concept (Shay, 1991, 2014), six of the seven behaviours he recommended clinicians
attend to focussed on the behaviour of the individual themselves and not that of a
powerful other such as a military leader.
Unlike Shay (Shay, 1991, 2014), who’s definition combined how the individual
behaved in combat with the clinician’s subjective impression to define moral injury itself,
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Litz (Litz et al., 2009) instead proposed a working definition, based on existing PTSD
literature, for potentially morally injurious experiences (PMIE); that is, experiences that
could potentially lead to a moral injury. Specifically, Litz defined a PMIE as:
perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress
deeply held moral beliefs and expectations (p. 700). This transgression, he proposed,
leads to a kind of cognitive dissonance being created between what the individual has
done/seen/failed to prevent (i.e., the PMIE) and their own internalized beliefs about how
things should be (e.g., how the world works, how people should behave), or what their
own role in the situation is supposed to be (e.g., protection of the innocent and stopping
the guilty). Others have phrased their definitions of PMIE slightly differently and with
varying specificity (Currier, Holland, Drescher, & Foy, 2015; Drescher et al., 2011), but
at their core they all contain references to a transgressive event occurring that causes a
disruption to the individual’s sense of morality. Litz (2009) goes on to stipulate that it is
not the PMIE itself that causes the moral injury, rather the moral injury is a result of a
multi-stage thought process that occurs within the individual beginning with the
(re)processing of the PMIE after the fact, followed by a realization that a moral
transgression has occurred, which leads to a cognitive dissonance being created in the
individual. It is the failure to resolve this dissonance that leads the individual to
sustaining the moral injury. This injury can present as a constellation of symptoms
including: feelings of inappropriate guilt, shame, self-directed anger (because they
betrayed their beliefs), self-condemnation, withdrawal from others, overt self-harm or
increases in risk taking behaviours, self-handicapping behaviours (e.g., increased
substance use or abuse, relationship sabotage), and existential or spiritual problems (e.g.,
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a loss of religion), or a disruption in the individual’s confidence and expectations about
one’s own and others’ motivation or capacity to behave in a just or ethical manner
(Currier, Holland, & Malott, 2015; Drescher et al., 2011).
In the broadest sense, transgressive acts can be divided into two broad categories
based on the morally injured party’s involvement with the perceived transgression: direct
(perpetration, or failure to prevent), or indirect (witnessing, or learning about after the
fact). A direct relationship exists if there was something the individual believes they
could have done, or not done, that could have potentially changed the outcome of the
situation. Perpertrative acts in war can include, but are not limited to: the accidental
killing of a non-combatant in a firefight or as a result of misidentifying them as a threat,
indiscriminate killing of others while the individual was in a fit of rage (similar to Shay’s
(1991) berserking), or the intentional torture, killing, or desecration, of either combatants
or non-combatants (atrocities). Failure to prevent transgressive acts could include acts
such as failing to make sure buildings were clear of civilians prior to calling in an
airstrike, failing to inform comrades after identifying civilians in the area, as well as
failing to prevent any of the aforementioned perpertrative acts from being done by
another. In contrast, an indirect relationship exists if there was nothing that the individual
could have done to affect the outcome of the situation, either because the transgressive
event had already occurred (e.g., discovering a mass grave), or because they were not
empowered to act in accordance with their moral beliefs. An example of the latter would
be the situation encountered during the UN Mission to Rwanda. The UN mandate for the
mission to Rwanda was that it be one of peacekeeping, as a result, UN forces were
instructed to remain neutral and were prohibited from intervening in the actions of the
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populous, only being allowed to act if they were directly threatened (Dallaire, 2003), as to
intervene in any other way could be seen as taking sides.1 As neither party directly
threatened the UN forces, UN troops were unable to more than merely observe and report
on the genocide that was occurring in front of them.
Litz (Litz et al., 2009) goes on to propose that how one views or interprets the
transgression and their role in it, may determine what behavioural or psychological
symptoms they experience and how these symptoms might progress. For example, if the
individual sees the transgression as caused by something they did (i.e., behaviour, “I did
something bad/wrong”), this may lead to feelings of guilt about that behaviour. At this
point, the guilt could still be functional as it could lead the individual to seek to make
reparations for their misdeed and change their behaviour so that they do not transgress in
that way again. If the individual is not able to make reparations sufficient to relieve their
inner conflict, however, their attribution of fault may change and become internalized (“If
the behaviour cannot be forgiven, maybe it is because I am unforgivable”). When the
transgression interpreted as being a result of a character flaw (i.e., something is wrong
with them, “I am a bad person”), this may lead to a feeling of shame and fear of
judgement by others: “If you look in my eyes, you will see the stain on my soul” (R.
Lanius, personal communication, 8 May 2015). This shame and fear of judgement can
lead the individual to withdraw from others both psychologically (e.g., they are unwilling
to discuss the transgressive event or their role in it) and socially. This tendency to
withdraw from others can be especially problematic for the individual’s recovery as

1

For example, if a UN soldier were to intervene to stop members of Group A from attacking a
civilian of Group B, they would be seen as taking the side of Group B since they were providing
them with protection.
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people tend to focus on information that reinforces their existing beliefs while
downplaying or ignoring contrary information. While withdrawing from others does
indeed decrease the likelihood of judgement, it will also decrease the likelihood of
exposure to individuals and situations that can challenge their distorted perceptions of
themselves and the transgressive event. Without access to this contrary information, their
distorted cognitions about themselves and the transgressive event can cause the distorted
thinking to become more ingrained and resistant to change.
PTSD and Moral Injury
While aspects of moral injury symptomatology can overlap with those present in
PTSD (e.g., the revisiting and reprocessing of the transgressive event, social withdrawal,
and self-condemnation of moral injury may parallel the re-experiencing and rumination,
avoidance, and emotional numbing seen in PTSD), the two stress injuries differ in
important ways. First, current conceptualizations of PTSD are predicated upon its being
a fear-based adjustment disorder that requires there to have been exposure to an actual or
threatened event in which the individual is at risk of serious injury or death (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013; Stein et al., 2012). A key aspect of PTSD is that the cause
(or agent) of this perceived life threat is external to the individual; someone or something
threatens the individual which leads to their trauma. With moral injury, the agent of the
trauma comes from within the individual themselves through the conscious or
unconscious reprocessing of the transgressive event. Put another way, it is the
reprocessing of the event and the conclusions the individual draws based on this
reprocessing, that are the actual cause of the moral injury and not the event itself (Litz et
al., 2009). This would mean that until the event is reprocessed, be it days, months, or
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even years after the initial act, the “injury” has yet to occur. Second, PTSD does not
require a transgression of one’s morality or belief system to have occurred for the
trauma/injury to be experienced. In contrast, a transgression of one’s morality or belief
system must have occurred and have been recognized as having occurred by the
individual, for there to be a moral injury. Returning to the earlier example of the
individual running at the checkpoint with an unidentified bundle, if it had turned out that
they were a suicide bomber or carrying an IED, it is less likely that the soldier would
have seen killing them as an act that transgressed their moral beliefs; the soldier would
likely have seen it as doing their job. There is an emerging body of research that
indicates that killing in war in itself is associated with the development of PTSD (Fontana
& Rosenheck, 1999; Fontana, Rosenheck, & Brett, 1992; Maguen et al., 2010; Maguen et
al., 2011; Maguen et al., 2013), however, how killing in general might be associated with
the development of moral injury specifically, has yet to be determined. Finally, PTSD is
a diagnosable mental disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and as such, has
particular, objective criteria that must be met before the diagnosis can be conferred.
There is no objective cut-off for the presence or absence moral injury, rather it is a
dimensional construct in which the same individual can manifest symptoms ranging from
none to severe at different points of time. Further research will be required before the
precise nature of the relationship between PTSD and moral injury can be determined. An
important first step to this goal is the creation of formal assessment tools for both
exposure to PMIE and the presence of moral injury itself.
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Assessment tools for moral injury and PMIE
Due to its relative newness in the field of military mental health, formal
assessment tools for both moral injury and exposure to potentially morally injurious
events (PMIE) are similarly still in their infancy. As part of their exploration of the
concept of moral injury, Drescher et al. (2011) interviewed a group of researchers, policy
makers, religious, and health care professionals working within the U.S. Department of
Defence and the Department of Veterans Affairs about their proposed conceptualization
of moral injury (i.e., disruptions in an individual’s confidence and expectations about
one’s own or others’ motivation or capacity to behave in a just and ethical manner, p.9),
and what elements of combat they felt would be most likely to lead to moral injury
including what symptoms they would most expect to observe following exposure to a
PMIE. Participants all agreed that the concept of moral injury was a useful one to aid in
the understanding that the complexities of psychological issues experienced by service
members and others can go beyond what is captured by the criteria for PTSD (Drescher et
al., 2011). Drescher et al. acknowledge that for research into moral injury to progress,
including the potential for formal clinical trials, reliable and valid measures of the moral
injury construct need to be developed and consistently applied by researchers, clinicians,
and others in the field. To date, only two assessment measures have been developed to
specifically investigate PMIE exposure: The Moral Injury Events Scale (MIES; Nash et
al., 2013) and the Moral Injury Questionnaire – Military Version (MIQ-M; Currier,
Holland, Drescher, et al., 2015), while another two measures have been developed to
measure the symptoms and expression of moral injury itself: the Moral Injury Symptom
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Scale – Military Version (MISS-M; Koenig et al., 2017) and the Expressions of Moral
Injury Scale – Military Version (EMIS-M; Currier et al., 2017).
Moral Injury Events Scale (MIES). Developed in 2013 (Nash et al., 2013), the
MIES is a scale to measure exposure to traumatic events that could lead to PTSD, not
because they involved actual or threatened serious injury or death, as would be required
by Criteria A of the diagnostic criteria for PTSD (American Psychiatric Association,
2013), but because they caused individuals’ deeply held values and moral beliefs to be
violated. The MIES is a 9-item, self-report measure describing events that draw upon the
Litz et al. (2009) definition of PMIE, namely involving the learning about, witnessing,
failing to prevent, or perpetrating acts which violate the individual’s moral beliefs and
expectations. Response options are given on a six-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1
(strongly agree) to 6 (strongly disagree) with higher scores being indicative of a greater
intensity of event exposure. The authors report that the even number of response options
was selected to preclude respondents from providing a “neutral” answer. The
psychometric evaluation of the MIES utilized the final two cohorts of the Marine
Resiliency Study (D. G. Baker et al., 2012), which was composed of Marines who were
previously deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan between 2008 and 2011, all of whom were
male. The first cohort (n = 533) was administered the MIES approximately 1-week post
deployment, and again approximately 3-months post deployment, while the second
cohort (n = 506) received the MIES at 6-months post deployment only. Internal
reliability of the MIEs was found to be excellent (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.90) with an
average item-total correlation of 0.65 (ranging from 0.52 to 0.75).
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When exploratory factor analyses were conducted, two factors were revealed
which explained 64.24% of the common variance: perceived transgressions by self or
others, and perceived betrayal by others. The first factor, perceived transgressions by self
or others, as the name suggests was composed of questions relating to both the witnessing
of acts of commission and omission that violated one’s moral beliefs and expectations,
and the perpetration of such acts, as well as the distress caused by the same (Nash et al.,
2013). The latter questions relating to the distress caused could be seen as paralleling
Criterion G in the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for PTSD (i.e., disturbance causes clinically
significant distress or impairment; American Psychiatric Association, 2013), as without
this distress it could be argued that there is no injury. The second factor, betrayal by
others, was composed of questions relating to feelings of betrayal by one’s superiors,
other service members, and individuals not in the military that they once trusted. Nash et
al. also found that the MIES had good temporal stability with paired t-tests comparing the
results from 1 week and 3 months post deployment all failing to meet the cut-off for
statistical significance. Results of the exploratory factor analyses using the second cohort
of Marines suggested that the two-factor model found had a good model fit based on
standard cut-off recommendations (standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR) =
0.04, comparative fit index (CFI) = 0.96).
Bryan et al. (Bryan et al., 2015) sought to further evaluate the psychometric
properties of the MIES in samples composed of both men and women, service members
from other branches of the military than Marines, and those from professions other than
combat arms. To this end, two groups of individuals were selected: a clinical sample of
151 active duty Air Force personnel who sought outpatient mental health treatment, and a
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non-clinical sample of 935 U.S. military personnel (84% Army National Guard). Using
the sample of Air Force personnel, a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to test
the two-factor model proposed by Nash et al. (Nash et al., 2013) the results of which
indicated a poor overall fit with a SRMR of 0.125 and a CFI of 0.779; general guidelines
for acceptable results are an SRMR < 0.08, and a CFI > 0.90 (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
When the confirmatory factor analysis was redone using the second sample of Army
National Guard personnel, the two-factor model fit improved slightly (SRMR = 0.082;
CFI = 0.930). The difference between the results of the two samples was postulated to be
a result of differential exposure to PMIE as only 25% of the Air Force sample reported
having direct combat experience compared with 75% of the Army National Guard sample
(Bryan et al., 2015).
Having failed to confirm the results of Nash et al. (Nash et al., 2013), Bryan et al.
conducted an exploratory factor analyses using the sample of Air Force personnel in
hopes of identifying the latent factor structure for the MIES in this group. This analysis
yielded a three-factor model that explained 75.6% of the total variance observed (SRMR
= 0.024, CFI = 0.922): transgression by others, transgression by self, betrayal by others
(essentially splitting the Nash et al. first factor in two). When a confirmatory factor
analysis was conducted using the Army National Guard sample to replicate the threefactor solution, the model fit was found to be excellent with an SRMR of 0.056 and a CFI
= 0.962 (Bryan et al., 2015).
Moral Injury Questionnaire – Military Version (MIQ-M). Drawing from
clinical evidence, military trauma theory, domains found by Drescher (Drescher et al.,
2011), as well as their own research using structural equation modelling (Currier,
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Holland, & Malott, 2015), Currier, Holland, Drescher, and Foy (2015) developed the
Moral Injury Questionnaire – Military Version (MIQ-M) to provide a unidimensional
assessment tool for exposure to PMIE. The MIQ-M is a 19 item, self-report
questionnaire with items drawing from the following six domains of potentially morally
injurious events: acts of betrayal, acts of disproportionate violence inflicted on others,
acts which involved death or harm to civilians, violence within military ranks, inability to
prevent death and suffering, and ethical dilemmas or moral conflicts (Currier, Holland,
Drescher, et al., 2015). Each item is scored on a four-point frequency scale where 1 =
Never, 2 = Seldom, 3 = Sometimes, and 4 = Often. The authors note that due to the
potential for guilt/shame and potential legal ramifications of admitting that they
participated in certain acts while on deployment, they opted to combine direct
involvement together with the witnessing of PMIE for several items on the MIQ-M to
increase the likelihood gaining accurate responding from participants (e.g., “I saw/was
involved with violations of rules of engagement”). The authors acknowledge that by
doing so, they likely confounded the effects of the two different types of war-zone
stressors; a conclusion reinforced by the findings of Bryan (Bryan et al., 2015). The
MIQ-M was administered to two groups of participants; a community sample of 131
Iraq/Afghanistan veterans attending a community college, and a clinical sample of 82
Iraq/Afghanistan veterans attending a residential rehabilitation program for severe PTSD.
Based on the results of a minimum average partial test (MAP) conducted on the
community sample, only a single factor model was tested with the results suggesting a
good fit with the data (SRMR = 0.04, CFI = 0.90). In the clinical sample, the MAP test
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also indicated that a one-factor model would also provide the best fit, with the results
indicating a good fit with the participants’ responses (SRMR = 0.05, CFI = 0.98).
Overall, the results for the MIES (Nash et al., 2013) and the MIQ-M (Currier,
Holland, Drescher, et al., 2015) provide support both for the utility of moral injury as a
construct, as well as preliminary psychometric evidence for the respective measures to
assess military personnel for PMIE exposure. Further refinements to both tools as well as
testing in other military populations will be required, however, before either can be used
in a clinical diagnostic setting. As both measures utilized a self-report methodology,
there is the potential for response bias having affected their respective results, especially
with regards to the reporting of perpertrative acts on the MIES. Finally, the crosssectional sampling utilized prevents drawing any associations between exposure to PMIE
and the eventual development of psychopathology in the future.
Moral Injury Symptoms Scale – Military Version (MISS-M). The MISS-M
(Koenig et al., 2017) was developed in 2017 to serve as an outcome measure for
intervention studies in moral injury in current and former service members diagnosed
with PTSD. The MISS-M is a 45-item, self-report questionnaire composed of questions
designed to assess respondents on 10 theoretically-grounded dimensions related to moral
injury symptomatology namely guilt, shame, moral concerns, religious struggles, loss of
religious faith/hope, loss of meaning or purpose, difficulties with forgiving, losses of
trust, and self-condemnation. Each question is ranked on a 10-point Likert scale relating
to the respondent’s amount of disagreement (1) or agreement (10) with various
statements (e.g., “Some of the things I did during war continue to bother me”), with
higher scores being indicative of greater moral injury. Participants were 427 veterans and
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active duty service members recruited from VA medical centres in five major
metropolitan areas plus one private research university which were then split to create
two samples on which exploratory (n = 214) and confirmatory factor analyses (n = 213)
were conducted.
The authors elected to conduct the respective factor analyses within each of the 10
respective dimensions due to their perceived theoretical importance and a desire to
maintain the 10 respective dimensions (i.e., the questions that were selected because the
authors believed that they reflected the “guilt” dimension, for example, were factoranalysed to verify that these questions held together as indicators of that dimension). The
number of questions analysed in each dimension ranged from 2 (shame, and loss of
religious faith/hope) to 10 (self-condemnation). All of the predicted dimensions
successfully loaded onto single factors with the exception of “difficulty forgiving” and
“self-condemnation” which each loaded on 2 factors corresponding to how the questions
were worded; positively worded questions (e.g., I take a positive attitude toward myself)
loaded on one factor while negatively worded questions (e.g., I certainly feel useless at
times) loaded on a second factor within each dimension (Koenig et al., 2017).
With regards to the reliability of the MISS-M, the overall Cronbach’s alpha for
the whole measure was 0.92, with alphas for the subscales ranging from 0.56 (loss of
religious faith/hope) to 0.91 (loss of trust) indicating that the measure as a whole has
good internal consistency. In terms of test-retest reliability, the MISS-M was
administered to a group of 64 veterans on two occasions separated by an average of 10
days. Overall ICC for the MISS-M was 0.91, and the ICCs for the subscales ranged from
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0.78 (moral concerns) to 0.90 (loss of religious faith/hope) indicating that the measure
has good reliability over time (Koenig et al., 2017).
Expressions of Moral Injury Scale – Military Version (EMIS-M). Developed
in 2017, the EMIS-M (Currier et al., 2017) is a 17-item, self-report measure designed for
use by clinicians and researchers to detect the potential warning signs of moral injury in a
military population. Unlike other measures of moral injury, or PMIE, the authors state
that they made no attempt to develop a measure that would capture all possible aspects
moral injury expression, rather they report approaching moral injury as a “nonpathological dimensional concept” (p. 5) to which additional expression can be added as
empirical, theoretical, and clinical knowledge increases. Participants were recruited from
two mid-sized research universities at the beginning of the 2015-16 and 2016-17
academic years using lists of students who were attending university using the GI Bill
funding.2 The final sample size for the whole study was 910 individuals with 286
individuals being utilized for an exploratory factor analysis, and the remaining 624 being
utilized for a confirmatory factor analysis.
Results of the exploratory factor analysis yielded a two-factor solution which
explained almost 63% of the variance in the selected items with the majority of the
variance (52%) being attributable to the first factor labelled Self-directed Moral Injury;
the second factor was labelled Other-directed Moral Injury. Indices of reliability were
reported to have exceeded the recommended threshold of 0.9, and six-month test-retest
coefficients ranging from 0.74 for self-directed moral injury, to 0.80 for other-directed

2

The GI Bill is an educational benefit provided by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs to
veterans, active duty, reserve, and National Guard members of the military to help them cover the
costs associated with receiving continued education.
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moral injury (Currier et al., 2017). The results of the confirmatory factor analysis to
verify the two-factor model were similarly favourable yielding an SRMR 0.03 and a CFI
of 0.96 indicating a good model fit. The authors report that indices of reliability
calculated for the various subscales exceeded the recommended threshold of 0.9,
however, the specific statistics were not presented (Currier et al., 2017).
Summary
Moral injury has become the subject of increasing amounts of research in recent
years, however, in order to maximize the quality and generalizability of research going
forward, consensus still needs to be reached around certain aspects of the construct. One
such point is the terminology used to describe the construct. Drescher (Drescher et al.,
2011) found that over a third of the respondents in their study felt that “moral injury”
carried with it potentially negative connotations. In particular, the use of the term
“moral” could be interpreted by those affected as implying that they somehow behaved
“immorally” while deployed; a position echoed in McClosky (McCloskey, 2011). This
interpretation could evoke negative emotions and negative self-judgement in the
individual and in turn, affect their responding both in clinical and research contexts.
Some of the alternatives suggested included spiritual injury, emotional injury, personal
values injury, and life values injury (Drescher et al., 2011).
Another point relates to how to categorize different PMIE. The work on the
MIES by Nash (Nash et al., 2013) resulted in two factors being found (transgression by
self or others, and betrayal by others), while that of Bryan (Bryan et al., 2015) found
three factors (transgression by self, transgression by others, and betrayal by others).
Drescher (Drescher et al., 2011) proposed that “betrayal by self” could also be a form of
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PMIE; how this concept might be related to, or different from, “transgression by self” has
not yet been determined and would benefit from further research. Stein and colleagues,
in their categorization system for traumatic military events, use the broad categories of
“moral injury by self” and “moral injury by others” to describe the differing types of
PMIE (Stein et al., 2012).
It is important to note that while both moral injury and potentially morally
injurious events have been examined predominantly within the context of the military, in
particular in relation to combat traumas (Currier, Holland, Drescher, et al., 2015;
Drescher et al., 2011; Litz et al., 2009; Wisco et al., 2017; Yan, 2016), the concept itself
is applicable to other groups as well. First responders (police, fire, and ambulance
personnel), can encounter situations in the course of their duties over which they have no
control and that may end badly (e.g., a suicidal individual who, despite the first
responder’s best efforts to talk them down, still jumps off the bridge). Another possible
group could be individuals working in health care who may be called upon to complete,
or assist with, procedures they do not personally agree with or run counter to their beliefs
(e.g., do not resuscitate (DNR) orders, Medical Assistance in Dying (MAID)). Referred
to as “moral distress” in the health care field, it has been a subject of inquiry for
bioethicists for a number of years. Traditional definitions posit that moral distress arises
from situations where the individual knows what the morally correct choice is to make
but they do not make it due to various limitations placed on them by either internal or
external (e.g., institutional) factors (Campbell, Ulrich, & Grady, 2016). In contrast to
moral injury as defined by Litz and colleagues (Litz et al., 2009) where the dissonance is
created after the event has occurred, this definition of moral distress would seem to imply
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that the distress exists for the individual before they have made their decision to act, or
not act. Campbell (Campbell et al., 2016) posits that the traditional definition may not
capture the full spectrum of possible types for moral distress and propose broadening the
definition citing a number of potentially distressing situations or conditions that are not
covered including “bad moral luck.” (See Campbell, et al., 2016, for complete
discussion). Bad moral luck can be caused by situations where individuals make the best
(moral) choice they can based on the information that they have available at the time, but
morally undesirable results still occur. Williams termed the emotional outcome of these
types of situations “agent-regret” (Williams (1982) cited in: McAninch, 2016) to identify
the complex nature of these situations; while the individual may be able to acknowledge
that there may have been no other choice they could have made in the situation that
would have led to a different outcome (regret about what happened), they none the less
still feel guilty about their role in it (regret about what they did). This broadened
formulation of moral distress brings its definition closer to what is currently seen as
moral injury in the military. As is the case with the military, however, the same issues
around terminology and categorization of PMIE apply and will need to be addressed
before research into these groups can proceed.
The current study will focus in the experiences of PMIEs in a military sample,
specifically, a representative sample of Canadian Armed Forces (CF) members who were
deployed in support of the recent mission to Afghanistan. The CF does not currently
collect information about exposure to potentially morally injurious events (PMIE) or
moral injury within either the veteran population or those currently serving, so prevalence
rates of either outcome within these populations are not currently known. The primary
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purpose of this study is to estimate the prevalence of exposure to PMIE within the
aforementioned population of CF members (Chapter 3), with the secondary purpose
being to determine how this exposure to PMIE affects CF members self-rated mental
health (Chapter 4). Prior to examining these research questions, however, the type and
extent of training regarding ethical decision making provided by the CF and its
applicability to PMIE will be reviewed (Chapter 2). While the topics of these chapters
are interrelated, they are not interdependent; each chapter is presented in such a way as to
be self-contained.
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Chapter 2
Canadian Forces ethics training: Applicability to moral injury
“While the prospect of inter-state war will not disappear, future challenges will be
more diverse – with asymmetric attacks launched by transnational terror groups, and the
political instability, civil war and humanitarian crises characteristic of fragile countries
making up the lion’s share of turmoil in the early 21st century” (Department of National
Defence, 2007, p. 4). These changes will alter both how service members will be utilized
in the field (e.g., moving from primarily peace-support and humanitarian aid provision
increasingly towards war-fighting) and the conditions they will encounter while they are
deployed, some of which will expose them to new and potentially challenging situations
that can tax their ability to cope both physically and mentally. Litz (Litz et al., 2009)
describes one such situation – the potentially morally injurious event (PMIE): the
perpetration, failure to prevent, witnessing of, or learning about acts that transgress the
individual’s deeply held moral beliefs and expectations about the rules that govern human
behaviour. Exposure to these PMIE could lead the individual to develop a “moral injury”
characterized by feelings of shame, guilt, and anxiety and collateral behaviours including
acts of self-harm (e.g., increases in substance use and abuse, parasuicidal behaviours) and
self-handicapping behaviours (e.g., social withdrawal, avoidance, self-isolation). The
actual moral injury, Litz continues, does not occur until such a time as the individual
realizes that their moral beliefs have been violated and a sense of inner conflict or
dissonance is created; this realization may occur immediately after the traumatic event,
after some time has passed (days, weeks, months), or it may never occur. According to
this formulation, moral injury can be seen as a complex, multifaceted concept that arises
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from a combination of law and philosophy in principle, and mental health in outcome: A
traumatic event occurs (PMIE) that violates an underlying philosophical (moral) belief
held by the individual regarding who they are and how the world should be that then
leads to the creation of a psychic conflict within the person (dissonance), which can
manifest in psychological or behavioural symptoms (moral injury).
It is important to keep in mind that, organizationally speaking, the military does
not operate like other groups of professionals. Doctors and lawyers, for example, operate
within organizations that are more associational in nature; while members of these
respective organizations may all work toward a shared goal (i.e., for the health and
welfare, or legal representation of their clients, respectively), they function as
autonomous individuals within that organization. The military, however, is a collective
profession in which groups of individuals must operate synergistically in order to achieve
an identified end (Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute,
2003). While they are deployed, but especially while actively engaged in mission related
activities (e.g., combat), service members no longer act as autonomous individuals but
rather individual parts of a larger whole (e.g., their fire team, section, platoon, etc.). The
role of the individual service member in relation to the military is analogous how the
heart and lungs operate within the body; while they remain distinct organs, their ability to
function correctly both affects and is affected by the functioning of the other organs such
that if they all do not function together appropriately, the whole body will suffer.
Another aspect of this collective or interdependent nature is a shared responsibility for the
continued health and wellbeing of every service member (when one individual suffers it
affects the functioning of their fire team, squad, platoon as well). This responsibility is
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carried by all levels of the military from the government agencies that oversee its
functioning (e.g., the Department of National Defence), through the organization itself
(e.g., the Canadian Armed Forces), and down the chain of command to the individuals
themselves.
Based on the extensive training that the military provides to its service members
before deploying them to hostile environments, both generally (e.g., weapons and
training, battle tactics) and deployment specifically (e.g., cultural sensitivity, political
climate, rules of engagement), as well as the sorts of equipment provided to maintain
service members’ physical safety (e.g., body armour, helmets, armoured transport), it
seems unlikely that the military, and the governmental organizations that oversee it,
would not have taken steps to prepare their service members for the types of potentially
morally injurious events (PMIE) they may encounter on deployment. As such, the
Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CF) must
believe that the training they provide to their service members is adequate preparation for
whatever events they may encounter while deployed.3
With this in mind, this chapter has three goals. First, to outline the current
training4 provided by the CF to its service members regarding the potential psychological
tolls of a modern deployment. Second, to summarize the training provided by the DND

3

This last point is proposed based on the assertion that if the opposite was true (i.e., that the
DND/CF do not believe that this training is adequate preparation for deployment experiences),
this would mean that the DND/CF would be knowingly sending service members into situations
for which they are unprepared.
4
Due to the specific details of training provided to CF members being of a classified nature, the
source material for this section is limited to documents that are either publicly available (e.g.,
from the Department of National Defence (DND), Canadian Forces (CF), and Government of
Canada (GC) websites), unclassified documents obtained directly from members of the DND or
CF by the author, or reports generated by Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC)
and third parties on behalf of the DND or CF.
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and CF around ethics and ethical decision-making in general and how these may be
applied during deployment. Finally, to evaluate, through the use of scenarios, if the
provided ethical decision-making training is applicable to situations that contain PMIEs,
and by extension, if this training may decrease the likelihood of service members
developing a moral injury as the DND/CF seem to believe it will be.
Mental Health and Stress Management: Road to Mental Readiness (R2MR)
Deployment on combat missions or on operations other than war such as peace
support operations (PSO; peace-making, peace building, peace enforcement,
peacekeeping), disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance have been shown to take a
psychological toll on the service members involved (Boulos & Zamorski, 2013; Boulos
& Zamorski, 2016; Hoge et al., 2004). In an effort to mitigate this toll through
prevention, management, and treatment, the Canadian Forces (CF) provides training to its
service members through a program entitled Road to Mental Readiness (R2MR,
Department of National Defence, 2016b). First implemented in 1997, the R2MR
program was designed to instruct service members about the basics of mental health and
to provide them with resilience training with the overarching goals of improving both
short-term performance while deployed, and long-term mental health outcomes. R2MR
training begins at the recruit level and continues through the members’ careers in the CF
gradually becoming more specialized and directed as they advance in rank and
deployment requirements change.
The mental health portion of R2MR training is designed with a focus on
increasing mental health literacy and reducing the stigma associated with seeking
professional help to deal with issues arising from deployment and other difficult life
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events (Department of National Defence, 2016b; Weeks, Zamorski, Rusu, & Colman,
2017). Training addresses topics including common beliefs that act as barriers to help
seeking in service members (e.g., that they can manage their problems themselves, that
therapy won’t help, fear that therapy won’t remain confidential due to the organizational
structure of the military, fear of how receiving assistance may affect their relationships
with team members and their future in the military), and the identification of signs and
symptoms of ineffective coping through the use of the Military Mental Health Continuum
Model. This model was designed to inculcate, force-wide, the knowledge that mental
health and coping are not “all or none” entities (i.e., healthy or ill, coping or not), but
rather that mental health and coping exists on a spectrum. The model makes use of a
four-colour spectrum ranging from healthy adaptive coping (“healthy,” green) at one end,
through mild yet reversable distress or functional impairment (“reacting,” yellow), more
severe and persistent impairment (“injured,” orange), and finally to clinically significant
impairment that affects functioning and requires medical intervention (“ill,” red) at the
other. For each level of the spectrum, service members are provided with common
behavioural indicators to be aware of in six different spheres: mood, attitude and
performance, sleep, physical symptoms, social behaviour, and alcohol use and gambling
(Table 2.1). By instituting the training force-wide beginning at the recruit stage service
members learn to both attend to the identified symptoms in themselves during the stresses
of basic training and also identify them in other service members. This type of peer
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Table 2.1
Military Mental Health Continuum Model
Reacting
(yellow)
Irritable/impatient;
nervous; feelings
of sadness or
being
overwhelmed

Injured
(orange)
Angry; anxious,
feelings of
pervasive
sadness or
hopelessness

Attitude and Good sense of
Performance humour;
performing well;
mentally “in
control”

Sarcastic;
procrastinating on
tasks;
forgetfulness

Sleep

Normal sleep
patterns; few
difficulties
relating to sleep

Trouble sleeping;
experiencing
intrusive thoughts;
nightmares

Increasingly
negative attitude;
poor
performance of
tasks or being a
workaholic; poor
concentration or
decision making
Increasingly
restless or
disturbed sleep;
experiencing
recurrent images;
frequent
nightmares

Physical
Symptoms

No physical
complaints; good
energy level

Social
Behaviours

Active both
physically and
socially

Experiencing
muscle tension or
headaches; low
energy level
Decreased amount
of physical
activity;
Socializes less
often

Increased aches
and pains;
increasingly
fatigued/tired
Actively avoids
physical and
socially activity

Alcohol use
and
gambling

No or limited
alcohol use or
gambling
(socially
appropriate)

Regular but
controlled alcohol
use or gambling
(used as coping
mechanism)

Alcohol use or
gambling now
harder to control;
experiencing
some negative
consequences

Mood

Healthy
(green)
Normal mood
fluctuations;
calm, takes
things in stride

Ill
(red)
Has angry
outbursts or
aggression;
experiences
excessive anxiety
or panic attacks;
depression or
suicidal thoughts
Overt
insubordination;
can no longer
perform duties,
control their
behaviour, or
concentrate
Can no longer
fall asleep or
remain asleep
(due to thoughts,
images, or
nightmares);
Sleeping too
much or too little
Physically ill;
fatigue almost
constant
No longer goes
out or answering
phone (total
social and
physical
withdrawal)
Frequent alcohol
use or gambling
now unable to
control;
consequences of
use now severe

Note: Table adapted from (Department of National Defence, 2016b)
support, referred to as “Buddy Aid” within the curriculum, also serves to reinforce the
synergistic nature of the military as an organization. The R2MR training provides
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suggestions to service members for how they might be able to assist each other should
they notice a colleague may be slipping away from the healthy (green) end of the
spectrum. Some of the suggestions provided include checking in with this colleague and
seeing if there is anything they can do for them (referred to as “being a good friend”);
basic active listening skills (i.e., listening attentively; asking non-judgemental questions
to help understand the situation better; reflecting back their understanding to the
individual for clarification); validating what the other person is feeling; and reminding
the troubled individual of the resources that are available to all service members (e.g.,
chaplains, primary health care, specialized mental health and addictions teams), both onbase and in the community, that they can access if they need to (Department of National
Defence, 2016b).
Related to mental health is the concept of resilience. While there is no single
accepted definition for what constitutes resilience within the military context (Litz, 2014;
Meredith et al., 2011), most definitions refer to an ability to endure some form of
traumatic or aversive circumstance and then return to a baseline level of functioning.
R2MR defines resilience as “the capacity of a soldier to recover quickly, resist, and
possibly even thrive in the face of direct [or] indirect traumatic events and adverse
situations in garrison, training, and operational environments” (Department of National
Defence, 2016b). The resilience training provided by the CF is multifaceted and
designed to provide service members with the practical skills required to deal with both
acutely stressful situations, like those encountered while on deployment, and more
common day-to-day stressors. This training is incorporated into their basic training
program as recruits and is refreshed at various points in their military career, as well as
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during the classroom portion of pre-deployment briefings. Based in part on work done in
sports and performance psychology, service members are taught specific skills, known as
“the Big 4.” The Big 4 consists of instruction in goal setting; mental rehearsal or
visualization (i.e., how to work through expected scenarios mentally and determine
appropriate responses ahead of time; this way should these situations occur while
deployed, or another time of high stress, the member already has a plan devised to help
deal with the situation); techniques to replace negative self-talk with positive self-talk;
and how to use combat tactical breathing (or “box breathing”) techniques to control
anxiety and arousal in stressful situations (i.e., inhale for a count of 4, hold breath for
count of 4, exhale for a count of 4). Service members are also provided with additional
techniques and general guidance relating to stress management in general including the
importance of maintaining a healthy lifestyle (sleep, exercise, diet), knowing one’s own
physical and psychological limits, how to break large tasks into smaller more manageable
goals should they begin to feel overwhelmed, the value of maintaining a strong social
support system (both to turn to in times of stress, and for recreation and escape), and the
importance of recognizing signs of distress and seeking help when needed (Department
of National Defence, 2016b).
Formal study of the R2MR program within the CF, however, has been
predominantly related to course content and methods of delivery rather than the efficacy
or effectiveness of the program itself. A recent study of non-commissioned member
(NCM) recruits and officer candidates (Fikretoglu, D'Agata, Sullivan-Kwantes, &
Richards, 2017) found that both groups begin basic training (called basic military
qualifications or basic military officer’s qualifications, for NCM recruits and officer
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candidates, respectively) exhibiting considerable variation in both understanding and
acceptance of mental health issues such as general disease course (temporary, transitory,
or chronic), use of terminology (many saw this as “labelling” the individual), and mental
health service use. With regards to the latter, while both groups acknowledged that
making use of mental health professionals can lead to a more successful management of
issues that arise, over half go on to indicate that doing so would still be a “last resort”
preferring to manage the problem on their own (Fikretoglu et al., 2017). This diversity in
knowledge and understanding makes the implementation of a single standardized, forcewide education program problematic. A second longitudinal (pre-post), randomized
controlled study of recruits who received R2MR training expressed less of a decrease in
attitude towards mental health service use that those who did not receive R2MR training
(i.e., R2MR lessened the decline in attitude), however, the attitudes of both groups
decreased significantly over the course of the study. A lesser decrease in intention to use
mental health services was also found in the R2MR groups as compared to the control
group who received no mental health training, but both groups were less likely to utilized
mental health services (Fikretoglu, Liu, & Blacker, 2016).
To date, only one longitudinal study has been conducted to investigate the
effectiveness of the R2MR training program, and this was conducted in a municipal
police force (Carleton et al., 2018). The study authors found that there were no
statistically significant changes in mental health knowledge, resilience, or stress levels
from pre-test (i.e., before R2MR training) and at either 6- or 12-month follow-up testing.
Attitudes regarding stigma around mental health did improve immediately following
training, however, these improvements had dissipated at the 6- and 12-month follow-up

MORAL INJURY IN CF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN

46

points. As one of the stated objectives of the R2MR program is to increase mental health
literacy and reduce stigma, these results could be seen as indicating that more work needs
to be done to refine the R2MR process and content in order to maximize efficacy.
Studies within the CF specifically will also need to be conducted to determine if the
outcomes of training are replicated in a military sample as well.
While the CF has incorporated R2MR into all stages of the service members
training and reiterates the key concepts of Military Mental Health Continuum, Buddy
Aid, the Big 4, and various stress management techniques at both pre- and postdeployment training stages, they acknowledge that the possibility still exists that
psychological/stress injuries can occur. It is believed, however, that the repeated
exposure to the R2MR training will inculcate the core concepts and, in turn, will decrease
the severity of the injury and foster a more rapid recovery.
Ethics training provided to DND employees and CF service members
As stated earlier, current deployments bear increasingly less similarities to those
of previous generations. One strategy increasingly used by insurgents and other non-state
actors is to intentionally disregard internationally recognized rules regarding the conduct
of war such as the Geneva Conventions, Laws of Armed Combat (LOAC), and
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2004).
This can create situations that soldiers may be unprepared for (e.g., insurgent who attacks
from within a protected site like a hospital or place of worship) and as a result, may lead
to ethical conflict for the service member. As such, it is important to gain an
understanding of the type and content of training currently provided by the CF with
regards to values, ethics, and morality.
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There are three different approaches that have generally been used to create
unified defence ethics programmes (compliance-based, prevention-based, and valuesbased), each possessing different strengths and weaknesses (Department of National
Defence, 2002; Thomson, Adams, & Sartori, 2005). Compliance-based defence ethics
programmes are founded on a strict adherence to a predetermined set of rules that govern
behaviour (i.e., what can/not be done), similar to how rules of engagement (ROE) govern
a service member’s behaviour while deployed. While this type of programme generally
has the advantage of being easy to understand, amend, and apply (i.e., when in doubt,
refer back to the rules), it has some shortcomings in terms of usability. By design,
compliance-based programmes require that there be a rule for every conceivable situation
that a service member may encounter, and these rules will need to be constantly updated
as situations change (similar to how ROE can be amended based on the results of afteraction reports that detail how well a given ROE functioned or was applied in the
practice). This can eventually create to a set of rules that is so extensive, complicated,
and potentially self-conflicting that it ceases to be functional. Another shortfall of a
compliance-based approach to defence ethics relates to the fact that since it is impossible
to foresee every possible situation a service member might encounter, there will
inevitably be situations for which there is no rule for them to refer back too. Finally,
strict adherence to compliance-based ethics programmes may preclude service members
from actively reflecting upon the larger ethical issues that underly the rules which risks
the creation of an almost automatic, blind obedience to those rules. Doing so can lead to
a reductionist way of approaching ethically complex situations; if a behaviour has not
been expressly prohibited, it must not be wrong. This change in focus from “doing what
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is right” to “not doing what is wrong,” will require constant monitoring and enforcement
to prevent unethical behaviour from occurring.
Prevention-based defence ethics programmes also make significant use of rules;
however, they temper these rules with instruction concerning the ethical values that
underly them. It is believed that the inclusion of ethical values instruction will allow for
increased understanding of the rules, and in turn, more ethical behaviour. In order to
avoid the issues caused by the more blanket nature of rules in compliance-based ethics,
prevention-based ethics programmes focus the resultant rules on the areas of the
organization and mission believed to be at greatest risk of ethical violation (e.g.,
intelligence gathering, or detention camp management). In this way, the overall number
of rules (and their concomitant complexity) can be decreased, while the areas felt to be
most in need of the guidance they provide still receive it (Department of National
Defence, 2002). Applying this kind of focussed attention to only specific organizational
areas, however, can limit the inculcation of ethics throughout the military; while some
areas may need it more, all areas still need ethics education. Much as was the case with
compliance-based models, the risk exists that individuals from areas not the focus of
targeted ethical rules may come to believe that ethics is not a concern for them even if
similar issues as covered by the rules may arise (e.g., a frontline soldier who needs to
gather information from a captured enemy combatant in the field).
Values-based defence ethics programmes, of which the DND and CF Defence
Ethics Program (DEP) is one, could be seen as the opposite of compliance-based ethics;
where compliance-based models focus on the “letter of the law,” values-based programs
focus on the “spirit of the law.” As the name suggests, this model focuses on conveying

MORAL INJURY IN CF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN

49

an understanding of the underlying ethical principles (or values) that the organization
wants its members to uphold. It is believed that once individuals understand these larger
ethical principles and why they are important, they can then apply this knowledge to any
situation they may encounter and ultimately make the “right decision” as to how they
should proceed (Department of National Defence, 2002; Thomson et al., 2005). While
there is a certain amount of prima facie truth to this belief, the depth of philosophical
understanding required to allow for this type of generalization to occur may not always
be obtainable or even applicable in practice due to the subtle distinctions between
available options and viewpoints that often need to be made. This point will be discussed
in greater detail later when discussing the specifics of the Defence Ethics Program (DEP)
used by DND and CF.
It might be argued that a prevention-based ethics programme would provide the
best of both extremes (i.e., compliance- and values-based programmes), it just needs to be
applied to the whole of the military rather than focused on specific areas. In this way
service members would benefit from all the structure and guidance provided by an
existing body of rules, while gaining a level of broader understanding through knowledge
of the underpinned values, which will allow existing rules to be generalized to new
situations. In practice, however, rather than resulting in a programme that possesses “the
best of both worlds,” this enhanced prevention-based approach could result in a
programme that contains the worst of both extremes – all the potential convolution of a
rule-heavy system with all the subtle complexities inherent to the philosophical
understanding required for a system based on values.
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Defence Ethics Program (DEP)
First implemented in 1997, the Defence Ethics Program (DEP) has undergone
several refinements and adaptations, in part, to address some of the perceived shortfalls
identified in successive Defence Ethics Survey Reports (Durson, Morrow, & Beauchamp,
2005; Fraser, 2008; Messevey, Howell, Gou, & Yelle, 2011). The DEP was designed
with the objective of providing both the civilian employees of the DND and military
members of the CF (collectively referred to as the Defence Team) with a common set of
ethical principles and obligations that can be applied to any decisions that they need to
make both domestically and while deployed; “to give [the Defence Team] the tools to
know what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ and to consistently choose ‘right’” (Walker, 2013). As
the respective audiences for the DEP training are generally non-academics, the relevant
documentation and training protocols have been designed in a way so as to be most
applicable and relatable to these individuals (i.e., non-academics). Consequently, some
of the more intellectually and theoretically complex aspects of the training (e.g., the
subtle intricacies of the different philosophical principles that can underlie ethical
decision making) are only provided in sufficient enough detail so that the necessary
information to understand the concept being explained is covered.
Central to the current iteration of the DEP was the creation of the DND and CF
Code of Values and Ethics (Department of National Defence, 2012), which came into
effect in June 2012, and serves to codify the values, obligations, and behaviours expected
from all members of the Defence Team during their respective employments. It is
important to note that for CF members the contents of this document are not considered
to be guidelines, but rather orders from the Chief of Defence Staff, and as such, failure to
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comply with them makes the member subject to formal disciplinary action (Department
of National Defence, 2012). Unlike employees of the DND, members of the CF are also
expected to know and follow the customs and practices outlined in Duty with Honour:
The profession of arms in Canada (Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces
Leadership Institute, 2003), as such, the relevant contents of this document will also be
discussed in turn.
The DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics (Department of National Defence,
2012) document is broken into four independent, but interrelated chapters covering the
following topics: values and ethics; values and ethics in operations; DND and CF policy
on conflicts of interest (COI) and post-employment; and disclosure of wrongdoing. As
the latter chapters detailing policies regarding COI (e.g., use of government assets, taking
part in political activities, receiving gifts) and obligations regarding the reporting of
wrongdoing, do not apply to the operational behaviours of CF members or the potential
development or prevention of moral injury, these chapters will be omitted from this
summary.
Values and Ethics. As was stated earlier, the DEP is a values-based ethics
program designed to provide both civilian employees and members of the military with
ethical guidance for their respective roles. Summarized in a document entitled the
Statement of Defence Ethics (Figure 2.1; Department of National Defence, 2014), this
chapter outlines three general ethical principles rooted in the Canadian Constitution and
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and five specific values and behaviours
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that all members of the Defence Team are expected to follow in their professional
activities. These principles are, in order of precedence: Respect the dignity of all
persons; treat all people with respect and fairness, value diversity and the benefits it
brings, help create and maintain a healthy workplace free of harassment and
discrimination, and always work in an open, honest, and transparent fashion. Serve
Canada before self; make decisions and act at all times in the public interest, perform
duties to the highest ethical standards, avoid and prevent situations that could lead to
COI, be open, candid, and impartial in relations with decision-makers.5 This principle
has special import for members of the CF, especially when on deployment. Members of
the military, as a function of their role, are required to relinquish some of the rights that
ordinary civilians possess (ex., the right to refuse to be put into harm’s way) while
deployed, while assuming additional responsibilities that civilians do not (ex.,
maintaining national security both at home and abroad). As a result, the military tends to
hold itself and its members to a more selfless standard in that the needs of the individual
service member are frequently prioritized below the needs of the mission (which receives
highest priority) and the group (e.g., their unit/troop; next highest priority) (Gabriel,
2007). This does not, however, completely negate the service members ability to
function as an individual or their responsibilities (e.g., to their family or community)
when not actively deployed, it only requires that these responsibilities be suspended

5

For example, if a member of the DND has two conferences they can attend on the same
weekend: One conference is in their hometown, so they would be able to visit friends and family
while they are there, but the content of the conference is of limited use to the CF. The other
conference’s content would of more use to the CF but is on the other side of the country away
from the person’s family and friends. According to this principle, they are supposed to attend the
second conference – serve Canada before self.
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temporarily so that they might effectively function as part of a group.6 Finally, obey and
support lawful authority; respect the rule of law, carry out duties in accordance with
legislation, policies, and directives in a non-partisan and objective manner. As the five
values (integrity, loyalty, courage, stewardship, and excellence) and their associated
behaviours are more detailed and potentially prescriptive they have been outlined in
Table 2.2.
Defence Team members are instructed that should upholding any of these values
come in conflict with one or more of the aforementioned principles, the principles are to
take priority. This chapter also outlines the duties and obligations specific to CF
members (i.e., all members must abide by the DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics in
their actions and behaviour, leaders must to exemplify military values of the CF, and
create a healthy ethical environment that is free of reprisal, ensure that all subordinates
have every opportunity to meet their legal and ethical obligations to act, and proactively
inculcate the values of DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics), and the ramifications of
failing to comply with the outlined principals, values, and behaviours (i.e., disciplinary
action). The DEP acknowledges that the document does not cover all expected situations
that may arise, in which case, the Defence Team member is “encouraged to discuss and
resolve these matters with their immediate supervisor.” (Department of National Defence,
2012, p. 14)

6

This contextual basis of individual rights and responsibilities in the military could be compared
to how the laws (rules) governing operating a motor vehicle can vary from province to province:
When driving in Québec, one is not allowed to make a right turn on a red light, but in Ontario this
turn is legal. When a service member is on patrol, for example, their rights as an individual are
suppressed in deference to the needs of the mission; once they return to base and are off duty,
however, their rights as an individual return.
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Table 2.2
Values and expected behaviours a
Value
Expected Behaviours
Integrity
DND employees and CF members shall serve the public interest by:
1. Acting at all times with integrity, and in a manner that will bear the
closest public scrutiny; an obligation that may not be fully satisfied
by simply acting within the law.
2. Never use their official roles to inappropriately obtain an advantage
for themselves or to advantage or disadvantage others.
3. Taking all possible steps to prevent and resolve any real, apparent,
or potential conflicts of interest between their official
responsibilities and their private affairs in favour of the public
interest.
4. Acting in such a way as to maintain DND’s and the CF’s trust, as
well as that of their peers, supervisors, and subordinates.
5. Adhering to the highest ethical standards, communicating with
honesty, and avoiding deception.
6. Being dedicated to fairness and justice committed to the pursuit of
truth regardless of personal consequences.
Loyalty
DND employees and CF members shall always demonstrate respect for
Canada, its people, its parliamentary democracy, DND and the CF by:
1. Loyally carrying out the lawful decisions of their leaders and
supporting Ministers in their accountability to Parliament and
Canadians.
2. Appropriately safeguarding information and disclosing it only after
proper approval and through officially authorized means.
3. Ensuring that all personnel are treated fairly and given opportunities
for professional and skills development.
Courage
DND employees and CF members shall demonstrate courage by:
1. Facing challenges, whether physical or moral, with determination
and strength of character.
2. Making the right choice amongst difficult alternatives.
3. Refusing to condone unethical conduct.
4. Discussing and resolving ethical issues with the appropriate
authorities.
Stewardship DND employees and CF members shall responsibly use resources by:
1. Effectively and efficiently using the public money, property, and
resources managed by them.
2. Considering the present and long-term effects that their actions
have on people and the environment.
3. Acquiring, preserving, and sharing knowledge and information as
appropriate.
4. Providing purpose and direction to motivate personnel both
individually and collectively to strive for the highest standards in
performance.
5. Ensuring resources are in place to meet future challenges.
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Excellence

DND employees and CF members shall demonstrate professional
excellence by:
1. Continually improving the quality of policies, programs, and
services they provide to Canadians and other parts of the public
sector.
2. Fostering or contributing to a work environment that promotes
teamwork, learning, and innovation.
3. Providing fair, timely, efficient, and effective services that respect
Canada’s official languages.
Note: Adapted from (Department of National Defence, 2012). a Italics mine.

Values and Ethics in Operations. Due to the brevity of this particular chapter, it
has been quoted in its entirety below.7
This chapter is to be developed by the CRS [Chief of Review Staff] through the
Director Defence Ethics Program in partnership with Level One stakeholders
from the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence that are
significantly involved in military operations at home and abroad. (Department of
National Defence, 2012, p. 15)
In the absence of the guidance that would be provided by this chapter, CF members are
directed to follow the remaining sections of DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics
(Department of National Defence, 2012), Duty with Honour: The profession of arms in
Canada (Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003), and
related key doctrines (S. Hare, personal communication, 10 February 2017).

Values and Ethics training specific to the CF. As stated earlier, members of the
CF are also expected to conform to the customs and practices of the CF (collectively

7

The most recent correspondence with the Manager for Programme Development of the DEP
confirms that, as of May 2018, Chapter 2 – Values and Ethics in Operations is still in
development and has not been finalized. No date as to when this finalization might occur was
possible at that time.
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referred to as the military ethos) outlined in Duty with Honour: The profession of arms in
Canada (Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003) as
part of the DEP. This military ethos is formed of three fundamental components: Beliefs
and expectation inherent to military service (unlimited liability, fighting spirit,
discipline, and teamwork). The most unique to the military of these expectations is the
concept of unlimited liability; the understanding that, as members of the military, they
could be ordered into harm’s way and potentially lose their lives and that refusing such a
deployment is not an option. This expectation of unlimited liability can extend to the
individual’s right to self-defence as the CF does not view this right as an absolute right,
but rather a right that can be curtailed. For example, service members cannot sacrifice
someone else to save themselves, flee during a firefight, or switch sides if it seems that
their position will be overrun. The acceptance of this possible need to self-sacrifice
forms the cornerstone of the edict “mission, own troops, self,” which is integral to
military’s conception of duty. Building on this edict, fighting spirit is what “imparts to
individuals the moral, physical, and intellectual qualities necessary to operate in
conditions of great danger … Fighting spirit is important to act decisively – including the
use of lawful, lethal force against an adversary – during combat operations” (p. 26). The
second component, Canadian values, is reflected in the three principles outlined in the
Statement of Defence Ethics (Department of National Defence, 2014) (i.e., Respect the
dignity of all persons, Serve Canada before self, and Obey and support lawful authority).
The final component, Canadian military values, outlines the personal qualities that the
CF believe are integral to its members to ensure their success. Some of these values
overlap with the values outlined in the Statement of Defence Ethics (loyalty, integrity,
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courage), while others are unique (duty, honour), all however are defined within Duty
with Honour from a distinctly military point of view. Loyalty, as well as reflecting an
allegiance to Canada and its people, also entails a faithfulness to one’s comrades that is
reciprocal and based on a mutual trust in one another, regardless of rank. Integrity
builds on the previous definition by stipulating that members must be committed to
meeting their professional obligations while remaining responsible and accountable for
their actions. While a CF member is required to follow all lawful authority, which would
include orders given by a superior officer, if they disagree with an order because they
believe it to be unethical, for example, they need not follow it. Should they choose to
disobey the order, however, they then must also bear the responsibility for their actions,
including whatever punishments for disobedience might be applied. Courage is
characterized as being a personal quality that allows one to do what’s right or what needs
to be done without regard for the personal cost of taking that action, and as such, is seen
as a function of the individuals’ willpower and resolve. The principles of “serve Canada
before self” and “obey and support lawful authority” form the pillars of the military value
embodied in the concept of duty; providing purpose and direction to CF members.
Finally, the most central military value, honour, is likely the hardest to define as it is an
abstract concept that can be seen as including all of the values, beliefs, and expectations
important to the military ethos: if one does one’s duty with loyalty, integrity, and
courage, and upholds the principles outlined in the Statement of Defence Ethics, then one
possesses honour. Honour is what “allows warriors to hold onto their humanity while
experiencing the horrors of war.” (Thompson, Thompson, & Adams, 2008, p. 4)
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DEP ethical decision-making model
While the DEP remains a predominantly a values-based programme, it also
incorporates an ethical decision-making model adapted from the Army Ethics Program
(Thomson, Hall, & Adams, 2010; Walker, 2013). The model as taught by the DEP
consists of four stages (perception, judgement, decision, action) designed to create a more
structured decision process for members to use when confronted by a potentially ethically
challenging situation. Part of the training includes a set of questions to help focus
trainees on the relevant information to be considered at each stage of the decision-making
process. The first stage, perception, involves the recognition that a potential ethical
issue exists and will need to be addressed. From a practical point of view, if no ethical
issue is recognized, the decision-making model stops. This step requires the individual to
draw upon their knowledge of the military ethos, mission requirements (e.g., ROE,
mission objectives), immediate environment, as well as individual factors (e.g., own
beliefs, values, attitudes) to view the situation from the broadest perspective possible. Is
there anything ethically wrong in the situation? Who may be harmed/benefit from this
situation? What are the relevant mission factors relating to this situation? It is believed
that the inculcation of all these factors through both training and pre-deployment
preparation makes the perception stage almost automatic (Thomson et al., 2010).
In the second stage, judgement, the individual refocuses their attention on the
specific situation they are confronted with. This multi-step process begins with an
ordered comparison of the current situation against core ethical principles and values
outlined in the Statement of Defence Ethics (Department of National Defence, 2014) and
military values to check if any of these have been violated. The next step involves the
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generation of alternate courses of action and then evaluating these alternatives according
to their various risks and benefits, both to the individuals involved and the CF as an
organization, using different ethical approaches to decision making. The objective of
using these different ethical approaches is to determine: What is the right thing to do, and
why? What things might prevent a person from doing the right thing? Who might one
turn to if one has difficulty doing the right thing? (Thomson et al., 2010)
As part of a mandatory 1-day course in applied ethics conducted by the DEP
annually, CF members are taught four different approaches to making ethical decisions:
rules-based, consequence-based, self-interest-based, and care-based, and the respective
strengths and weaknesses of each (Walker, 2013). As taught, rules-based or
deontological (Keating, 2015) approaches are based on Kantian philosophy, specifically
the first two formulations of the categorical imperative (i.e., if the decision applies in this
case, it must apply in all similar cases; individuals are ends in themselves and should not
be treated as mere means to an end). Accordingly, following a rules-based approach, the
individual seeks to determine if there is a rule, regulation, order that would be applicable
in this situation; these rules are treated as absolutes. Some of the limitations of a rulesbased approach outlined include that it does not allow for decisions to be made using
methods other than reason (e.g., compassion, love, generosity) and that no rules are
absolute; there are exceptions to almost all rules. A consequence-based (Baker, 2015a)
approach is based on Utilitarianism, where it is the consequences of a given action that
determine the action’s rightness or wrongness. Specifically, the action that leads to the
greatest good for the greatest number is considered to be the correct action to take; the
needs of the many will outweigh the needs of the few. Strict adherence to this approach,
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however, would seem to justify the use of unethical actions providing that the resultant
outcome is for the greatest good for the greatest number (the end justifies the means).
This approach also fails to take into consideration any past or present obligations that an
individual may have, instead its only concern is with future outcomes.8 In contrast,
legitimate self-interest-based (Baker, 2015b; Walker, 2013) approaches are concerned
with inalienable rights and freedoms of the individual and uses the maintenance of these
rights and freedoms as the basis for making a decision (i.e., will a particular course of
action violate someone else’s rights or freedoms). Similar to the case with rule-based
approaches, individual’s right must be treated as absolutes for this approach to work
consistently. Consequently, legitimate self-interest could allow the rights and freedoms
of the individual to have more weight in decision-making than what may be in the best
interest of the group; the rights of the one can outweigh the needs of the many. Finally,
care-based approaches focus on how a given act will affect the relationships between
individuals and groups by altering the foundational elements of that relationship such as
trust, honesty, and compassion. Care-based approaches, however, provide no guidance
for how to address situations where maintaining positive relationships with one group
will cause conflict with relationships with other groups (e.g., to be compassionate and

8

For example, if intelligence reports indicate that a group of insurgents are going to invade a
village and a platoon is deployed to defend the village and its residents [current obligation].
However, the officer in charge of that platoon reasons that instead of actively defending the
village (which would put his own troops at risk, as well as possibly allow some insurgents to
escape) they could instead evacuate the villagers and then wait for the insurgents to invade and
set up camp. Once they had done so, he could then call in an airstrike on the village and
eliminate that insurgent threat completely. While this alternate course of action would require the
sacrificing of the village proper, it would also prevent this group of insurgents from invading any
future villages and causing harm to the inhabitants [maximize future gains at cost of current
obligation].
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supportive of one individual requires that another individual be lied to; “steal from Peter
to pay Paul” – good for Peter, bad for Paul).
There is another method for ethical decision making available, however, the CF
does not include this as part of its DEP program: case-based reasoning. In case-based
reasoning (or casuistry) the individual begins by determining the facts of the situation
they are presented with (not a theoretical foundation as was the case in previous decision
models) and from these extracts what they feel are the appropriate features that need to be
considered. They then identify prior cases that are similar to the current situation in
terms of these important facts, then extracts from those prior cases the rules that were
used to come to a solution. These rules are then applied to the current situation to come
to a decision. This type of reasoning is often used in legal proceedings when lawyers
refer to precedent setting cases to show a parallel to situations in their current case. There
are two potential problems with using this form of decision making, however. First, it
draws upon anecdotal evidence and, as such, requires generalizations to be made which
may overlook important differences between situations (similar does not mean the same;
what was the right decision then may not be the right decision now). Second, for casebased reasoning to work, there needs to have been at least one similar prior case to refer
back to for guidance. In the absence of a prior case, the individual is forced to make use
of one the aforementioned theoretical foundations (i.e., rules-based, consequence-based,
etc.) to determine the correct course of action. These shortcomings may be part of the
reason that the DND and CF do not offer case-based reasoning as part of their DEP
program.
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According to the DEP model, once the individual has weighed the risks and
benefits of their alternative options they must come to a decision as to how they will
proceed, since “not acting is not an option” (Thomson et al., 2010, p. 27), and then act on
that decision. Should individuals find themselves unable to come to a decision as to what
is the correct course of action, or if they are uncertain as to the decision they have chosen,
DEP recommends that they should discuss the situation with others who may be more
qualified or trusted to decide to assist them.
It is important to note that while the stated goal for the DEP training program is to
assist Defence Team members with “making the right choice,” in practice it does not
provide any specific direction as to which approach should be used in which situations
(e.g., in matters of life or death, always use a consequences-based approach), as a result,
there could potentially be multiple “right choices” depending on which approach a
service member elected to use at the judgement stage. Similarly, the DEP model also
does not provide direction with regards to how to select the correct action when different
approaches yield outcomes that conflict with each other (i.e., there is no hierarchy to the
approaches). Returning to the example of the officer who ordered the airstrike on the
village, his selected action was rooted in consequences-based reasoning, however, by
doing so he would violate the villagers right to life and freedom (legitimate-self-interest),
it would also likely sacrifice the required relationship between the military and the
civilian population that is required for ultimate mission success (care-based approach). It
seems that, in practice, rather than providing a structured process from which service
members can more easily make ethical decisions, the decision-making model as it is
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taught in the DEP may actually serve to make determining what the “right choice” is
more difficult.
Application of the DEP ethical decision-making model to PMIE
The first 2 scenarios are not true accounts of actual situations, but they do reflect
situations in which members of the CF may find themselves while performing their
duties. The final scenario is based on the findings of a DND/CF Board of Inquiry report
relating to an actual situation experienced during a recent CF deployment overseas
(Department of National Defence, 2016a). After each scenario the decision-making
process taught to CF members will be applied, and the following three questions will be
addressed: How well does the DEP provided training address this scenario? Could this
situation reflect a PMIE? Does the provided training address the potentially morally
injurious aspects of the scenario?

Scenario 1: Terrorist attack
A fighter pilot is patrolling the skies over Toronto in response to a recent
terrorist attack that occurred in New York City involving commercial
airliners that had been hijacked by terrorists. The fighter pilot has been
issued Rules of Engagement (ROE) that allow him to engage and bring
down any highjacked aircraft that poses a threat to a civilian target. The
pilot has been advised that 5 terrorists have hijacked a small commuter
aircraft with approximately 30 passengers and crew on board and is
currently heading towards downtown Toronto. The pilot has just detected
the aircraft, which is heading towards a major sports stadium where
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approximately 30-thousand people are attending a baseball game. The pilot
attempts to contact his control station to inform them of the plane’s location
and receive further instructions but, due to communication issues, is unable
to do so. The pilot then attempts to contact the hijacked aircraft but
received no response. It is clear to the pilot that the aircraft is heading
towards the stadium and he must engage it immediately to prevent it
crashing into the stadium.

Perception: Is there anything ethically wrong in the situation? Who may be
harmed/benefit from this situation? What are the relevant mission factors relating to this
situation? Yes, there is an ethical transgression possible, specifically, his requirement to
uphold his mission (protect civilian targets) possibly puts him at odds with the
requirement to uphold the principle of respecting the dignity of all people in that his
actions or inactions will directly affect, that is, the lives of both the 30 passengers and
crew on the plane and the 30-thousand spectators in the stadium. Judgement: What are
the alternatives the fighter pilot has available to him? What are the ramifications of each
of these options? The pilot has four options available to him: engage the plane, do not
engage the plane, talk to his command to get more information, or talk to the plane’s pilot
to try and negotiate a safe landing somewhere. As mentioned earlier, not making a
decision is not an option for a CF member, but even if it were, in this case, to not decide
would yield the same results (i.e., plane hitting stadium) as deciding to not engage the
plane. The pilot has already tried the latter two options to no avail, which leaves him
with either engaging the plane or not engaging the plane, both of which violate the first
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ethical principle of respecting the dignity of all people. If he elects to engage the
commuter aircraft and shoot it down, he’d be violating the right to life of the passengers,
crew, and terrorists; however, if he does not shoot the plane down, he is risking the lives
of the 30-thousand people in the stadium. The pilot could conclude that, whichever
course of action he chooses (engage or not engage the plane), the lives of the passengers
and crew on the commuter plane will be lost, so their lives should not be a factor in his
decision. However, this would imply that their lives have no value and that they are
expendable, which would also violate the first principle (Respect the dignity of all
people). Since both options available to the pilot will result in the deaths of people, they
both violate key components of the ethical decision-making models taught to CF
members: Rule-based/Kantian ethics would be violated in that to engage the plane would
result in the passengers and crew being treated as if they are mere means to an end (i.e.,
saving the 30-thousand in the stadium), and doing so would then necessitate that all
future planes be shot down (or not shot down) should similar situations be present.
Legitimate-self-interest reasoning would be violated in that the rights of the individuals to
live is violated, and care-based reasoning is violated in that the trust of the passengers and
crew that they are safe is lost as well as shooting the plane down could be seen as not
showing compassion to their plight (i.e., they are in a situation not of their choosing, yet
they will end up paying with their lives).
In contrast, if the pilot were to utilize a consequences-based ethical reasoning
process, while engaging the plane would lead to the inevitable deaths of the people on
board, to not engage the plane might lead to the deaths of a larger number of people in the
stadium should the plane crash there (i.e., only a single individual needs to die in the
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stadium to tip the ethical balance in favour of engaging the aircraft), so engaging the
plane would seem to be the correct choice for the pilot to make. As well, to engage the
plane would also allow the pilot to fulfil his responsibilities to the second and third
principles of Serving Canada before Self, and Obeying Lawful Authority. Not engaging
the plane would violate both of these principles in that it would put the lives of Canadians
at risk and the pilot would be disobeying his orders to eliminate threats to civilian targets,
respectfully.
The pilot having now decided upon his potential course of action (engage the
plane), must check to see if taking this action would violate any of the values and ethics
outlined in the Statement of Defence Ethics (integrity, loyalty, courage, stewardship, and
excellence) or the additional values of duty and honour key to the military ethos. While
this decision wouldn’t violate most of the held values, the military value of honour may
be violated, in that honour in part insists that “all non-combatants be protected and
accorded the dignity and other considerations that their situations may entitle them to”
(Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003, p. 32).
Upholding this value, however, would raise the same conflicts as outlined for the first
principle (respecting the dignity of all people), as the harm caused to civilians is
inevitable if the pilot is to fulfil his mission requirements (protection of the Canadian
populace), which he must, or he violates the third principle (obeying lawful authority).
Action: Engage the commuter plane before it can crash into stadium.
How well does the DEP training address this scenario? If the scenario was viewed as an
abstract, thought exercise, the DEP training could be applied fairly easily; the pilot had
all the information he would need to make his decision, and he would have received
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sufficient training to weight the pros and cons of various choices and ultimately be able to
come to the “right answer” that the training demands. A major obstacle even in this
application, however, stems from the nature of the decision being made; it will result in
the death of innocent civilians either way. It is an operational reality for members of the
military that their decisions can sometimes be the difference between life and death for
themselves and others, and as such, the first principle (respect the dignity of all persons)
will be violated. From a practical point of view, however, the DEP model (perceive,
judge, decide, act) is too time consuming to actually be applied as taught to this situation.
While the pilot is trying to generate alternative courses of action, weighing the pros and
cons of each, then comparing of these each of these options against the set of principles
and values prescribed in the Statement of Defence Ethics to be sure that none of these are
violated, and trying to resolve any violations that might have arisen, the commuter plane
is getting closer and closer to the shore and the concomitant risk to the population is ever
increasing and his window to act with minimal casualties is closing.
Could this situation reflect a PMIE? The scenario described could still lead to the fighter
pilot experiencing a moral injury, even though they did exactly what they were trained to
do, how they were trained to do it. This is because the potential for injury stems not from
what they did, but what they feel they should have done and what aspects of the situation
they ultimately choose to focus on. By engaging the commuter plane and shooting it
down the pilot may focus on the 30-thousand people in the stadium that were potentially
saved, and the elimination of the associated pain and suffering their families would have
experienced from their deaths. Alternately, the pilot might instead focus on the lives of
the innocent people on the plane who died as a direct result of the decision and associated
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action he took. Maybe if he had shot somewhere different, he would have crippled the
plane and it would have been forced to ditch in the water. Maybe if he had tried to
contact the plane just one more time he might have gotten through and been able to
negotiate with the terrorists. Ultimately, the number of ways the pilot could reinterpret
the situation and the choice he made is limited only by the depth and degree to which he
wishes to re-examine it.
Does the training provided to CF members affect the possible development of moral
injury in this scenario? Based on the documents available to review, there appears to be
minimal training provided that would affect either the pilot’s resilience to moral injury
(i.e., to increase resistance to developing it), or their ability to deal with the aftermath of
the choice he made.

Scenario 2: Child Soldier
A unit is on foot patrol through a village where intelligence indicates that
insurgents have set up camp. As they enter the town square they come
under fire from the doorways and windows of the surrounding buildings. A
private opens fire at one of these doorways and the shooting from that
location stops. The firefight continues for a while longer, but eventually
ends, and the unit begins to sweep the buildings for remaining insurgents.
The private is the first through the door she shot at and she immediately
comes across the body of a boy, no more than 11 or 12 years old, who has
been shot; an assault rifle is laying by his side. The private realizes that she
is likely the person who shot him.
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Perception: Is there anything ethically wrong in the situation? Who may be
harmed/benefit from this situation? What are the relevant mission factors relating to this
situation? Whether or not there is anything ethically wrong with the situation depends on
whether the child-soldier is seen to be a “child” or a “soldier.” If they are viewed as a
child, then yes there is something ethically wrong with the killing of children; however, if
they are viewed as a soldier, then the killing of an enemy combatant during a firefight is
acceptable, and there is nothing ethically wrong. At the time the decision was made (i.e.,
during the firefight), however, the child-soldier was attempting to cause grievous harm to
members of the unit and in this role, would be considered to have been a soldier.
How well does the DEP training address this scenario? As the DEP program teaches a
model designed to assist with decision making, and the decision to engage the hostile had
already been made and acted upon during the firefight, the model as taught is not actually
applicable to this situation. Similar to the scenario with the hijacked plane, time for
evaluation of possible alternative courses of action was not available as any hesitation in
a firefight on her part could have led to the death or serious injury of unit members or
herself at the hands of an insurgent. Part of the reason that soldiers devote so much time
drilling with their weapons and practicing tactics is to make their actions and reactions
during stressful situations automatic; identify threat, eliminate threat. The DEP is by
design a thought-driven process, and as such, could potentially be seen as a hinderance
rather than a help in a firefight in that it could derail the tactical training service members
have received and slow their reactions.
Could this situation reflect a PMIE? This scenario contains within it the potential for a
conflict between the private’s beliefs about appropriate actions that can be taken during a
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firefight (identify threat, eliminate threat), what her duty is with regards to children
(children are to be protected), and the rules of war including the Geneva conventions
which prohibit the use of children in combat ("Geneva Conventions," 1949); so the child
should not have been in the firefight at all. Again, a moral injury is not caused by the
traumatic or transgressive event itself, but rather the individual’s processing of the event.
The insurgent that she shot during the firefight turned out to be a child, and if her
reprocessing of the event becomes fixated on that aspect of the situation, to the exclusion
of the other aspects (e.g., he was trying to harm her and the members of her unit), this
scenario has the potential to become a PMIE. If she manages to not fixate on the
insurgent’s age, however, the likelihood of her developing a moral injury may be
lessened.
Does the training provided to CF members affect the possible development of moral
injury in this scenario? Based on the documents available to review, there appears to be
minimal training provided that would affect either the soldier’s resilience to moral injury
(i.e., to increase resistance to developing it), or their ability to deal with the aftermath of
the choice she made.

Scenario 3: Abuse of a minor9
While deployed as part of a NATO contingent to [country], a group of
soldiers witness what appears to be the sexual assault of a minor by
members of the [Country] National Security Force. Not sure what they are
allowed to do in such situations under their Rules of Engagement (ROE),

9

Adapted from (Department of National Defence, 2016a)
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they report what they observed to their commanding officer. The
commander informs them that others have told him that they too have
witnessed actual or suspected sexual assaults by members of the [Country]
National Security Force, but the rules currently in place were unclear as to
how they should proceed in this situation: While the CF Use of Force
Manual would allow soldiers to intervene if a serious crime was being
committed, sex with a minor didn’t meet the “serious bodily harm” criteria
required for them to do so. This was in part due to the use in the CF Use of
Force Manual of outdated “rape terminology” (i.e., rape only applies when
a man subjects a woman who is not his wife to sexual intercourse against
her will), which is not as inclusive as the term “sexual assault” which
would apply to everyone irrespective of age, gender, or marital status. As
well, Canadian Forces (CF) members have no authority to enforce
International, Canadian, or [country] laws against [country] citizens; this
is the responsibility of the [country] government. Finally, there was no
procedure in place at the time regarding reporting national-on-national
crimes to the [country] government (i.e., how to report it, and who to report
it to, since the suspected abusers were representatives of the country’s
government, sometimes including members of law enforcement), and even if
there were procedures, such reporting is only required if the human rights
abuses would fall under violations of the Law of Armed Combat (LOAC),
which sexual assault of a minor would not, since it’s not combat related.
The commander reminds the soldiers that in order for the larger mission to
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be successful, the NATO forces need to be able to work alongside the
[Country] National Security Force as they will eventually be the group
responsible for the nation’s security once the NATO mission ends and the
troops have withdrawn. The soldiers leave their commanders office no
clearer on how they should proceed should they encounter a similar
situation again. While there doesn’t seem to be any rules that would
prevent them from intervening in the future, if they chose to do so, their
intervention would carry no legal weight under the rules that did exist and,
as a result, there would be nothing that would prevent the abuser(s) from
doing it again when the soldiers were not around to witness it. As well,
intervening might put the larger mission goals in jeopardy due to the
potential for loss of trust between the NATO forces and the [Country]
National Security Force.

Perception: Is there anything ethically wrong in the situation? Who may be
harmed/benefit from this situation? What are the relevant mission factors relating to this
situation? Yes, conflict exists between what CF members believe they should do
(intervene), and what it appears they can do under the rules in place. The child/children
being abused by the National Security Forces are being harmed by the activity, but to
intervene may be ineffective and possibly jeopardize the larger mission by turning the
National Security Force against the NATO force members. Judgement: What are the
alternatives that these soldiers have available to them? What are the ramifications of
each of these options? The soldiers have two options available to them, since not
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intervening and not reporting the incident are not options: intervene in the situation
directly to stop the abuse should they witness it again and report the incident to their
commander, or not intervene but still report it to their commander (observe and report).
If they elect to intervene, they will fulfil the first principle (respect dignity of all people)
since they will be stopping the assault on a child, and they will be upholding Canadian
values and be acting in the public’s interest (serve Canada before self). However, if they
elected to follow a rules-based approach, the rules that they are to operate under while
deployed to [country] do not seem to support their intervention, but neither do they
expressly prohibit it, so it is unclear if intervening would or would not violate the
principle of obeying lawful authority; overall, a rules-based approach would likely not be
useful in this situation. If the soldiers elected to use a legitimate self-interest approach,
based on the fact that children have a right to be free of abuse, this may also be of limited
utility. As part of their pre-deployment mission orientation, CF members receive
information about some of the cultural differences that are present in the countries they
will be deployed to (Department of National Defence, 2016a). For example, the status of
women and what constitutes culturally acceptable behaviour towards them in [country]
differs dramatically from what is considered acceptable in most western countries who
would have supplied NATO troops; information regarding what would constitute an
illegal act with regards to minors was not covered, however, so it is unknown to the
soldiers what the rights of the child are in [country].10 As well, to intervene to stop the
behaviour could conceivably be considered to be disrespectful of the country’s culture,

10

According to the DND/CF Board of Inquiry report (Department of National Defence, 2016a),
any sexual act with a minor is illegal under international, Canadian, [country], and Islamic law.
CF members, however, still have no authority to enforce these laws against [country] citizenry, as
this is the responsibility of the [country] government.
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beliefs, and practices (which would also violate a prime tenet of a care-based approach)
which could in turn lead to a possible loss of trust between the CF/NATO troops and
civilian nationals and the National Security Force. Using a consequences-based
approach, while it might be possible to save the child being abused for the moment, the
future consequences of doing so are unknown. Since the CF members have no means to
keep the child safe after intervening (i.e., they cannot take the child away), they will need
to release the child again which could lead to their being subjected to even more
extensive abuse later on when the CF members are not around in retaliation for the
soldiers’ interference. As the National Security Force members doing the abusing are
unlikely to appreciate the NATO soldiers intervening, this could create animosity
between the two forces and put NATO soldiers at risk when they are in the field together
with National Security Forces (e.g., retaliation by National Security Force members in the
form of slower response times, indiscriminate shooting leading to “friendly fire”
incidents, or “fragging” – the deliberate killing of one soldier by another on the same
side), as well as increase the potential for loss of civilian lives. This possible loss of trust
with the National Security Force and potential for increased risk of harm would run
counter to the stated mission goals, which could be seen as violating lawful authority
(principle three).
If the soldiers elect to not intervene directly but instead only report what they
witnessed to their commander, this may or may not fulfil the first two principles
depending on how the commander chooses to proceed. If the commander elects to take
direct action, for example, by issuing orders regarding what the soldiers should do in this
situation, it would then allow all subordinate soldiers to meet all three of the required
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ethical principles since they would have a clear, lawful authority (i.e., order) to obey. 11
However, the commanding officer is then putting themselves in the potentially ethically
conflicted position; if they issue an order (be that to intervene or not intervene) that is not
supported by the any of the established rules that the mission is to operate under, they
may not be upholding the principle of obeying lawful authority, which could lead to the
same aforementioned issues that may affect the mission. If the commander elects not to
take a direct action (e.g., just file a report with his own superiors), then their subordinates
are in the same potentially conflicted position as outlined previously. Action: As the
actions taken or not taken in this situation can have potential wide-reaching repercussions
(e.g., for the mission, the relationships with the local citizenry and the country’s
government), the power to select the appropriate action may be beyond the abilities of the
front-line soldiers. This would make deferring to their superior (until clear direction can
be given) the ethically correct action to take. Alternatively, since the principles taught as
part of the DEP are listed in order of precedent, with respecting the dignity of all people
being foremost, the soldiers could see this as indicating that they would need to intervene
to stop the abuse should they witness it in the future (the child must be protected), even
though doing so may carry no legal weight and cause issues with completing their
mission, and they may be called upon to answer for their choice should it be challenged
later on.

11

This was what happened in one of the situations that this case is based upon; the commanding
officer (CO) issued an order stating that if similar events were witnessed, service members were
to intervene and report the act up the chain of command. Unfortunately, this CO only issued the
orders to his troops verbally so there was no official record of the orders and they were not passed
on to the next group of soldiers deployed to the area (Department of National Defence, 2016a).
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How well does the DEP training address this scenario? Unlike was the case in the
previous two scenarios where the fighter pilot and the private were empowered to make
the choices they did, in this scenario, even if they could utilize the DEP decision-making
process they were taught, their ability to take the action decided upon is in question.
After they came upon the scene initially the soldiers were unclear as to how they should
proceed, so they elected to discuss the situation with someone who was more qualified to
decide, their commanding officer, as they are instructed to by the DEP. Issues arise in
that their commanding officer was unable to provide them with direction since the
assorted rules that should dictate appropriate behaviour are confused and vague. In this
way, the difficulty in implementation does not actually stem from the DEP decisionmaking process itself, but a lack of useful information to draw upon to make the decision.
If, for example, the ROE, LOAC, or CF Use of Force Manual empowered soldiers to
intervene and lay charges against the abusers in these situations, then the soldiers would
be able to determine what they should do using the DEP process and prevent the abuse
from continuing.
Could this situation reflect a PMIE? As presented, the vagueness and confusion created
by the ROE and other rules currently in place may directly conflict with what the soldiers
see as their duty, that is to protect civilians from harm. The way the rules are structured
now, however, creates a difficult situation: if they intervene, they save the child for the
moment but possibly risk jeopardizing the mission, which could cost lives in the future.
If they do not intervene, the greater mission may succeed but it is done at the physical,
mental, and emotional cost of the children who will likely continue to be abused. This
conflict could lead to the development of a moral injury for those involved as the soldiers
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may view it as a betrayal of their personal and professional principles by those who wrote
the rules (e.g., NATO or the CF) and potentially their commanding officer for reinforcing
those rules, as the rules force the soldiers to choose between doing “what’s right” and
fulfilling their mission.
Does the provided training address the potentially morally injurious aspects of the
scenario? Based on the documents available to review, there appears to be minimal
training provided that would affect either the soldier’s resilience to moral injury (i.e., to
increase resistance to developing it), or their ability to deal with the aftermath of the
choices made.
Observations relating to CF preparation for PMIE
The review of the obtained documents relating to the training provided by the
DND and CF around psychological tolls that exposure to PMIE can have on service
members during deployment and the extent to which the ethics and values training
provided are applicable to potentially morally injurious situations has led to the following
observations. First, and possibly most importantly, the key reference document that
outlines the standards against which members of the DND and CF ethical behaviour will
be judged, the DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics (Department of National
Defence, 2012), is missing the chapter that relates specifically to ethical behaviour while
on operations; likely the most important chapter for members of the CF. Since this
document came into force in June 2012, members of the CF have taken part in over 50
operations (Department of National Defence, 2018) including 11 operations to areas
where encountering hostile resistance is possible (e.g., the UN Missions to the Republic
of South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo). The Government of
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Canada’s recent decisions to supply troops in support of the UN Peacekeeping Mission in
Mali and the NATO mission to Iraq to combat Daesh (a.k.a., the Islamic State in Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL) and Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)), would bring this total to
13 operations. A recent report from the Secretary-General of the UN has identified both
these countries as locations where children have been used as combatants (United
Nations General Assembly Security Council, 2017), which dramatically increases the
likelihood that children will be killed by CF members in the course of their duties. This
same report documents that the recruitment and use of children in combat roles is not
limited to just insurgent groups; there were 11 UN-verified cases attributed to the Afghan
National Defence and Security Forces in 2015 alone. As stated earlier, in the absence of
the direction provided by the missing chapter, CF members are instructed to utilize the
contents of the remaining sections of the DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics, Duty
with Honour: The profession of arms in Canada (Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian
Forces Leadership Institute, 2003), and related key doctrines to guide their behaviour
while on operations (S. Hare, personal communication, 10 February 2017). As
demonstrated in Scenario 3 (Abuse of a minor), following this direction is not always as
straightforward as it should be when there are multiple sets of rules in place
simultaneously. This can be particularly problematic when forces are involved in
multinational missions, like those conducted by the UN and NATO, where service
members are governed by overarching mission rules and mandates in addition to the rules
set out by their respective countries; rules which may conflict with each other (e.g.,
Country A views “waterboarding” as a legitimate technique to gain information from
captured insurgents, while Country C considers the act to be torture, which makes its use
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forbidden). Another example of the kinds of conflicts that having multiple systems of
rules operating at the same time might be the UN mission to Rwanda. The UN mission
was to be a Chapter VI peacekeeping mission (i.e., to assist parties in settling intra- and
international disputes through the use of peaceful means such as negotiation, arbitration,
and conciliation; (United Nations)), which would mean that the UN peacekeepers
deployed were to remain neutral. This need for neutrality, however, also limits
peacekeepers use of force to personal protection and prevents them from intervening to
prevent harm to the country’s citizenry; as doing so could be interpreted as “taking sides”
in the conflict. So, if Scenario 3 were to have happened on a UN Chapter VI
peacekeeping mission where the National Security Force was abusing a child from the
other side of the conflict, the soldiers would have been expressly prohibited from
intervening to stop the assault, irrespective of the instruction provided by the DEP around
respecting the dignity of all people, which could create a PMIE for those soldiers
involved.
Related to this first observation, what guidelines are provided to CF members
around making ethical decisions seem to have limited utility in an operational
environment. Problems such as these (i.e., where models work well in theory or in the
abstract, but not in actual application) are not unique to the military but can also be seen
in such areas as hospital bioethics as well. While all three types of defence ethics
programmes discussed earlier provide guidance regarding how to make an ethical
decision, in contrast with compliance- and prevention-based systems, the values-based
system utilized by the DND and CF is more time intensive and knowledge dependant.
Both compliance- and prevention-based programs provide a structure for the individual to
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refer back to, which can focus the decision-making process on the relevant core elements
that are key to determining what the “right decision” might be; there is only one possible
approach to use to interpret the situation. While these systems have their own flaws,
those flaws have more to do with the practical issues associated with using a given
process (e.g., the sheer number of rules required, or the specificity of who those the rules
apply to) than the decision-making process itself. With a values-based system, in
contrast, it is the decision-making process itself that leads to the bottleneck. As shown in
Scenarios 1 and 2 (Terrorist Attack, and Child Soldier, respectively), operational
decisions often need to be made in a near instantaneous manner as dire consequences
may result from hesitation. In order to properly apply the decision-making model taught
in the DEP, the service member needs both a detailed understanding of the philosophical
underpinnings of each approach (rules-, consequence-, legitimate self-interest-, and carebased) so that they can attempt to select the best one, and the time to weight the
respective advantages and disadvantages of each possible course of action according to
each of these approaches.
Another potential shortcoming of the DEP process is that it provides no specific
direction to the individual. Consequently, the decision the individual makes can be
subjective; another individual confronted with the same situation and information could
potentially come to a different decision, and both individuals could be equally correct, or
incorrect, as the case may be. This less than ideal model fit for operational environments
may stem in part from the DEP training being designed to be applicable to both civilian
(DND) and military (CF) members of the Defence Team, which may ignore the
differences inherent in the roles the two groups perform (bureaucratic/governmental
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versus combat operations) and the possible ramifications of making the wrong choice
(DND – money is wasted, versus CF – people may die). For non-operational ethical
decision-making situations where time limitations do not factor in in the same way (e.g.,
should someone report a colleague for taking stationary supplies from the office for their
own use), or for judging the appropriateness of an operational decision after the fact (e.g.,
in a court-martial setting), the model taught may have some applicability. This criticism
has been raised by others (e.g., Sanschagrin, 2006; Woodgate, 2004) about previous
versions of the DEP and may partially underpin the current redevelopment of the
program, and the associated delay in the development of the chapter specifically related
to operational ethics, to make it more operationally applicable.
From a practical point of view, the decision-making process has potential
limitations when applied to situations that would constitute PMIEs. First, the process
requires that the individual have all the information required to make their decision
available to them at the time they need to make the decision. If Scenario 1 (Terrorist
attack) were rewritten such that the fighter pilot was advised that terrorists stole the
commuter plane but there are no passengers or crew on board, then the right decision
becomes clearer: he should engage the plane and eliminate the threat. If the scenario was
rewritten such that the pilot was advised that the commuter plane posed no threat, and he
was able to confirm this with the plane’s pilot via radio, his decision also becomes
clearer: do not engage the plane and allow it instead to land. What about if the pilot had
no information about who is on the plane or what their intentions are, and he cannot raise
them on the radio? The plane could conceivably contain only civilians (no threat),
civilians and terrorists (threat), or only terrorists (threat), the fighter pilot has no
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information on which to base his decision. In this situation, the fighter pilot would need
to proceed as if the plane posed a threat and engage it in order to save the people in the
stadium, since to do nothing would potentially put the stadium goers’ lives at risk. The
information he required to determine what the right decision is only becomes available to
him after the fact when the wreckage is examined, and the presence or absence of
terrorists is established. If there turns out to have been no terrorists on board, the pilot
now has to live with the knowledge he shot down a plane that was of no threat and he
killed innocent civilians; a PMIE.
A second limitation is that the DEP content is only applicable to situations in
which the individual has the ability to affect the outcome. As outlined by Litz (Litz et al.,
2009), in addition to situations where the morally injured individual is the perpetrator of
the PMIE, moral injuries can also be caused by witnessing or learning about potentially
transgressive events after the fact, when the individual has no ability to affect the
outcome. Based on the documents reviewed, it appears that the DND and CF believe that
their training as it exists currently is sufficient to allow its service members to deal with
these circumstances and make the “right choice” when called upon to do so. The training
provided, however, may only be useful for a narrow band of situations, operational
requirements, often exist outside this narrow band which makes the training inapplicable
to some of the problems encountered as was shown in applying the decision-making
model to the situations described earlier. In particular, the DEP provides little if any
training regarding how service members should best react to situations in which they may
be unable to do “the right thing” either because injurious event already happened, they
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are not empowered to affect the outcome, or conflicting rules makes determining what
the right decision is unclear.
The DEP program structures its training in such a way as to teach steps required
for individuals to make the right decision, but when it comes to being applied in an
operational setting, it may be better viewed as teaching what steps to take in order to not
make the wrong decision. The difference between the two (making the “right choice”
versus “not making the wrong choice”) is subtle but important; just because an individual
didn’t do anything wrong does not mean what they did was right. In the last iteration of
the terrorist attack scenario, the pilot didn’t do anything wrong (ethically) by shooting
down the plane but, based on the results (there were only civilians on board), he may feel
that his decision was not the right one. The same would be true for the private in the
child soldier scenario; she didn’t do anything wrong (ethically) by engaging a hostile
during the firefight, but she may still feel she did when she discovers that it was a child
doing the shooting. The disconnect between these two interpretations of the rightness of
the act could be seen as a difference in how the act is framed by those involved: the
DND/CF would view the actions from within an ethical frame, while the pilot and private
potentially view, and later may re-evaluate them from within their own personal, moral
frames.
Ethics as taught by the DEP seems to be an organizational-level ethics, an ethics
designed to be applied the same way by everyone, in which some behaviours are
identified as being allowed while others are identified as being prohibited.12 In this way,
the application of ethics can be an objective and impersonal process where the opinions
Stating that behaviour “A” is not allowed (e.g., kicking puppies), by extension, the opposite
behaviour (not A) is allowed (i.e., not kicking puppies).
12
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and values of the individual regarding a given course of action need not enter into the
decision-making process so long as all the requisite steps are applied. In this application
of ethics, some behaviours are deemed to be wrong because they are prohibited (i.e., they
are against the established rules; mala prohibita). Morality, in contrast, relates to a
personal set of values that the individual holds for themselves and, to a limited extent, for
others. This does not mean, however, that moral beliefs are unique to each individual as
some beliefs may be common to many people (e.g., the killing of children is wrong,
kicking puppies is wrong); some actions are mala in se (wrong in themselves). The belief
that there are some actions that are “just wrong” contains within it a comparison against a
standard that transcends ethics, a standard that the individuals involved may see as one
that cannot be violated. It is this comparison that may lay at the heart of moral
evaluations and moral injury; some behaviours are wrong because they are prohibited
(ethics), while others are prohibited because they are wrong (morality); believing that the
latter prohibition has been violated is what underlies moral injury.
In scenario 2 (child soldier), if the private had instead made the wrong ethical
choice (e.g., she had seen that the shooter was a child, elected not to shoot, and a unit
member died as a result) and there was an investigation, she would likely be judged
severely by the CF (and potentially herself as well) because she failed in her duty to
protect fellow unit members by engaging an insurgent; the child-soldier is viewed as a
soldier from the frame of ethics. The way the scenario was written, the private does
shoot at the insurgent and later realizes that she is responsible for the death of a child
causing a conflict within herself. The source of this conflict is her belief that killing
children is mala in se; the facts that she was in a firefight and the child was shooting at
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her unit, while relevant at the time she made her decision, are no longer relevant to her
upon reflection since she is now comparing her actions against this inviolable higher
standard and using this as the standard against which to make a moral judgement about
the rightness or wrongness of her actions, and by extension, also judging herself as a
person. While in areas other than the military the distinction between ethics and morality
may be more academic, the military is an organization in which behaviour is highly
governed by the application of rules and regulations, so the distinction between ethics and
morality may be of greater importance. Service members, in essence, serve two masters:
as members of the military on deployment they operate as parts of a larger machine with
their behaviour is governed by rules and regulations (ethics) meant to ensure mission
success. However, they still remain individuals in their own right and as such, are also
governed by, and judge themselves according to, their own core beliefs (morality).
While the DEP predominantly uses the term “ethics” and speaks of “ethical
decision-making,” it also uses the term “morality” in some places (e.g., in their definition
of courage: “Facing challenges, whether physical or moral, with determination and
strength of character” (Department of National Defence, 2012, p. 10)), and at other times
uses “ethical and moral;” yet the DEP does not define these terms in any of the reviewed
documents so that the distinction between them is made clear. This may partially be a
result of the programme’s more superficial coverage of some core philosophical concepts
to ensure maximum understanding of programme participants; they assume that the
participants understand at a visceral level that the two concepts (ethics and morality)
differ, even if they cannot explain precisely how they differ in words.13 This assumed
If a person as done something that is “unethical,” participants understand that this is bad (i.e., it
is wrong because it is prohibited); the person broke an established rule. But if a person has done
13
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intuitive understanding may make their codification into specific guidelines especially
challenging (Mileham, 2016). By using both terms interchangeably in their instruction
and course materials, however, the DEP risks creating the appearance that the two terms
are synonymous and glossing over the inherent, viscerally understood, differences
between the two concepts. By extension, this confusing of terms might be indicative of a
belief within the DND/CF that the ethics-focussed training they provide to their service
members will also assist them in making morally correct decisions, and as such, pre-empt
the development of a moral injury. As the scenarios demonstrate, this assumption may
not be true; individuals can make ethically correct actions (i.e., decisions resulting from
working through the ethical decision-making process) yet still sustain a moral injury as a
result of their choices.
This would seem to indicate that ethics and morality may exist as separate
entities, thereby creating a four-quadrant structure where “ethical-unethical” behaviour
exists on one axis, and “moral-immoral” behaviour on another (Figure 2.2). Operational
behaviours that would be both ethical and moral (quadrant A) could include such
behaviours as neutralizing a suicide bomber before they can detonate their vest, these
would be the least likely to be considered a PMIE. Ethical but potentially immoral
behaviours (quadrant B) could include acts such as shooting an individual running at a
checkpoint who’s intent at the time was unknown but upon post-incident investigation
was found to not have hostile intent (i.e., an innocent); if this person was found to have
been carrying a bomb, however, then the act would fall into quadrant A – ethical and
moral. Quadrant B behaviours would generally be considered to be PMIE. Quadrant C
something that is “immoral,” participants understand that this is qualitatively different (i.e., it is
prohibited because it is wrong); the person broke a rule that cannot be broken.
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(unethical but moral) would contain acts such as shooting an enemy combatant who is
fatally wounded but would die slowly and in immense pain (i.e., battlefield mercy killing,
the deliberate taking of the life of another on the field of battle where the killer’s intent

Morality
Immoral

Ethical

A

B

Unethical

C

D

Ethics

Moral

Figure 2.2. Four quadrants Ethical – Moral behaviour model

claims to be one of mercy towards the person killed.)14 As the service member’s intent
was to end the individual’s suffering, it is likely that they would also consider the action
to have been morally correct, so it is unlikely to be considered a PMIE. This having been
said, the behaviour is likely be the subject of disciplinary or even court-martial
proceedings due to its illegality. Finally, behaviours that would be placed in quadrant D
(unethical and immoral), such as the massacre at My Lai during the Vietnam War, would
also be considered to be PMIE however, the individual involved may not realize the
immorality of their actions until much later.

14

Under the Geneva Conventions, battlefield mercy killings are illegal. Incapacitated individuals

(by injury, or being unconsciousness), and those who have formally surrendered, are considered
no longer to be a threat and are not to be harmed ("Geneva Conventions," 1949). The behaviour
does still occur, however (Deakin, 2013; Friscolanti, 2010).
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Recommendations for ways to improve DND/CF preparation for PMIE
Based on the documents available for review, as it is designed and implemented
currently, neither the R2MR nor the DEP seems to provide CF service members with
sufficient preparation to deal with the kinds of potentially morally injurious situations
they may encounter on a contemporary military deployment. This being said, there is no
reason this needs to continue to be the case going forward. First and foremost, the DND
and CF needs to complete and release the missing chapter from DND and CF Code of
Values and Ethics (Department of National Defence, 2012) that relates to values and
ethics in operations. As the situations encountered on both combat and peace-support
operations are constantly changing, sometimes even from one encounter to the next,
creating a guidance document that will cover all eventualities will not be an easy task.
This being said, it can be argued that some guidance is better than no guidance at all,
which is the current state of the document it seems; documents can always be updated or
amended as situations change. Second, in light of the increasing possibility for
encountering potentially morally injurious events while on deployment, it would be
beneficial for the DEP to provide definitions of the terms “ethics” and “morality” (and
their derivatives) in their training programs so participants are clear on their respective
meanings and contexts for use, as well as being able to accurately identify when a
situation requires an ethical or a moral decision be made. Alternately, the DND/CF could
remove references to morality from its training and guidance documents completely so
that it becomes clear to participants and instructors alike that the training provided is only
designed to address ethical dilemmas. It is important to note that not every ethical
question is necessarily a dilemma (i.e., a situation where an individual is required to make

MORAL INJURY IN CF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN

90

a choice between two or more equal alternatives where making the choice requires a
compromise be made that is undesirable). Moral questions, in contrast, generally are also
dilemmas due to the deeply held and absolute nature inherent in these beliefs. Third, the
DEP could incorporate into their training scenarios situations that are more reflective of
the types of situations service members might encounter on deployment. These could
include situations where multiple sets of equally valid ethical rules conflict with each
other (an ethical dilemma) and the service member needs to determine which rules they
will follow and be able to justify why they made that choice; situations where there is no
possibility of achieving a positive outcome no matter what choice they make (i.e., no-win
situation); or situations where following the ethical decision-making model they are
taught will lead them to making a decision that would be considered to be morally
incorrect. By introducing these situations into training in a safe, controlled environment,
the service members will gain exposure to the inherent conflicts (personal and
procedural) before they encounter them in the field; similar to how they are instructed in
mental rehearsal as part of their resilience training. Finally, with regards to the mental
health and resilience, include training in basic coping mechanisms (e.g., positive self-talk,
focussing on the facts of the situation) specifically focussed on encounters with a PMIE
while deployed so they are better prepared for dealing with the feelings of conflict should
they arise, thus potentially blunting some of the psychic impact that can result.
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Chapter 3
Prevalence Rate of Potentially Morally Injurious Events (PMIE) in CF members
For the 50 years following the Korean War the Canadian Armed Forces (CF) have
predominantly been deployed internationally on multinational peace support operations
(i.e., peace-making, peace building, peace enforcement, peace keeping, and monitoring)
and humanitarian aid missions to areas of the globe affected by disasters, both natural and
man-made. While peace support was to be the intended foci of these missions, this does
not mean that CF members did not occasionally have to also engage in combat while
deployed. During the UN protection mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992 to 1995), for
example, Canadian troops were deployed to supervise the removal of heavy weapons
from major cities, protect non-combatants and maintain security of UN protected areas,
reopen the airport in Sarajevo to allow humanitarian aid flights to come in, and to protect
these aid convoys from hostiles (Department of National Defence, 2016; Department of
Public Information - United Nations, 2016). They would, however, come under fire from
both major parties in the conflict and a variety of non-governmental paramilitary groups
using indiscriminate shelling of the cities and UN protected areas, and snipers
intentionally targeting civilians and UN troops, to achieve their respective ends. As a
result, the Canadian troops were required to respond to protect both the civilians and
themselves. As well as violating the internationally recognized rules of war (i.e., the
Geneva Conventions, Laws of Armed Conflict, International Humanitarian Law (Legal
Information Institute, 2018)), these behaviours also exposed Canadian soldiers to
situations they had rarely witnessed previously including mass graves, genocide, and
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other acts that would later be classified as crimes against humanity (United Nations,
2017).
This predominant focus on multinational peace support missions changed in
October 2001, however, when the CF were deployed to Afghanistan as part of operations
focussed on the identification and neutralization of members of al-Qaeda believed to be
hiding in the country, as well as the overthrowing of the Taliban regime that was
supportive of international terrorism (Public Safety Canada, 2018); the CF members were
deployed specifically in a combat role (i.e., for war). Ultimately, the CF would remain in
the region for the next 13 years and during this time would be engaged in a different kind
of warfighting than they had encountered previously. As was the case with the UN
deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina, this deployment exposed CF members to combat
situations for which they may have been unprepared, as well as exposing them to
situations where what the ‘morally correct’ decision was either unclear or not available to
them. These situations could include encountering a child pointing a rifle at them, or
when quickly determining whether the individual who just stepped around the corner is a
hostile combatant or an innocent civilian in the wrong place at the wrong time is
impossible. Circumstances such as these have been postulated to lead to some service
members experiencing a different type of combat injury; an injury caused by a
transgression of that service member’s core moral beliefs, beliefs about what is Right,
Just, and Fair, about themselves, others, and the world as a whole.
The phenomenon was first termed “moral injury” by Shay (Shay, 1991, 2009) to
describe the internal conflicts experienced by veterans as a result of what they
encountered, and occasionally engaged in, during their participation in the Vietnam War.
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These experiences, alternately referred to in the literature as potentially morally injurious
experiences (PMIE; Litz et al., 2009) or as transgressive acts (Frankfurt & Frazier, 2016),
have been defined with varying levels of specificity in recent years (e.g., Currier,
Holland, & Malott, 2015; Drescher et al., 2011) but at their respective cores remains the
formulation put forth by Litz and his colleagues: “the perpetration, failure to prevent,
bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and
expectations” (Litz et al., 2009). These PMIEs form the precursors for what may
eventually manifest as a moral injury. Litz et al. goes on to stipulate that the moral injury
itself is not caused by exposure to the PMIE, but rather a result of the individual’s
reprocessing of the event after the fact leading to a realization that some aspect of their
moral belief system has been compromised or transgressed. This realization of the moral
transgression then leads to the creation of dissonance or inner conflict for the individual
which then manifests in the actual moral injury; in effect, it is the reprocessing and
realization of the transgression that is the cause of the moral injury.
Predicting which individuals will go on to develop a moral injury after exposure
to a transgressive event is a challenging prospect as what is and is not considered
“morally permissible behaviour” can vary across culture, time, and context. Take for
example the near universal belief that killing another person is an immoral act and, as
such, should not be done. The killing of an enemy combatant in war, however, is
allowable and is almost an expected behaviour for combat soldiers while for medical
personnel, such action is only permissible in self-defence, and for a military chaplain
never permissible. Individual differences also contribute to the complexities of defining
morally permissible and impermissible behaviours in that what may violate one
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individual’s moral code may not violate another’s. Another issue relates to rates of
reporting and the concomitant prevalence rates. As outlined above, moral injury results
from an internal conflict which requires the affected individual first admit to another
person, such as a colleague, therapist, or chaplain, that they are conflicted and what the
event was that lead to this conflict. Depending on the nature of the transgression
involved, such an admission may bring with it the potential for interpersonal and legal
consequences, including loss of the trust or respect of their colleagues, courts-martial, or
potentially even prison time. The real or perceived risk of these outcomes may decrease
the likelihood that individuals will report their moral conflict resulting in knowledge of
who is affected and what occurred that led to the problem remaining unknown and
unaddressed.
These issues have, until the recent development of specific scales to measure
moral injury such as the Moral Injury Events Scale (MIES; Nash et al., 2013), Moral
Injury Questionnaire – Military Version (MIQ-M; Currier, Holland, Drescher, & Foy,
2015), Expressions of Moral Injury Scale – Military Version (EMIS-M; Currier et al.,
2017), and the Moral Injury Symptom Scale – Military Version (MISS-M; Koenig et al.,
2017), necessitated that researchers approach the problem of moral injury by looking
instead at rates of its precursor PMIE. Similar to with many diseases like influenza where
exposure to the virus does not necessarily mean that the individual will develop the
illness, if an individual does present with the illness, they must have been exposed to the
virus; if a service member is to develop a moral injury, they first need to have been
exposed to a PMIE.
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Aim of this study
The CF does not currently collect information on either exposure to PMIE or rates
of moral injury itself within its serving member or veteran’s populations, so the
prevalence rates for these events are not currently known. As such, this study set out to
accomplish three tasks. First, to estimate the prevalence rate of PMIE exposure within a
representative sample of CF members who served in support of the recent mission to
Afghanistan. Second, validate the resulting group formations with regards to potential
moral injury by comparing the groups on questions relating to common symptoms and
behavioural expressions associated with having experienced a moral injury (e.g., anxiety,
feelings of alienation, purposelessness, social withdrawal, and self-handicapping).
Finally, using the groups created based on endorsement of questions indicative of
potential PMIE exposure, determine if there are any sociodemographic, military, or
deployment characteristics that may be related to said exposure.
Methods
Data source and study population
The data for this study was obtained from the Canadian Forces Mental Health
Survey (CFMHS), conducted by Statistics Canada between April and August 2013
(Statistics Canada, 2014c). The CFMHS is a cross-sectional survey containing a range of
questions relating both directly and indirectly to the mental health status of Canadian
Armed Forces (CF) members. A subset of the population surveyed for the CFMHS (n =
4854) serves as the target population for this study, specifically, all regular and reserve
force members of the CF who had been deployed in support of the mission to
Afghanistan between 2001 and time of survey completion.

MORAL INJURY IN CF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN

102

Sampling and data collection
For the CFMHS, Statistics Canada utilized a stratified random sampling
framework (stratified by military rank) to ensure that the resultant sample would remain
representative of the whole of the CF. In order to reinforce the confidentiality of the
survey, interviews were conducted on-base by Statistics Canada personnel using a
computer assisted personnel interview. These Statistics Canada personnel were neither
affiliated with nor would they report back to the CF any responses received during survey
administration.
Measures
Since the CFMHS was administered in 2013, several scales related to moral injury
have been published (e.g., Moral Injury Events Scale (MIES; Nash et al., 2015), Moral
Injury Questionnaire – Military Version (MIQ-M; Currier et al., 2017), Moral Injury
Symptoms Scale – Military Version (MISS-M; Koenig et al., 2017), Expressions of
Moral Injury Scale (EMIS-M; Currier et al., 2017)), however, these tools were not
available at that time. As a result, for this study exposure to potentially morally injurious
events (PMIE) was determined using a composite measure based on prevailing moral
injury theory and questions from the psychometrically validated MIES and MIQ-M that
referred specifically to PMIE as a guide. The resultant measure was composed of
questions drawn from the Deployment Experiences (DEX) and Post-Traumatic Stress
(PTS) modules of the CFMHS. The final list of questions selected was sent to a content
expert for review and verification that they met the criteria for PMIE (B. Litz, personal
communication, 03 August 2017).
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The DEX questions15 selected were DEX-2 “found yourself in a threatening
situation where you were unable to respond because of rules of engagement;” DEX-4
“ever seen ill or injured women or children you were unable to help;” DEX-6 “ever felt
responsible for the death of Canadian or allied personnel;” and DEX-8 “ever had
difficulty distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants.” Selected PTS
questions included were PTS-25 “Have you ever done something that accidentally lead to
serious injury or death of another person;” PTS-26 “Have you ever purposely injured,
tortured, or killed another person;” and PTS-27 “Have you ever seen atrocities or
massacres such as mutilated bodies or mass killings.” In an effort to restrict participant
inclusion to only those who had experienced PMIE during deployment(s), participants
must have also endorsed one of the two following questions for the aforementioned PTS
questions to be included in the measure: “Have you ever participated in combat, either as
a member of the military, or as a member of an organized non-military group,” or “Have
you ever served as a peacekeeper or relief worker in a war zone or in a place where there
was ongoing terror of people because of political, ethnic, religious, or other conflicts?”
(PTS questions 1 and 2, respectively). Individuals who positively endorsed any of
selected DEX or PTS questions were considered to have been exposed to a PMIE
(PMIE+), the remaining participants were considered to have not been exposed to a
PMIE (PMIE-).
The CFMHS also contains information relating to the sociodemographic and
military characteristics of the participants at the time the survey was completed. This
information includes the participants’ age, sex, marital status, educational attainment,

15

All DEX questions are preceded by “During any [Canadian Forces] deployment, have you …”
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rank category (Junior Non-Commissioned Member (NCM) [Private to Master Corporal],
Senior NCM [Sargent to Chief Warrant Officer], or Officer), component (regular force,
reserve force), previous exposure to mental health training, and information relating to
their Afghanistan deployment.

Statistical Analyses
Statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS 23 and STATA 15, with results
being weighted and an alpha level set to 0.05. List-wise deletion was used to ensure all
analyses were conducted on complete cases. Statistics Canada provided the final sample
weights (adjusting for initial sampling weight, removal of outliers, and participant nonresponse) so that the estimates produced from the CFMHS data would be reflective of the
entire Canadian Armed Forces population at time of survey (n = 68,866) and not just the
sample (Statistics Canada, 2014a). A bootstrapping technique using sampling weights
(500 bootstrap samples also provided by Statistics Canada) was used to account for the
complex survey design (Statistics Canada, 2014d). Per Statistics Canada requirements
for release of confidential data, all final cell counts were rounded to the nearest 20, so as
to protect the identity of respondents. Descriptive statistics were calculated for each
variable used in the analyses (e.g., socio-demographic, military, mental-health training,
and deployment related characteristics), and used as covariates in logistic regressions
conducted to explore the impact they had on exposure to PMIE. With regards to Mental
Health Training, only the final composite question (i.e., “Any mental health training in
the last 5 years”) was used as a covariate in the regression analysis. Adjusted Odds
Ratios (AOR) were calculated for the logistic regressions rather than the usual regression
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coefficient (i.e., β) to ease the interpretation of results. The AOR indicates the odds of a
given outcome occurring (e.g., developing the flu) if the individual was exposed to a
specific event or stimulus (e.g., receiving the flu shot) compared with the odds of the
same outcome occurring without said exposure (e.g., not receiving the flu shot), when all
other covariates (e.g., age, sex, marital status, etc.) are kept constant.
Ethics approval
The original data collection procedures for the survey and access to the resultant
database containing the survey results were reviewed and approved by the relevant
committees at Statistics Canada that serve these purposes in terms of ethical treatment of
participants, following the principles detailed in the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical
Conduct of Research Involving Humans (TCPS-2). The Research Ethics Board of
Western University provided a waiver for this study as it constitutes a secondary data
analysis, which does not require an ethical review under TCPS-2.
Results
The weighted demographic, military, and deployment characteristics of survey
respondents are presented in Table 3.1. Of those CF members who were deployed in
support of the mission to Afghanistan, just over 86% were in the Regular Forces, 48%
had ranks of Master-Corporal or below (i.e., Junior Non-Commissioned Member), and
51% had finished post-secondary education (i.e., college or university graduate). With
regards to having received some form of mental health training in the five-years prior to
survey administration, endorsement rates ranged from almost 14% (During trades
training) to almost 64% (at the end of their deployment), with 84% indicating that they
had received some mental health training during the stated time period. Almost two-
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Table 3.1.
Demographic, Military, and Deployment Characteristics (Weighted N = 33,440)
Characteristic
Weighted %
95% CI
Sociodemographic
Sex
Male
89.20
88.20 – 90.20
Female
10.80
9.80 – 11.80
Age (years)
19-24
4.06
3.43 – 4.69
25-34
36.58
35.23 – 37.92
35-44
34.43
33.11 – 35.74
45-54
22.98
21.79 – 24.16
55 and over
2.03
1.70 – 2.35
Marital Status
Married or Common-law
72.73
71.42 – 74.04
Widowed, Separated, or Divorced
8.41
7.54 – 9.28
Single (never married)
18.85
17.73 – 19.98
Education
Less than secondary school graduation
4.55
3.93 – 5.17
Secondary school graduate
28.90
27.48 – 30.33
Some post-secondary
9.22
8.32 – 10.11
Post-secondary graduation
51.23
49.66 – 52.79
More than post-secondary graduation
6.10
5.49 – 6.72
Military Factors
Military Component
Regular Forces
86.69
86.61 – 86.78
Reserve Forces
13.37
13.28 – 13.45
Rank Group*
Junior NCM
48.21
47.74 – 48.68
Senior NCM
31.74
31.35 – 32.14
Officer
20.05
19.78 – 20.31
Mental Health Training last 5 years (endorsed)
In preparation for CF deployment
58.92
57.47 – 60.38
At the end of CF deployment
63.71
62.26 – 65.17
Preparation for a higher rank
33.35
31.90 – 34.81
During trades training
13.89
12.81 – 14.98
By PSP personnel/health office
20.48
19.20 – 21.76
Routine training/professional development
46.83
45.27 – 48.38
Any mental health training in the last 5 years
83.89
82.77 – 85.01
Total number of days deployed to Afghanistan
< 120 days
13.67
12.60 – 14.74
121 – 240 days
57.25
55.74 – 58.77
241 – 360 days
14.15
13.04 – 15.25
Over 361 days
14.93
13.85 – 16.00
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Potentially Morally Injurious Events (PMIE)
Exposure to any PMIE
Not exposed (PMIE-)
34.84
33.37 – 36.32
Exposed (PMIE+)
65.21
63.74 – 66.68
Specific PMIE (endorsed experience)
Accidentally caused serious injury or death of
6.11
5.31 – 6.92
another person
Purposely injured, tortured, or killed another
15.94
14.77 – 17.11
person
Saw atrocities or massacres
29.33
27.87 – 30.79
Found self in threatening situation where you
35.41
33.90 – 36.92
were unable to respond due to ROE
Seen ill or injured women or children who you
48.37
46.68 – 50.07
were unable to help
Felt responsible for the death of Canadian or
8.41
7.48 – 9.35
allied personnel
Had difficulty distinguishing between
43.55
41.87 – 45.24
combatants and non-combatants
Note: CF = Canadian Armed Forces, Junior NCM = Private to Master Corporal, NCM =
non-commissioned member, PMIE = Potentially Morally Injurious Event, PSP =
Personnel Support Program, ROE = Rules of Engagement, Senior NCM = Sargent to
Chief Warrant Officer

thirds (65.21%) of deployed personnel indicated that they had experienced at least one
event that could be considered a PMIE. This included 48.37% seeing ill or injured
women and children that they were unable to help, 43.55% reported being in situations
where they could not distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, and 35.41%
reported finding themselves in threatening situations where they were unable to respond
due to the rules of engagement (ROE) set out for the mission.
A comparison of available survey questions related to common symptoms and
behavioural expressions by PMIE grouping is presented in Table 3.2. With the exception
of a feeling of belonging to their community, the distributions of responses differed
significantly between groups according to their PMIE exposure status (< 0.001 p ≤
0.003).
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Logistic regression models for exposure to any PMIE and component PMIE subquestions are presented in Table 3.3. Variables found to be associated with a statistically
significant increase in endorsement of any PMIE exposure (i.e., endorsement of any
single PMIE sub-question) included being in the youngest age group relative to the oldest
group (AOR: 2.08, 95% CI: 1.16 – 3.73), being a member of the Reserve Forces
(AOR:1.46, 95% CI: 1.27 – 1.68), being in the Senior NCM rank group compared to
being an Officer (AOR: 1.30, 95% CI: 1.07 – 1.59), having received any mental health
training in the previous five years (AOR: 1.92, 95% CI: 1.61 – 2.29), and having a total
number of days deployed to Afghanistan of longer than 121 days (AOR: 1.67 – 2.56; see
Table 3.3 for respective confidence intervals). In comparison, being female (AOR: 0.44,
95% CI: 0.36 – 0.55) was associated with a statistically significant lower rate of PMIE
endorsement. This statistically significant lower rate of PMIE endorsement for female
service members was also found on all PMIE sub-questions with the exception of
questions relating to seeing sick/injured women and children they were unable to help,
and feeling responsible for the death of Canadian or allied personnel, which, while still a
lower rate than for males, failed to reach statistical significance (p = 0.086, and p = 0.743,
respectively).
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Table 3.2
Common symptoms and behavioural expressions of moral injury
PMIE Characteristic or Behavioural Expression
Proportion
95% CI
(CFMHS Variable Name)
Depression
Feld sad/depressed in last month (DIS_10G)
No
57.02 54.55 – 50.49
Yes
42.98 40.51 – 45.45
Felt hopeless in last month (DIS_10D)
No
84.08 82.23 – 85.92
Yes
15.75 13.91 – 17.60
Felt worthless in last month (DIS_10J)
No
87.99 86.29 – 89.70
Yes
12.01 10.30 – 13.71
Depression; Received a positive screening for ~ (SCRDEP)
Yes
57.53 55.00 – 60.07
No
42.47
3.94 – 45.00
Anxiety
Generalized Anxiety Disorder; Received a positive screening for ~ (SCRGAD)
Yes
42.44 39.90 – 44.98
No
57.73 55.19 – 60.28
Panic Disorder; Received a positive screening for ~ (SCRPAD)
Yes
45.21 42.53 – 47.88
No
54.80 52.12 – 57.47
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PMIE +
Proportion
95% CI

p=

46.98
53.11

45.19 – 48.77
51.32 – 54.90

< 0.001

74.20
25.71

72.52 – 75.88
24.03 – 27.39

< 0.001

82.43
17.57

80.98 – 83.89
16.11 – 19.02

< 0.001

67.40
32.60

65.90 – 69.21
30.79 – 34.41

< 0.001

56.04
43.96

54.21 – 57.87
42.13 – 45.79

< 0.001

67.22
32.78

65.40 – 69.04
30.96 – 34.60

< 0.001
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Social Withdrawal
In the past month, how often did you feel …
That you belonged to a community (PMH_05)
Every day or almost every day
About 1 to 3 times per week
Once or twice a month, or never
When dealing with stress, how often do you …
Avoid being with people (STR_6_3)
Often
Sometimes
Rarely
Never
Sense of belonging to local community
(GEN_10)
Very strong
Somewhat strong
Somewhat weak
Very weak
Self-harm
Suicidal thought – Past 12 months (DEPFSYT)
Yes
No
Suicidal thoughts – lifetime (DEPFSLT)
Yes
No
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59.00
21.27
19.73

56.41 – 61.61
19.16 – 23.39
17.64 – 21.81

56.99
21.42
21.60

55.23 – 58.74
19.89 – 22.95
20.42 – 23.16

0.320

7.38
33.62
35.68
23.16

6.02 – 8.73
31.18 – 36.06
33.17 – 38.19
20.96 – 25.35

13.28
35.35
33.70
17.58

11.95 – 14.61
33.49 – 37.21
31.92 – 35.48
16.28 – 18.92

< 0.001

10.65
46.74
31.44
11.34

8.96 – 12.35
44.07 – 49.40
28.98 – 33.91
9.67 – 13.01

10.95
41.86
31.65
15.64

9.83 – 12.06
39.98 – 43.74
29.92 – 33.37
14.25 – 17.03

< 0.001

3.26
96.74

2.33 – 4.19
95.81 – 97.67

5.59
94.41

4.65 – 6.54
93.46 – 95.35

< 0.001

12.18
87.82

10.46 – 13.90
86.10 – 89.54

18.79
81.21

17.31 – 20.27
79.73 – 82.69

< 0.001
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Role or Purpose in Society
In the past month, how often did you feel …
That you had something to contribute to society? (PMH_04)
Every day or almost every day
67.78
About 1 to 3 times per week
19.55
Once or twice a month, or never
11.49
That your life has a sense of direction or meaning to it
(PMH_14)
Every day or almost every day
79.55
About 1 to 3 times per week
15.71
Once or twice a month, or never
4.64
Trust / Betrayal
In the past month, how often did you feel …
That people are basically good (PMH_07)
Every day or almost every day
68.61
About 1 to 3 times per week
24.36
Once or twice a month, or never
7.03
That you had a warm, trusting relationship with others (PMH_11)
Every day or almost every day
86.45
About 1 to 3 times per week
10.81
Once or twice a month, or never
2.74
Self-Blame or Self Handicapping
When dealing with stress, how often do you …
Blame yourself (STR_6_10)
Often
Sometimes

9.47
41.65
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66.34 – 71.22
17.45 – 21.65
9.73 – 13.26

63.73
22.87
13.41

61.96 – 65.50
21.24 – 24.49
12.12 – 17.70

0.003

77.41 – 81.71
13.85 – 17.77
3.53 – 5.75

74.15
17.69
8.16

72.53 – 75.77
16.28 – 19.10
7.05 – 9.27

< 0.001

66.24 – 70.98
22.11 – 26.60
5.64 – 8.42

54.23
31.07
14.71

52.36 – 56.09
29.26 – 32.88
13.29 – 16.12

< 0.001

84.69 – 88.21
9.23 – 12.38
1.87 – 3.61

80.93
14.57
4.49

79.36 – 82.51
13.20 – 15.95
3.65 – 5.34

< 0.001

7.91 – 11.02
38.96 – 44.34

14.59
41.56

13.21 – 15.96
39.66 – 43.46

< 0.001
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Rarely
35.11
Never
13.77
Alcohol abuse or dependence – lifetime (AUDDL)
Yes
26.12
No
73.88
Alcohol abuse or dependence – last 12 months (AUDDY)
Yes
2.23
No
97.94
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32.61 – 67.61
12.04 – 15.50

32.57
11.28

30.75 – 34.39
10.02 – 12.55

23.84 – 28.40
71.61 – 76.16

37.65
62.38

35.98 – 39.32
60.68 – 64.02

< 0.001

1.48 – 2.99
97.18 – 98.70

4.59
95.50

3.80 – 5.38
94.71 – 96.29

< 0.001

Satisfaction with life in general (GENGSWL)
Satisfied
94.52 93.33 – 95.71
89.09
87.91 – 90.27
< 0.001
Neutral
2.91
2.02 – 3.81
5.68
4.79 – 6.58
Dissatisfied
2.57
1.74 – 3.40
5.13
4.32 – 5.95
Note: CFMHS = Canadian Forces Mental Health Survey; PMIE- = Not exposed to potentially morally injurious event; PMIE+ =
Exposed to potentially morally injurious event
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Logistic regression models to determine the associations between covariates and
the prediction of each of the PMIE sub-questions yielded mixed results (Table 3.3). With
the exception of female sex, none of the sociodemographic, military, or deployment
related covariates showed a statistically significant association with endorsement of the
question “Have you ever done something that accidentally led to the serious injury or
death of another person?” In contrast, endorsement of the question “Have you ever
purposely injured, tortured, or killed another person?” was significantly associated with
the following covariates: being under 45 years of age compared with being over 55 years
of age (AOR: 4.53 – 6.40, see table 3.3 for respective 95% CI), and having been deployed
for over 361 days (AOR: 1.85, 95% CI: 1.25 - 2.74). Reporting having witnessed
atrocities (e.g., massacres or mass killings) was statistically associated with having
graduated from a post-secondary educational institution (AOR: 0.66, 95% CI: 0.46 –
0.96), being a Senior NCM of the CF (AOR: 1.61, 95% CI: 1.26 – 2.07), and having been
deployed to Afghanistan for over 241 days in total (AOR: 1.40 – 1.74, see Table 3.3 for
95% CI).
Having a post-secondary education was also significantly associated with being
unable to respond in a threatening situation due to ROE (AOR: 0.62, 95% CI: 0.43 - 0.88)
when compared with those with less than a secondary school education. Holding a less
than officer rank (AOR: 1.60 – 1.88), and being deployed between 121 and 240 days, or
over 361 days (AOR: 1.34 – 1.53) were both associated with a higher rate of endorsement
of the inability to respond due to ROE question see Table 3.3 for respective 95% CIs).
Witnessing sick/injured women or children they were unable to help was associated with
being a member of the Reserves, a Senior NCM, and having a total-days deployed
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Table 3.3
Logistic regression for prediction of exposure to PMIE
Characteristic

Any PMIE
AOR

Sociodemographic
Sex
Male
Female
Age (years)
19-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55 and over
Marital Status
Married or Common-law
Widowed, Separated, or Divorced
Single (never married)
Education
Less than SS graduation
SS graduate
Some post-secondary
Post-secondary graduation
More than post-secondary
graduation
Military Factors
Component
Regular Forces
Reserve Forces
Rank Group
Junior NCM
Senior NCM
Officer
MHT in last 5 years
Any Mental Health Training
Deployment Related
Total number of days deployed
(days)
< 120 days
121-240 days
241-360 days
Over 361 days

Reference
0.44 ***
2.08 *
1.39
1.55
1.08
Reference
Reference
1.15
1.02

95% CI

0.36 - 0.55
1.16 – 3.73
0.88 – 2.19
0.99 – 2.43
0.69 – 1.69

Accidentally caused
serious injury or death of
another person
AOR
95% CI

Reference
0.34 *
0.34
0.70
0.66
0.59
Reference

0.13 – 0.90
0.10 – 1.11
0.28 – 1.73
0.26 – 1.65
0.23 – 1.54

0.87 – 1.40
0.84 – 1.23

Reference
1.03
1.15

0.60 – 1.75
0.77 – 1.73

Reference
0.75
0.90
0.70

0.52 – 1.10
0.57 – 1.41
0.49 – 1.02

Reference
0.77
1.19
0.71

0.39 – 1.52
0.55 – 2.58
0.36 – 1.39

1.18

0.73 – 1.90

1.04

0.42 – 2.54

1.27 – 1.68

Reference
1.09

0.79 – 1.49

Reference
1.46 ***
0.95
1.30 **
Reference

0.78 – 1.17
1.07 – 1.59

0.84
1.05
Reference

0.53 – 1.37
0.67 – 1.66

1.92 ***

1.61 – 2.29

1.17

0.76 – 1.81

1.37 – 2.05
1.32 – 2.19
1.95 – 3.35

Reference
0.90
1.07
1.04

0.55 – 1.45
0.63 – 1.83
0.60 – 1.80

Reference
1.67 ***
1.70 ***
2.56 ***

115

MORAL INJURY IN CF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN

Characteristic

Sociodemographic
Sex
Male
Female
Age (years)
19-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55 and over
Marital Status
Married or Common-law
Widowed, Separated, or
Divorced
Single (never married)
Education
Less than SS graduation
SS graduate
Some post-secondary
Post-secondary graduation
More than post-secondary
graduation
Military Factors
Component
Regular Forces
Reserve Forces
Rank Group
Junior NCM
Senior NCM
Officer
MHT in last 5 years
Any Mental Health Training
Deployment Related
Total number of days deployed
(days)
< 120 days
121-240 days
241-360 days
Over 361 days

Purposely injured,
tortured, or killed
someone
AOR
95% CI

Reference
0.23 ***
6.40 ***
6.26 ***
4.53 **
2.19
Reference

0.13 – 0.42
2.04 – 20.05
2.15 – 18.24
1.54 – 13.35
0.75 – 6.56

Reference

Saw atrocities or
massacres
AOR

95% CI

Reference
0.47 ***

0.34 – 0.66

1.08
0.76
1.10
0.97
Reference

0.81 – 1.44
0.46 – 1.24
0.67 – 1.80
0.59 – 1.57

Reference

1.30

0.92 – 1.85

1.08

0.81 – 1.44

0.96

0.74 – 1.24

0.95

0.77 – 1.18

Reference
1.10
1.07
0.81

0.68 – 1.78
0.63 – 1.83
0.50 – 1.31

Reference
0.78
0.74
0.66 *

0.54 – 1.13
0.49 – 1.13
0.46 – 0.96

0.95

0.50 – 1.80

0.86

0.51 – 1.37

0.93 – 1.40

Reference
1.05

0.89 – 1.23

Reference
1.14
0.91
0.96
Reference

0.55 – 1.27
0.69 – 1.35

1.19
1.61 ***
Reference

0.92 – 1.53
1.26 – 2.07

1.05

0.78 – 1.43

1.23

0.98 – 1.55

0.86 – 1.75
0.66 – 1.64
1.25 – 2.74

Reference
1.16
1.40 *
1.74 ***

0.90 – 1.49
1.04 – 1.90
1.30 – 2.34

Reference
1.23
1.05
1.85 **
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Characteristic

Unable to respond due to
ROE
AOR

Sociodemographic
Sex
Male
Female
Age (years)
19-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55 and over
Marital Status
Married or Common-law
Widowed, Separated, or Divorced
Single (never married)
Education
Less than SS graduation
SS graduate
Some post-secondary
Post-secondary graduation
More than post-secondary
graduation
Military Factors
Component
Regular Forces
Reserve Forces
Rank Group
Junior NCM
Senior NCM
Officer
MHT in last 5 years
Any Mental Health Training
Deployment Related
Total number of days deployed
(days)
< 120 days
121-240 days
241-360 days
Over 361 days

Reference
0.41 ***
1.61
1.02
0.98
0.95
Reference
Reference
1.00
0.97

95% CI

0.30 – 0.56
0.91 – 2.85
0.64 – 1.62
0.63 – 1.55
0.61 – 1.51
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Seen injured
women/children unable
to help
AOR
95% CI

Reference
0.81
1.24
1.07
1.30
0.95
Reference

0.64 – 1.03
0.72 – 2.14
0.70 – 1.64
0.52 – 1.97
0.63 – 1.45

0.77 – 1.32
0.80 – 1.17

Reference
1.11
1.04

0.88 – 1.41
0.86 – 1.24

Reference
0.80
0.74
0.62 **

0.56 – 1.15
0.50 – 1.12
0.43 – 0.88

Reference
0.89
0.86
0.82

0.62 – 1.28
0.57 – 1.29
0.57 – 1.17

0.66

0.40 – 1.10

1.39

0.89 – 2.17

Reference
1.08

0.93 – 1.25

Reference
1.19 *

1.03 – 1.37

1.59 ***
1.88 ***
Reference

1.26 – 2.02
1.49 – 2.38

1.12
1.46 ***
Reference

0.92 – 1.37
1.19 – 1.79

1.07

0.85 – 1.34

1.07

0.87 – 1.31

Reference
1.34 *
1.22
1.53 **

1.06 – 1.70
0.92 – 1.62
1.15 – 2.03

Reference
1.27 *
1.26
1.48 **

1.03 – 1.56
0.97 – 1.63
1.15 – 1.92
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Characteristic

Sociodemographic
Sex
Male
Female
Age (years)
19-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55 and over
Marital Status
Married or Common-law
Widowed, Separated, or Divorced
Single (never married)
Education
Less than SS graduation
SS graduate
Some post-secondary
Post-secondary graduation
More than post-secondary
graduation
Military Factors
Component
Regular Forces
Reserve Forces
Rank Group
Junior NCM
Senior NCM
Officer
MHT in last 5 years
Any Mental Health Training
Deployment Related
Total number of days deployed
(days)
< 120 days
121-240 days
241-360 days
Over 361 days

117

Felt responsible for the
death of Canadian or
allied personnel
AOR
95% CI

Difficulty distinguishing
between combatants and
non-combatants
AOR
95% CI

Reference
0.93

Reference
0.33 ***

1.91
2.22
1.84
1.52
Reference

0.61 – 1.43
0.67 – 5.49
0.90 – 5.45
0.77 – 4.39
0.63 – 3.64

1.55
1.17
1.20
1.01
Reference

0.25 – 0.43
0.85 – 2.81
0.73 – 1.88
0.75 – 1.92
0.64 – 1.61

Reference
0.80
1.06

0.48 – 1.31
0.78 – 1.42

Reference
1.00
0.94

0.78 – 1.29
0.79 – 1.13

Reference
0.85
1.07
0.91

0.44 – 1.68
0.51 – 2.24
0.47 – 1.75

Reference
1.15
0.95
1.06

0.80 – 1.66
0.63 – 1.43
0.75 – 1.52

1.86

0.86 – 4.04

1.07

0.68 – 1.67

0.82 – 1.35

Reference
1.33 ***

1.15 – 1.53

Reference
1.05
0.78
0.90
Reference

0.54 – 1.14
0.61 – 1.32

0.72 **
0.90
Reference

0.58 – 0.89
0.73 – 1.10

1.39

0.93 – 2.06

1.58 ***

1.29 – 1.93

Reference
2.13 ***
1.61
2.05 **

1.35 – 3.36
0.93 – 2.82
1.23 – 3.41

Reference
1.5 **
1.24
1.83 ***

1.08 – 1.67
0.96 – 1.61
1.42 – 2.35
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Note: AOR = Adjusted Odds Ratio, MHT = Mental Health Training, NCM = Non-Commissioned
Member, PMIE = Potentially Morally Injurious Event, ROE = Rules of Engagement, SS =
Secondary School
* .01 < p ≤ .05, **.001 < p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ 0.001

between 121 and 240 days or over 361 days (AOR: 1.18 – 1.48). Reporting having total
deployment durations of between 121 and 240 days, or over 361 days was the only
covariate that showed a statistically significant association with reporting feeling
responsible for the death of Canadian or Allied personnel (AOR: 2.13 and 2.05,
respectively). Finally, having difficulty distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants was significantly associated with an increased likelihood of being in the
Reserves (AOR: 1.33, 95% CI: 1.15 – 1.54), and having deployments between 121 and
240 days, or over 361 days (AOR: 1.35 – 1.83), while being of the lowest rank grouping
(i.e., Junior NCM) was associated with a decreased likelihood of endorsement (AOR:
0.72, 95% CI: 0.58 – 0.89) when compared with being an officer.
Discussion
Using data collected as part of the Canadian Forces Mental Health Survey
(CFMHS), a cross-sectional survey of representative sample of all regular and reserve
force members of the CF who were deployed in support of the mission to Afghanistan,
the prevalence rate of exposure to various potentially morally injurious events (PMIE)
during deployment was determined. The association between various demographic,
military, and deployment related characteristics and endorsement of PMIE exposure was
also established.
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Prevalence rate for exposure to PMIE
Almost two-thirds of the CF members who were deployed to Afghanistan
reported having experienced at least one PMIE during their deployments. While this
result is significantly higher that the results of other studies investigating the prevalence
of exposure to PMIE in military populations, it is in line with their respective findings
regarding the pervasiveness of incident exposure. In their study of 867 active duty U.S.
Marines who were deployed to Afghanistan, Jordan et al. (Jordan, Eisen, Bolton, Nash, &
Litz, 2017) found that over 37% of respondents endorsed at least one question on the
Moral Injury Events Scale (MIES) at the level of “slightly,” “moderately,” or “strongly
agree.” Wisco et al. found similar results in their investigation of U.S. combat veterans
who took part in the National Health and Resilience in Veterans Study in 2013 using
slightly more restrictive MIES criteria; 42% endorsed at least one question at the level of
“moderately” or “strongly agree” (Wisco et al., 2017). Differences in typical deployment
lengths between Canada and U.S. militaries make accurate comparisons between these
results difficult however; the typical deployment duration for a CF member is 6-months
(Peddie & Koundakjian, 2009), while for a member of the U.S. military it is 12-months.
The only Canadian study reporting rates of exposure to PMIE was conducted by Nazarov,
Fikretoglu, Liu, Thompson, and Zamorski (2018). As one of the stated goals of that
study was to investigate the potential association between exposure to PMIE and the
development of post-traumatic stress disorder, the questions used therein were more
restrictive than those used in the current study. This difference in PMIE definition likely
contributed to the difference in reported prevalence rates of any PMIE between their
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study (58%; Nazarov, Fikretoglu, Liu, Thompson, & Zamorski, 2018) and the current
study (65%).
As was the found in Nazarov et al. (2018), the two most commonly reported
PMIE by CF members in the current study were seeing ill or injured women and children
that they were unable to help (48%), and having difficulty distinguishing between
combatants and non-combatants (43%). These results likely arose in part from the nature
of the operational deployment undertaken (i.e., counter-insurgency operations) where
combat often takes place in populated areas, against combatants who blended in with the
civilian population, which in turn would increase the probability of civilians being
unintentionally injured. In addition, insurgent forces have been known to use civilians as
pseudo-combatants (e.g., as suicide bombers or distractions), often against their will. The
complex combat environment created has been associated with increased incidents of
operational stress injuries (i.e., and persistent psychosocial problem resulting from a
military operation) and post-traumatic stress disorder with the highest incident rates being
reported in service members deployed to Kandahar (17%) and Kabul (15%), the two most
populated cities in Afghanistan (Boulos & Zamorski, 2008). Nazarov et al. (2018)
acknowledge that the deployment related experiences that they used to create their PMIE
exposure variable may not have captured the range of potentially morally injurious events
that a service member might encounter while deployed. Using the three-factor structure
proposed for the MIES (Bryan et al., 2015) as guide (i.e., transgression by self,
transgression by others, and betrayal), the three questions selected by Nazarov et al. could
all be categorized as “transgressions by self.” The current study attempted to capture a
wider variety of PMIE, and thereby create a more complete picture of PMIE exposure,
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through the inclusion of additional questions drawn from both the deployment
experiences (DEX) and post-traumatic stress (PTS) modules of the survey. Specifically,
the DEX question about finding themselves a threatening situation where they were
unable to respond due to rules of engagement (ROE), endorsed by over 35% of
respondents, could be interpreted by the service member as a “betrayal” as the ROE
prevented the individual from responding to a situation to which they believe they should
have been allowed to respond. The United Nations (U.N.) peace-support and
humanitarian aid operations in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda where the
ROE outlined by the U.N. actively prevented soldiers from intervening in situations that
were not considered to be part of the mission’s respective mandates (Dallaire, 2003;
United Nations), would be examples of such a PMIE. Similarly, the included PTS
question relating to the witnessing of atrocities or massacres, endorsed by over 29% of
respondents in this study, could be viewed as an example of “transgression by others.”
Characteristics associated with PMIE exposure.
The likelihood of being exposed to a PMIE was found to be associated with
several sociodemographic, military, or deployment related covariates, though the
direction of the association varied according to question. The most consistent finding,
that females were less likely to report exposure to PMIE than males, was found on the
“any PMIE” question and across 6 of the 7 PMIE subtypes. This sex difference in
exposure likely results from females representing less than 15% of the total Canadian
military with only 2.4% to 5.6% (Regular and Reserve Forces, respectively) serving in
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combat arms roles16 (Department of National Defence, 2014); the remainder serve in
more distal roles such as logistic support, communications, or medical personnel. The
only other variable that was associated with a lower prevalence for PMIE endorsement
was education, specifically graduating from a post-secondary institution, which only
reached statistical significance twice: once for witnessing atrocities or massacres, and
again for inability to respond to threatening situations because of ROE (34% and 38%
reductions relative to not finishing secondary school, respectively). Individuals in the
rank grouping of Senior NCM (Sargent to Chief Warrant Officer) were found to have a
greater likelihood of endorsing exposure to a PMIE, in particular witnessing atrocities,
being unable to respond due to ROE, and seeing injured women or children that they
were unable to help. This finding may be a function of the length of time they have been
in the CF, and not their rank per se (i.e., the longer a person is in the military, the greater
the likelihood that they would have advanced in rank). Having served for a longer period
of time also increases the odds that they would have been deployed on the
aforementioned UN missions to areas such as Rwanda or Somalia, where most of the
associated PMIEs could have been experienced. Future studies should include a variable
that accounts for length of time in the military in order to investigate this interpretation.
The covariate that was most frequently associated with an increase in PMIE exposure
endorsement was deployment duration, however, the underlying reason for this
association potentially differs. Individuals whose total deployment duration ranged from
121 to 240 days were associated with between a 27% and 113% increase rate in PMIE

The term “combat arms” is used by the Canadian Forces to describe the four combat-focused
areas of occupation that make up the Canadian Army: infantry, armour, artillery, and combat
engineers.
16

MORAL INJURY IN CF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN

123

endorsement relative to those deployed for less than 121 days. This group, however,
represented 57% of those surveyed and the result may be a reflection of the number of
individuals deployed and therefore are available to be exposed to PMIEs and not duration
per se. In comparison, individuals deployed for over 361 days were associated with
between a 48% and a 156% increase in PMIE endorsement compared to those deployed
for less than 121 days and thereby may be a more accurate reflection of the effect of
deployment duration (the longer an individual is deployed, the more opportunities they
have to be exposed to a PMIE) than those deployed between 121 and 240 days. Future
researchers interested in the influence of deployment duration on PMIE exposure might
wish to create a variable that standardizes the relationship (e.g., number of PMIE
exposures per days deployed).
It is important to remember that since the outcome variables of interest relates to
exposure to PMIEs and not the development of a moral injury, these results are
associational in nature and not causal; none of the demographic, military, or deployment
characteristics will either cause or protect service members from exposure to a PMIE.
Using receiving a flu shot as an analogy, there is nothing inherent in receiving a flu shot
[demographic characteristics] that will increase or decrease an individual’s likelihood of
coming in contact with the flu virus [exposure to a PMIE], what the flu shot does affect is
the likelihood that the individual will go on to develop the flu should they encounter the
virus [moral injury]. The variable that would have a causal relationship with PMIE
exposure, and in effect may underly all of the characteristics found to have significant
associations, was not measured as part of the CFMHS – exposure to combat situations.
Not everyone who was deployed in support of the mission to Afghanistan would be
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engaged in combat operations, so not everyone had the opportunity to be exposed to the
types of PMIE that were captured in this study. Consequently, future research into both
PMIE and moral injury might wish to incorporate some type of a “combat exposure”
variable, be it one of frequency, intensity, or duration.
Limitations
There are some notable limitations to this study. The first limitation stems from
the necessity to use a proxy measure of PMIE composed of questions available in the
CFMHS rather than using an established and validated measure of PMIE such as the
MIES (Nash et al., 2013) or the MIQ-MV (Currier, Holland, Drescher, et al., 2015). As a
result, the questions used may not reflect the complete spectrum of PMIE that a service
member may encounter while deployed, and consequently, the results may be
underestimates of true exposure prevalence. While these measures were not available at
the time of either survey creation or administration, they are currently available and
future iterations of the CFMHS would benefit from their inclusion as well as the
inclusion of measures specifically focussed on moral injury such as the MISS-M (Koenig
et al., 2017) or the EMIS-M (Currier et al., 2017). Related to the use of proxy measures
for PMIE was the questions that were selected to use as symptom and behavioural
comparisons between PMIE exposure groups. As the primary goal of the study was to
estimate the prevalence rate of PMIE exposure within the Canadian Armed Forces as a
proxy for moral injury, it was necessary to select questions that had been administered to
all survey respondents to maintain this representativeness. While there existed within the
CFMHS questions pertaining to symptoms and behaviours more typically associated with
moral injury (e.g., feelings of shame and guilt), these questions were contained within the

MORAL INJURY IN CF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN

125

Depression module of the survey, a module that was only administered to individuals that
screened positive for possible depression based on earlier questions; approximately 64%
of respondents (Statistics Canada, 2014b). Consequently, the answers from these
questions would not be representative of the whole CF, rather only that subgroup within
the CF.
A second limitation relates to the cross-sectional nature of the CFMHS. As with
all studies that use this design, since it only captures the participants’ responses at a
single time point, its results cannot be used to predict future events. As the development
of moral injury in particular is a function of the individual’s reprocessing of the PMIE,
which can happen at any time after the event (Litz et al., 2009), longitudinal studies will
need to be conducted to determine precisely how exposure to PMIE may be linked to the
development of moral injury. Third, the CFMHS is a self-report questionnaire and, as
such, is vulnerable to a number of recall biases most importantly, social desirability bias.
While Statistics Canada took all appropriate steps to ensure both the anonymity of
participants and confidentiality of their responses, some of the questions asked delve into
areas where service members may still be hesitant to respond to truthfully. The questions
that formed the PMIE exposure variable in particular relate to situations that by definition
may violate the service members deeply held moral beliefs, they may have difficulty
admitting the truth to themselves let alone a stranger who is not part of the military. As
self-report measures will likely continue to be the default method for obtaining
information of this nature, future research might wish to also include supplemental
information sources to corroborate the individual’s responses (e.g., after-action reports),
as well as taking formal steps to ensure that there are no legal or military repercussions
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for service members who admit engaging in unsanctioned behaviours (e.g., formal
waivers of culpability). Fourth, the CFMHS at times made use of multi-barrelled
questions (e.g., Have you ever purposely injured, tortured, or killed another person?)
which can lead to conflicted answers, especially when answer options are limited to yes
or no. Using this question as an example, injuring, or killing other people is sometimes a
necessary part of a service members role, especially when deployed on a combat mission,
so high levels of endorsement of these actions would be expected. Purposely torturing
people, in contrast, is not part of their role and is expressly prohibited under international
law, and as such, low levels of endorsement would be expected. In addition to the
aforementioned waivers from prosecution, future researchers need to be sure that all the
options contained within multi-barrelled questions (when they cannot be avoided) relate
to the same concept. For example, “injure” and “kill” both exist as points on the same
conceptual spectrum relating to the amount or degree of harm caused to another person
(the injury is the result of an action). The concept of torture, in contrast, which may
involve causing injury to an individual, also contains the underlying purpose of causing
that injury (e.g., to get information); injury is the method of action to achieve the
outcome and not the outcome itself. Another potential limitation is the absence of a
variable in the CFMHS that specified the specific year(s) each service member was
deployed to Afghanistan, thus precluding the analysis of potential cohort effects and how
these related to exposure to PMIEs. The purpose and scope of the Canadian Forces
deployment to Afghanistan changed over the duration of their various operations;
combating international terrorism post-9/11 (2001-2003), combating insurgents and
securing the capital of Kabul so that a new Afghan government could take power (2003-
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2008), conducting combat operations throughout the whole of Kandahar Province (20062011), and finally delivering training and professional development support to various
Afghan National Security Forces (2011-2014) so they could assume responsibility for the
country’s security when the Canadian Forces mission ended in 2014 (Department of
National Defence, 2018). Related to these changes during different operational phases
were increases in the number of fatalities the Canadian Forces sustained which peaked
between 2006 and 2009 averaging 33 individuals per year during this time (Veterans
Affairs Canada, 2019).
Finally, the CFMHS was only administered to currently serving members of the
Canadian Armed Forces, which may have led to an incomplete picture of the prevalence
of PMIE exposure in those service members who were deployed in support of the mission
to Afghanistan; individuals who served in Afghanistan but have since been discharged
from the military due to physical or psychological injury, for example, would not have
been captured in this sample. This could mean that the prevalence rates presented in this
study may be more representative of a “high functioning” sample of CF members – those
who were exposed to PMIE but are still able to function adequately to continue in their
current roles. Future research into prevalence rates of both PMIE and moral injury itself
would benefit from administering the updated versions of CFMHS to all CF members
who were deployed to Afghanistan, whether they are currently members of the military or
are now considered to be veterans.
Notwithstanding these limitations, this investigation found that exposure to
potentially morally injurious events was a common occurrence for those Canadian Armed
Forces members deployed to Afghanistan. As such, further focussed research into the
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exposure to potential morally injurious events and the concomitant emotional,
psychological, and behavioural ramifications of such exposure is needed. The results of
these studies will provide a needed foundation for developing training procedures that
will better prepare service men and women for when they encounter this new aspect of
the ever-changing battlespace.
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Chapter 4
Connection between exposure to PMIE and Self-Rated Positive Mental Health
The World Health Organization (WHO) described mental health as “a state of
wellbeing in which the individual realizes his or her own abilities, can cope with the
normal stresses of life, can work productively and fruitfully, and is able to make a
contribution to his or her own community” (World Health Organization, 2004, p. 10).
Central to this definition is the individual’s ability to function, both as an individual and
as part of their larger community. Notably absent from this definition however is any
mention of mental illness, specifically, it contains no requirement for the individual to be
free of mental illness. According to this description, it would be possible for an
individual who has been diagnosed with a mental illness (e.g., depression, anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder), but is functioning well in society as a result of psychotherapy
or medications, for example, to still be considered to be mentally healthy. By extension,
it also allows for the opposite to be true; an individual may not be mentally healthy even
though they have not been diagnosed with a mental illness, solely because they are not
functioning well. Mental health and mental illness, rather than existing as opposing poles
on a single continuum (Figure 4.1a), are seen as existing on two separate continua
ranging from a maximal level of mental health (or mental illness) to a complete absence
of mental health (or mental illness) (Keyes, 2014) (Figure 4.1b). Using a physical
malady as an analogy, an individual with untreated diabetes can experience a variety of
symptoms as a result of their illness including fatigue, blurred vision, and slower healing
of injuries. With appropriate treatment such as lifestyle change or medication, these
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(a)

(b)

Figure 4.1a. Traditional Single Continuum Model
Figure 4.1b. Dual Continuum Model (adapted from Keyes, 2014)

symptoms can be managed, and the individual can live a normal life (i.e., function in
society). Even though they are no longer experiencing symptoms and are functioning
well, they are nonetheless still a diabetic. Applying the WHO definition to this example,
they could be considered to be both “sick” and “healthy” (i.e., functional) at the same
time. A similar inclusion of a functional component can be seen in the frequently used
diagnostic criterion within the latest version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM-5), requiring that the symptoms the individual experiences
“cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other
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important areas of functioning” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013); if this
criterion is not met, the individual does not receive the diagnosis.17 This
conceptualization of mental health and mental illness as existing on two separate continua
(dual continuum model), also reflects a change in practice focus for those treating
individuals who are living with mental illness, moving away from what has been termed
an illness-driven model where the goal of treatment is the reduction in symptoms, to a
model that now includes the reinforcement of behaviours that encourage positive mental
health. (For a detailed review of the positive mental health concept, see Hubka &
Lakaski, 2013)
Keyes and colleagues have operationalized this dual-continua concept through the
creation of the Mental Health Continuum – Short Form (MHC-SF; Keyes, 2009). The
MHC-SF was designed to measure well-being in three interrelated spheres: First,
emotional well-being, is characterized by happiness and an interest in and satisfaction
with one’s life. Second, psychological well-being, is characterized by self-acceptance, a
perceived mastery of one’s environment, a sense of autonomy and purpose in life, the
ability to have personal growth, as well as having positive, trusting relationships with
others. Finally, social well-being, which is characterized by feelings of social
acceptance, social growth, social coherence, and that one is contributing to society.
Based on their responses to questions designed to measure these respective spheres,
individuals are categorized as “flourishing,” “languishing,” or as possessing “moderate”
mental health. The MHC-SF has been administered and validated in non-clinical

17

Realistically speaking, if their symptoms were not causing some form of distress (for them or
others), it is unlikely that the individual would be seen by a clinician for diagnosis or treatment to
begin with.
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populations in a number of countries including Canada (Hubka & Lakaski, 2013), the
Netherlands (Lamers, Westerhof, Bohlmeijer, ten Klooster, & Keyes, 2011), the United
States of America, South Africa, France, South Korea, Poland, Italy, Portugal, Iran, and
Argentina (cited in: Franken, Lamers, Ten Klooster, Bohlmeijer, & Westerhof, 2018;
Keyes, 2009), as well as in a population of Dutch psychiatric out-patients (Franken et al.,
2018). The MHC-SF has also been incorporated into the Canadian Community Health
Survey (CCHS); an annual cross-sectional survey designed to collect information of the
health status, health care utilization, and determinants of health for the Canadian
population, since the 2012 iteration.
Exposure to the traumas associated with military service and how these exposures
are related to the prevalence of mental illness has been the focus of many researchers, in
particular the recent deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq (e.g., Garber, Zamorski, &
Jetly, 2012; Hoge et al., 2004; Visco, 2009). These conflicts have brought with them
exposure to a new type of warfighting not experienced by service members in previous
wars; one where their opponents are seemingly not constrained by the international
recognized rules of war (e.g., Geneva Conventions, International Humanitarian Law).
This abandonment of rules by one party can create situations where service members may
witness, be unable to prevent, or even act in ways that can conflict with their core moral
beliefs about themselves, others, and their role in the world. The reprocessing of these
events, alternately called potentially morally injurious events (PMIE; Litz et al., 2009) or
transgressive events (Frankfurt & Frazier, 2016), after the fact can lead them to realize
that a core moral belief may have been violated. This realization may lead to a state of
inner psychic conflict or dissonance being created that the individual cannot resolve for
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themselves. The affect that these types of combat experiences may have on service
members self-perceived mental health has not yet been investigated however and forms
one of the objectives for this study.
Aims of this study
Using the results of the Canadian Forces Mental Health Survey (Statistics Canada,
2014b), this study aims to answer the following questions: What are the prevalence rates
of positive mental health (i.e., flourishing, languishing, and moderate mental health) in
Canadian Forces members deployed in support of the mission to Afghanistan? What
sociodemographic, military, or deployment characteristics might be associated with
positive mental health in this population? How are the prevalence rates of positive
mental health affected by Canadian Forces members’ exposure to potentially morally
injurious events (PMIE)?
Methods
Data source and study population
The Canadian Forces Mental Health Survey (CFMHS, Statistics Canada, 2014b)
was the source of the data for this study. Conducted by Statistics Canada between April
and August 2013, the CFMHS is a cross-sectional survey containing a variety of
questions directly and indirectly related to the mental health status of the Canadian
Armed Forces (CF) members surveyed. A subset of this population, specifically all
regular and reserve force members of the CF who had been deployed in support of the
mission to Afghanistan between 2001 and 2013 (n = 4,854), forms the target population
for this study.
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Sampling and data collection
Statistics Canada utilized a stratified random sampling framework (stratified by
military rank) to ensure that the resultant sample would remain representative of the
whole of the CF. In order to reinforce the confidentiality of the survey, interviews were
conducted on-base by Statistics Canada personnel using a computer assisted personnel
interview. Respondents were informed that these Statistics Canada personnel were
neither affiliated with nor would they report back to the CF any responses received
during survey administration.
Measures
Potentially Morally Injurious Experiences (PMIE)
Several scales related to exposure to PMIEs and moral injury have been published
since the CFMHS was administered in 2013 (e.g., Moral Injury Events Scale (MIES;
Nash et al., 2015), Moral Injury Questionnaire – Military Version (MIQ-M; Currier et al.,
2017), Moral Injury Symptoms Scale – Military Version (MISS-M; Koenig et al., 2017),
Expressions of Moral Injury Scale (EMIS-M; Currier et al., 2017)), however, these tools
were not available at that time. Consequently, exposure to potentially morally injurious
events (PMIE) was determined using a composite measure based on prevailing moral
injury theory and questions that refer specifically to PMIE from the psychometrically
validated MIES and MIQ-M as a guide. The resultant measure was composed of
questions drawn from the Deployment Experiences (DEX) and Post-Traumatic Stress
(PTS) modules of the CFMHS. The final list of questions selected was sent to a content
expert for review and verification that they met the criteria for PMIE (B. Litz, personal
communication, 03 August 2017).
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The DEX questions18 selected were DEX-2 “found yourself in a threatening
situation where you were unable to respond because of rules of engagement;” DEX-4
“ever seen ill or injured women or children you were unable to help;” DEX-6 “ever felt
responsible for the death of Canadian or allied personnel;” and DEX-8 “ever had
difficulty distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants.” Selected PTS
questions included were PTS-25 “Have you ever done something that accidentally lead to
serious injury or death of another person;” PTS-26 “Have you ever purposely injured,
tortured, or killed another person;” and PTS-27 “Have you ever seen atrocities or
massacres such as mutilated bodies or mass killings.” In an effort to restrict participant
inclusion to only those who had experienced PMIE during deployment(s), participants
must have also endorsed one of the two following questions for the aforementioned PTS
questions to be included in the measure: “Have you ever participated in combat, either as
a member of the military, or as a member of an organized non-military group,” or “Have
you ever served as a peacekeeper or relief worker in a war zone or in a place where there
was ongoing terror of people because of political, ethnic, religious, or other conflicts?”
(PTS questions 1 and 2, respectively). Individuals who positively endorsed any of
selected DEX or PTS questions were considered to have been exposed to a PMIE
(PMIE+), the remaining participants were considered to have not been exposed to a
PMIE (PMIE-).
The CFMHS also contains information relating to the sociodemographic and
military characteristics of the participants gathered from two sources: Department of
National Defence and Canadian Forces administrative records and directly from the

18

All DEX questions are preceded by “During any [Canadian Forces] deployment, have you …”
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respondents. This information includes the participants’ age, sex, marital status,
educational attainment, rank category (Junior Non-Commissioned Member (NCM)
[Private to Master Corporal], Senior NCM [Sargent to Chief Warrant Officer], or
Officer), component (regular force, reserve force), previous exposure to mental health
training, and information relating to their Afghanistan deployment.
Self-rated Mental Health
The CFMHS module on positive mental health utilized the Mental Health
Continuum – Short Form (MHC-SF) (Keyes, 2009). The MHC-SF is a 14-item, selfreport questionnaire in which each item is designed to measure a single dimension of
well-being within three interrelated spheres, namely, emotional well-being, psychological
well-being, and social well-being. Available response options are arranged to indicate
frequencies of experiencing within the last month ranging from “every day” through
“never” on a 6-point Likert scale (see Appendix A). Based on their responses to the
questions, individuals are categorized as having “flourishing” mental health if they
responded at a high level (i.e., “every day” or “almost every day”) on at least one of the
emotional well-being questions and at a high level on least 6 of the remaining questions,
“languishing” if they responded at a low level (i.e., either “never” or “once or twice”) to
the emotional well-being questions and at a low level on at least 6 of the remaining
questions, and “moderate” if they do not meet the criteria for either flourishing or
languishing.
Statistical Analyses
Statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS 23 and STATA 15, with results
being weighted and an alpha level set to 0.05. List-wise deletion was used to ensure all
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analyses were conducted on complete cases. Statistics Canada provided the final sample
weights (adjusting for initial sampling weight, removal of outliers, and participant nonresponse) so that the estimates produced from the CFMHS data would be reflective of the
entire Canadian Armed Forces population at time of survey (n = 68,866) (Statistics
Canada, 2014a). A bootstrapping technique using sampling weights (500 bootstrap
samples also provided by Statistics Canada) was used to account for the complex survey
design (Statistics Canada, 2014c). Per Statistics Canada guidelines, all final cell counts
were rounded to the nearest 20, so as to protect the identity of respondents. Descriptive
statistics were calculated for each variable used in the analyses (e.g., socio-demographic,
military, mental-health training, and deployment related characteristics), and used as
covariates in logistic regressions to determine the effect of PMIE exposure on self-rated
positive mental health. With regards to Mental Health Training, only the final composite
question (i.e., “Any mental health training in the last 5 years”) was used as a covariate in
the regression analysis. Adjusted Odds Ratios (AOR) were calculated for the logistic
regressions rather than the usual regression coefficient (i.e., β) to ease the interpretation
of results. The AOR indicates the odds of a given outcome occurring (e.g., developing
the flu) if the individual was exposed to a specific event or stimulus (e.g., receiving the
flu shot) compared with the odds of the same outcome occurring without said exposure
(e.g., not receiving the flu shot), when all other covariates (e.g., age, sex, marital status,
etc.) are kept constant.
Ethics approval
The original data collection procedures for the survey and access to the resultant
database containing the survey results were reviewed and approved by the relevant
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committees at Statistics Canada that serve these purposes in terms of ethical treatment of
participants, following the principles detailed in the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical
Conduct of Research Involving Humans TCPS-2 (Secretariat on Responsible Conduct of
Research, 2014). The Research Ethics Board of Western University provided a waiver
for this study as it constitutes a secondary data analysis, which does not require an ethical
review under TCPS-2.
Results
The weighted sociodemographic, mental health, military, and deployment
characteristics for survey respondents are presented in Table 4.1. Of those deployed in
support of the mission to Afghanistan who were surveyed, almost 73% indicated that they
were either married or in a common-law relationship, 41% were under the age of 35, and
over half had completed post-secondary education (i.e., a university degree or college
diploma). Almost 84% of respondents indicated they had received mental health training
from the CF in the previous five years with the periods prior to and following a CF
deployment receiving the highest rates of endorsement (59% and 64%, respectively).
Those CF members who felt their mental health was either very good or excellent
accounted for 56% of respondents, and almost 73% would be classified as “flourishing”
on the MHC-SF.
Logistic regressions were conducted to investigate the association between
proportion of respondents assigned to each of the three levels of positive mental health
classification according on the MHC-SF and the selected respondent characteristics are
presented in Table 4.2. Variables associated with statistically significant increases in
proportions of respondents classified as “flourishing” included being between 19 and 24
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Table 4.1
Demographic, military, and deployment characteristics
Characteristic
Sociodemographic
Sex
Male
Female
Age (years)
19-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55 and over
Marital Status
Married or Common-law
Widowed, Separated, or Divorced
Single (never married)
Education
Less than secondary school graduation
Secondary school graduate
Some post-secondary
Post-secondary graduation
More than post-secondary graduation
Mental Health Related
Self-rated mental health
Poor
Fair
Good
Very Good
Excellent
Positive Mental Health (MHC-SF)
Flourishing
Moderate
Languishing
Mental Health Training last 5 years (endorsed)
Preparation for a CF deployment
End of a CF deployment
Preparation for a higher rank
During trades training
By PSP personnel/health office
Routine training/professional development
Any mental health training in the last 5 years
Military Factors
Military Component
Regular Forces
Reserve Forces

Weighted %

95% CI

89.20
10.80

88.20 – 90.20
9.80 – 11.80

4.06
36.58
34.43
22.97
2.03

3.43 – 4.69
35.23 – 37.92
33.11 – 35.74
21.79 – 24.16
1.70 – 2.35

72.73
8.41
18.85

71.42 – 74.04
7.54 – 9.28
17.73 – 19.98

4.55
28.90
9.22
51.23
6.10

3.93 – 5.17
27.48 – 30.33
8.32 – 10.11
49.66 – 52.79
5.49 – 6.72

3.40
12.77
27.86
39.38
16.65

2.83 – 3.97
11.73 – 13.81
26.52 – 29.21
37.94 – 40.81
15.50 – 17.79

72.48
24.96
2.63

71.11 – 73.85
23.64 – 26.27
2.10 – 3.15

58.92
63.71
33.35
13.89
20.48
46.83
83.89

57.47 – 60.38
62.26 – 65.17
31.90 – 34.81
12.81 – 14.98
19.20 – 21.76
45.27 – 48.38
82.77 – 85.01

86.69
13.37

86.61 – 86.78
13.28 – 13.45
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Rank Group*
Junior NCM
48.21 47.74 – 48.68
Senior NCM
31.74 31.35 – 32.14
Officer
20.05 19.78 – 20.31
Deployment Related
Total number of days deployed (days)
< 120
13.67 12.60 – 14.74
121-240
57.25 55.74 – 58.77
241-360
14.15 13.04 – 15.25
Over 361
14.93 13.85 – 16.00
Potentially Morally Injurious Events (PMIE)
Not exposed
34.84 33.37 – 36.32
Exposed
65.21 63.74 – 66.68
Specific PMIE (endorsed)
Accidentally caused serious injury or death of
6.11
5.31 – 6.92
another person
Purposely injured, tortured, or killed another
15.94 14.77 – 17.11
person
Saw atrocities or massacres
29.33 27.87 – 30.79
Found self in threatening situation where you were
35.41 33.90 – 36.92
unable to respond due to ROE
Seen injured women or children who you were
48.37 46.68 – 50.07
unable to help
Felt responsible for the death of Canadian or allied
8.41
7.48 – 9.35
personnel
Had difficulty distinguishing between combatants
43.55 41.87 – 45.24
and non-combatants
Note: Some proportions may not total to 100% as a result of Statistics Canada rounding
requirements.
PSP = Personnel Support Program, MHC-SF = Mental Health Continuum – Short Form,
NCM = Non-Commissioned Member, Junior NCM = Private to Master Corporal, Senior
NCM = Sargent to Chief Warrant Officer, ROE = Rules of Engagement
relative to being 55 and over (AOR: 1.92, 95% CI: 0.04 – 1.27), having more than a postsecondary education (AOR: 1.96, 95% CI: 1.19 – 3.22), and reporting having received
any mental health training in the previous 5 years (AOR: 1.32, 95% CI: 1.08 – 1.61).
Being either single or widowed, separated, or divorced were associated with decreased in
rates of flourishing compared to those who were married or living common-law (AOR:
0.57 – 0.65, see Table 4.2 for respective 95% CIs), as was having a non-commissioned

MORAL INJURY IN CF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN

147

rank compared to being an officer (AOR: 0.57 – 0.80). The proportion of respondents
classified as possessing “moderate” mental health was significantly increased in
respondents who were of Junior NCM rank (AOR: 1.58, 95% CI: 1.26 – 1.99) versus
Officers, and those who were not married or living common-law (AOR: 1.40 – 4.68). In
contrast, having more than a post-secondary education and having received mental health
training in the previous 5 years were associated with statistically significant decreases in
rates of moderate mental health classification (AOR: 0.49 and 0.76, respectively).
Finally, being single (never married) was associated with an increased prevalence of a
languishing classification on the MHC-SF (AOR: 2.23, 95% CI: 1.25 – 3.96), as did
being of a Junior NCM rank (AOR: 3.55, 95% CI: 1.47 – 8.53). Deployment duration
was not statistically significantly associated with classification in any mental health
classification (p > 0.05).
Logistic regression models for the association between PMIE exposure types and
the proportion of respondents flourishing, moderate, or languishing are presented in Table
4.3 (full regression models are presented in Appendices B, C, and D, respectively).
Controlling for sociodemographic, military, and deployment characteristics, all of the
possible PMIE exposure types were associated with almost equal decreases in rates of
flourishing (AOR: 0.63 to 0.75, see Table 4.3 for full AOR and 95% CI) versus not
flourishing, with “feeling responsible for the death of Canadian or allied personnel”
having the strongest association (AOR: 0.63, 95% CI: 0.49 – 0.82). Similarly, all
possible types of PMIE exposure were associated with statistically significant increases in
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Table 4.2
Associations between sociodemographic, military, and deployment factors and self-reported mental health categories.
Characteristic
Flourishing
Moderate
Languishing
AOR
95% CI
AOR
95% CI
AOR
95% CI
Sociodemographic
Sex
Male
Reference
Reference
Reference
Female
0.97
0.77 - 1.22
1.07
0.85 - 1.34
0.75
0.32 - 1.79
Age (years)
19-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55 and over

1.92 *
1.25
0.96
1.07
Reference

Marital Status
Married or Common-law
Widowed, Separated, or Divorced
Single (never married)

Reference
0.57 ***
0.65 ***

Education
Less than SS graduation
SS graduate
Some post-secondary
Post-secondary graduation
More than post-secondary graduation

Reference
0.94
1.28
1.16
1.96 **

1.03 - 3.58
0.77 - 2.04
0.60 - 1.52
0.66 - 1.72

0.63
0.96
1.22
1.01
Reference

0.44 - 0.73
0.43 - 0.80

Reference
1.68 ***
1.40 **

0.66 - 1.35
0.84 - 1.94
0.91 - 1.66
1.19 - 3.22

Reference
1.16
0.79
0.92
0.49 **

0.34 - 1.17
0.59 - 1.58
0.76 - 1.94
0.62 - 1.63

0.23
0.58
0.40
0.66
Reference

0.04 - 1.27
0.07 - 1.05
0.11 - 1.42
0.18 - 2.42

1.31 - 2.17
1.13 - 1.72

Reference
1.70
2.23 **

0.90 - 3.20
1.25 - 3.96

0.80 - 1.68
0.52 - 1.22
0.63 - 1.34
0.30 - 0.82

Reference
0.59
0.86
0.65
1.05

0.24 - 1.45
0.33 - 2.26
0.27 - 1.54
0.25 - 4.36
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Military Factors
Component
Regular Forces
Reserve Forces

Reference
0.95

Rank Group
Junior NCM
Senior NCM
Officer

0.57 ***
0.80 *
Reference

0.45 - 0.71
0.63 - 1.00

1.58 ***
1.20
Reference

1.26 - 1.99
0.95 - 1.51

3.55 **
1.96
Reference

1.47 - 8.53
0.83 - 4.62

1.32 **

1.08 - 1.61

0.76 **

0.62 - 0.93

0.88

0.52 - 1.51

MHT in last 5 years
Any Mental Health Training

0.81 - 1.11

Reference
1.09

0.93 - 1.27

Reference
0.85

0.54 - 1.32

Deployment Related
Total number of days deployed (days)
< 120 days
Reference
Reference
Reference
121-240 days
0.96
0.77 - 1.20
1.08
0.86 - 1.36
0.78
0.40 - 1.51
241-360 days
1.09
0.82 - 1.45
0.94
0.70 - 1.26
0.81
0.35 - 1.89
Over 361 days
0.85
0.65 - 1.13
1.19
0.89 - 1.58
0.97
0.44 - 2.16
Note: AOR = Adjusted Odds Ratio, MHT = Mental Health Training, NCM = Non-Commissioned Member, ROE = Rules of
Engagement, SS = Secondary School
* .01 < p ≤ .05, **.001 < p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ 0.001, Reference category has an AOR = 1.00
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rates of languishing (AOR: 1.71 to 3.29, see Table 4.3 for full AOR and 95% CI)
compared with not languishing, with “accidentally causing the serious injury or death of
another person” having the strongest association (AOR: 3.29, 95% CI: 1.78 – 6.10).
Discussion
Using data collected as part of the Canadian Forces Mental Health Survey
(CFMHS), a cross-sectional survey of representative sample of all regular and reserve
force members of the CF who were deployed in support of the mission to Afghanistan,
the prevalence rate and potential sociodemographic, military, or deployment predictors of
self-reported positive mental health as measured by the Mental Health Continuum
(Keyes, 2009) was determined. As well, the association between exposure to potentially
morally injurious events (PMIE) and positive mental health was examined.
Prevalence rates for self-reported positive mental health
Of the Canadian Forces members who were deployed in support of the recent
mission to Afghanistan, almost 73% would be classified as flourishing, 3% as
languishing, and 25% as having moderate (i.e. neither flourishing nor languishing) mental
health according to the Mental Health Continuum – Short Form (Keyes, 2009). These
finding differ slightly from those found on the 2012 Canadian Community Health
Survey– Mental Health (CCHS-MH), where, using the complete sample, the respective
percentages were 77%, 1.5%, and 22% (Gilmour, 2014). When individuals who had
experienced a mental disorder (i.e., mood disorder, generalized anxiety disorder,
substance use or abuse disorder) in the preceding 12 months were removed from the
CCHS-MH sample, the percentages flourishing, languishing, or possessing moderate
mental health changed to 80.7%, 0.7%, and 18.7%, respectively (calculated from data
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Table 4.3
Effect of PMIE exposure on Positive Mental Health category.
PMIE Type Experienced

Flourishing
Any PMIE
AOR
0.63 ***
95% CI
0.54 - 0.74
Accidentally caused serious injury or death of
AOR
0.66 *
another person
95% CI
0.48 - 0.91
Purposely injured, tortured, or killed someone
AOR
0.68 ***
95% CI
0.56 - 0.84
Saw atrocities or massacres
AOR
0.75 **
95% CI
0.63 - 0.94
Unable to respond due to ROE
AOR
0.68 ***
95% CI
0.58 - 0.79
Seen injured women/children unable to help
AOR
0.66 ***
95% CI
0.56 - 0.77
Felt responsible for the death of Canadian or
AOR
0.63 ***
allied personnel
95% CI
0.49 - 0.82
Difficulty distinguishing between combatants
AOR
0.68 ***
and non-combatants
95% CI
0.59 - 0.79
Note: PMIE = Potentially Morally Injurious Event, ROE = Rules of Engagement
* = 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ** = 0.001 < p ≤ 0.01, *** = p ≤ 0.001

Positive Mental Health
Moderate
1.46 ***
1.24 - 1.70
1.20
0.86 - 1.67
1.23 *
1.02 - 1.56
1.24 *
1.04 - 1.49
1.34 ***
1.14 - 1.58
1.44 ***
1.22 - 1.70
1.34 *
1.02 - 1.75
1.35 ***
1.16 - 1.58

Languishing
2.38 **
1.36 - 4.17
3.29 ***
1.78 - 6.10
2.62 ***
1.49 - 4.60
1.71 *
1.06 - 2.76
2.24 ***
1.42 - 3.53
1.82 **
1.16 - 2.86
2.81 ***
1.58 - 4.99
2.10 ***
1.36 - 3.23
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provided in: Gilmour, 2014). Researchers investigating population prevalence rates of
positive mental health in other countries have found proportions that are significantly
different than those found herein (e.g., flourishing: 20%, languishing: 14%, and
moderate: 66% found by (Keyes, 2002)), however, these surveys are not directly
comparable due to differences in language and format of survey administration,
population of interest, and age ranges.
Characteristics associated with MHC-SF classifications
The most consistent characteristics associated with positive mental health
classification were Marital Status and Rank Group. Relative to those respondents who
reported being either married or living in a common-law relationship, individuals who
were widowed, separated, or divorced were 43% less likely to be classified as having
flourishing mental health, and 68% more likely to be placed in the moderate mental
health category; they were also 70% more likely to be classified as languishing, but this
last difference did not reach statistical significance (p = 0.10). Similarly, individuals who
were single (never married) were 35% less likely to be classified as having flourishing
mental health, 40% more likely to be classified in the moderate mental health category,
and were 123% more likely to be classified as languishing, than those who were married
or in a common-law relationship. These results, in particular those regarding decreases in
flourishing and increases in languishing, coincide with the findings of Smith et al. who
also found that being married was associated with a more favourable health status (Smith
et al., 2007) and may be explained using social causation theory (Lee & Kim, 2009).
This theory asserts that marriage improves psychological well-being either directly or
through the moderating (or buffering) of negative life events. This buffering effect is
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believed to occur in part as a result the increased levels of social support provided by the
family structure and increased social network size created by marriage (e.g., combination
of social circles of both partners, in-laws) assisting individuals to deal with stressful
situations that could affect their mental health. Individuals who are single (never
married) theoretically would not have access to this type of enhanced social support
network when they return from deployment, while service members who are no longer
married but once were (i.e., separated, divorced, or widowed), once had access to this
network but through their change in marital status, have lost it, potentially compounding
the effect (Williams, Frech, & Carleson, 2010). This mediation of positive mental health
through the social support provided by family and household characteristics was also
found in a sample of Canadian Forces members conducted in 2016 (Therrien, Richer,
Lee, Watkins, & Zamorski, 2016). The definitions used in the CFMHS with regards to
marital status, however, potentially miss another potential “relationship-type” grouping
which both the single and widowed, separated, and divorced individuals may be a part –
those in a romantic relationship with a non-cohabiting partner who could potentially
provide for them the same kind of social support network as that of married individuals.
The relationship between marital status and mental health is a potentially complex one as
factors such as marriage quality (e.g., good versus bad), marriage length, gender of
individuals, age of individuals, and if this is a first versus a successive marriage may all
potentially have an effect, and would benefit from further study, especially in a military
context.
When compared with Officers, individuals in the Junior NCM (Private to Master
Corporal) rank group were 43% less likely to be classified as possessing flourishing
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mental health, 58% more likely to be classified as having moderate mental health, and
255% more likely to be languishing. Senior NCM (Sargent to Chief Warrant Officer)
were found to be 20% less likely to be classified as flourishing compared to those of
Officer rank. The pattern of increasing likelihood of classification as possessing
moderate or languishing mental health was also seen in the Senior NCM rank grouping,
however, failed to reach statistical significance (p > 0.05). This finding aligns with those
of other researchers (e.g., Smith et al., 2007; Watkins, Lee, & Zamorski, 2017) who
found that having an Officer rank was associated with more favourable mental health
status. Rank had also been found to have a significant correlation with an individual’s
marital status with NCM being more likely to be single (never married) than Officers, and
Officers more likely to be married (Therrien et al., 2016), so the aforementioned
explanation regarding social causation theory may hold for rank as well. Also related to
the buffering effect of a solid social network, individuals at the lowest ranks (i.e., Junior
NCM), tend to have been in the military for shorter periods of time and may not have
rebuilt the same depth of a social network as they may have possessed before they
enlisted. The nature of military service often entails long periods separated from (nonmilitary) friends and families, people may not understand why they enlisted and in turn
begin to distance themselves from the recruit, and the increased risk of injury and death
itself can put stresses on relationships and can cause them to falter. In contrast,
individuals of higher ranks, tend to have been in the military for longer and may have
(re)formed a social network where their being in the military is potentially less
problematic; their friends are either in the military themselves so they know and accept
the associated hardships that come with service, or they entered into the social circle
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when the service member were already in the military so there is no change in the service
members social role in terms of their relationship. As was the case with marital status,
rank within the military is a potentially more complex concept than it may first appear
(e.g., rank can be related to the types of duty assignments an individual receives, roles
they serve while deployed, branch of service, etc.) and its association with an
individual’s mental health will be similarly complicated
Effect of PMIE exposure on MHC-SF classification
Probably the most dramatic finding of this study was the affect that exposure to
PMIE had on positive mental health classification. Holding all other demographic,
military, and deployment characteristics constant, it was found that individuals who
reported having been exposed to any PMIE were 37% less likely of being classified as
flourishing, 138% more likely to be classified as languishing, and 46% more likely to be
classified as possessing moderate mental health (i.e., neither flourishing or languishing)
when compared to those did not report a PMIE exposure. This pattern of decreased
levels of flourishing (ranging from 25% less [saw atrocities or massacres] to 37% less
[felt responsible for the death of Canadian or allied personnel]) and increased levels of
languishing (ranging from 71% [saw atrocities or massacres] to 229% increase
[accidentally caused serious injury or death of another person]) held for all reported subtypes of PMIE exposure. These findings provide strong support for both the presence of
exposure to PMIE in CF members who were deployed in support of the mission to
Afghanistan, and it’s associated detrimental effect on the mental health of those
members. This is especially true for PMIEs that involved causing the death, be it
intentional or accidental, of another individual, which would reinforce the specific
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relationship between of this traumatic event later development of PTSD, increased rates
of suicidal ideation and attempts, and substance use and abuse disorders proposed by
Maguen and others (Jensen & Simpson, 2014; Maguen et al., 2017; Maguen et al., 2010;
Maguen et al., 2011; Tripp, McDevitt-Murphy, & Henschel, 2015).
Limitations
There exist some notable limitations to this study. The first stems from the use of a proxy
measure to capture PMIE exposure that was composed of questions available in the
CFMHS and as a result, the complete spectrum of PMIEs a service member may
encounter while deployed may not have been captured. Future iterations of the CFMHS
would benefit from the inclusion of a validated measure of PMIE such as the MIES (Nash
et al., 2013) or the MIQ-MV (Currier, Holland, Drescher, & Foy, 2015) or ideally a
measure focussed specifically on moral injury, the actual outcome of interest, such as the
MISS-M (Koenig et al., 2017) or the EMIS-M (Currier et al., 2017).
A second limitation relates to the cross-sectional nature of the CFMHS. Since it
only captures the participants’ responses at a single time point, the results found cannot
be used to predict future events. To determine how exposure to PMIE is linked to the
development of moral injury, longitudinal studies will need to be conducted. Third, the
CFMHS is a self-report questionnaire and, as such, is vulnerable to recall bias, especially
social desirability bias. While test administrators took steps to ensure both the anonymity
of participants and confidentiality of their responses were maintained, some questions
still delve into areas where service members may be hesitant to respond to truthfully
despite these assurances. The questions that formed the exposure to PMIE variable in
particular relate to situations that, by definition, may violate the service members deeply
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held moral beliefs, they may have difficulty admitting the truth to themselves let alone
someone who is not in the military. As self-report measures will likely continue to be the
default method for obtaining information of this nature, future research might benefit
from the inclusion of supplemental information sources that can be used to corroborate
the individual’s responses (e.g., content of after-action reports), as well as taking formal
steps to ensure that there are no legal or military repercussions for service members who
admit engaging in unsanctioned behaviours (e.g., formal waivers of culpability).
The absence of a variable in the CFMHS that specified the specific year(s) each
service member was deployed to Afghanistan, thus precluding the analysis of potential
cohort effects and how these related to exposure to PMIE and self-rated positive mental
health, is another potential study limitation. In particular, the number of fatalities the
Canadian Forces (CF) experienced fluctuated significantly over the 12-year duration of
the Afghan deployment peaking between 2006 and 2009 when on average 33 individuals
were killed each year (Veterans Affairs Canada, 2019). These fluctuations in fatalities
were associated with changes in both the purpose and scope of the various operations that
comprised the mission as a whole. Between 2001 and 2003, for example, the CF were
focussed on combating international terrorist entities hiding in-country and the regime
believed to be supporting them. This focus was modified between 2003 and 2008 when
the security of the nation’s capital, Kabul, became paramount such that a new Afghan
government could be established; the CF mandate was broadened further to encompass
combating the insurgency in Kandahar Province (2006-2011). Finally, beginning in 2011
CF members were responsible for assisting with the training and professional
development support of various Afghan National Security Force personnel so that they
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would be ready to take over responsibility for the nation’s security when the CF mission
to Afghanistan would come to an end in 2014 (Department of National Defence, 2018).
Finally, as the CFMHS was only administered to currently serving members of
the Canadian Armed Forces, it may present an incomplete picture of both the prevalence
of positive mental health in the CF and the affect that exposure to a PMIE may have on
the same. For example, individuals who served in Afghanistan but have since been
discharged from the military due to physical or psychological injury, would not have
been captured in this iteration of the CFMHS. Consequentially, the prevalence rates
presented in this study may be more representative of a “high functioning” sample of CF
members. Future research regarding prevalence rates of mental health issues including
positive mental health and moral injury would benefit from broadening the sample to
include both current members of the CF as well as those who would not be considered
veterans to ensure that the results are as representative of the CF membership as possible.
These limitations aside, this investigation found that the positive mental health of
Canadian Forces members deployed in support of the mission to Afghanistan is similar to
that of the general Canadian population as a whole, but exposure to potentially morally
injurious events while deployed has a detrimental effect on the mental health of these
service members. As such, further research into how the exposure to potential morally
injurious events and the concomitant emotional, psychological, and behavioural
ramifications of such exposure is needed. The results of these future studies will provide
a foundation for developing training procedures that will better prepare service men and
women for when they encounter this new aspect of the everchanging battlespace.
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Chapter 5 – Overall Discussion
Using data from the Canadian Forces Mental Health Survey (CFMHS; Statistics
Canada, 2014), the current study examined a representative sample of Canadian Armed
Forces (CF) members who were deployed in support of the recent mission to Afghanistan
and their experiences with and exposure to potentially morally injurious events (PMIE).
As the Canadian Forces and Department of National Defence (DND) do not currently
collect information on exposure to PMIE, the primary focus of the study was to estimate
the prevalence rate of exposure to PMIE in this population. Next, two groups were
created according to Canadian Forces members’ reported exposure to PMIE (i.e., exposed
to a PMIE, not exposed to a PMIE) to determine how this exposure affects the self-rated
mental health of these CF members. The extent and type of ethical training currently
provided to CF members and its applicability to situations that might represent a PMIE
was also reviewed in order to establish context for the subsequent empirical analyses.
Prevalence estimates for exposure to PMIE
Questions relating to seven different events that would meet the criteria for a
PMIE according to the definition given by Litz (Litz et al., 2009) were asked including if
the respondent had difficulty distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants,
ever accidentally injured or killed another person, seen injured women or children that
they were unable to help, or witnessed atrocities or massacres while on a CF deployment
(see Table 3.1 for complete list of questions). Of those CF members that took part in the
CFMHS, almost two-thirds reported having experienced an event that would meet the
criteria for being a PMIE, with the most frequently endorsed PMIEs relating to seeing ill
or injured women and children they were unable to help (48%) and having difficulty
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distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants (43%). As the CFMHS used a
stratified random sampling framework to ensure that survey respondents would be
representative of the whole of the CF, this would translate to approximately 45,000
service members having potentially been exposed to some type of a PMIE, with 33,000
reporting they were unable to help sick or injured women and children, and 30,000
having experienced difficulty distinguishing combatants from non-combatants. These are
likely conservative estimates of the actual exposure rates since the CFMHS only
surveyed currently serving Regular and Reserve Force members, meaning that
individuals who had left or been discharged from the CF prior to survey completion
would not have been captured.
Exposure to PMIE and self-reported mental health of CF members
While the number of individuals exposed to a PMIE that go on to develop a moral
injury is not currently known, in part due to the highly personal and thereby variable
nature of the injury itself. However, if one were to use the past-year prevalence rate of
PTSD as a rough guideline for moral injury prevalence (i.e., 5.3%; Pearson, Zamorski, &
Janz, 2014), this would mean that over 3,600 currently serving CF members may be
experiencing the effects of a moral injury. The effect that exposure had on the results of
the MHC-SF (Keyes, 2009), a self-report measure of mental health and functioning,
would seem to support this assumption. When the responses of all CFMHS participants
were analysed the rates of flourishing (i.e., positive mental health and functioning) and
languishing (i.e., negative mental health and functioning) reported by CF members were
similar to those of the Canadian population as reported in the 2012 Canadian Community
Health Survey – Mental Health (CCHS-MH; Gilmour, 2014). However, when analyses
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were conducted comparing the mental health statuses of those CF members exposed and
not exposed to PMIEs the rates of flourishing and languishing diverged significantly.
Individuals who reported having been exposed to a PMIE were found to be 37% less
likely to be classified as flourishing and 138% more likely to be classified as languishing
than those members who did not report experiencing a PMIE exposure.19 This increased
in rate of languishing is most dramatic for those CF members who report accidentally
killing or seriously injuring another person with this group having a 229% greater
likelihood of languishing than those who had not. These results clearly indicate that
exposure to PMIEs has a detrimental effect on the mental wellbeing of CF members,
however it is measured.
CF training around mental health and resilience
The mental health and resilience training (MHT) program utilized by the CF,
entitled the Road to Mental Readiness (R2MR), has been the subject of a variety of
research regarding content and format of delivery (e.g., Fikretoglu, Beatty, & Liu, 2014;
Fikretoglu, D'Agata, Sullivan-Kwantes, & Richards, 2017; Fikretoglu, Liu, & Blacker,
2016; Gaspar, Fikretoglu, Liu, & Blacker, 2017), the analysis of CFMHS data conducted
herein may have uncovered related issue that the CF and DND may wish to address,
namely the ability of CF members to recognize that the training they received constitutes
MHT. According to the training materials reviewed, R2MR training begins at the basic
military qualifications training levels and continues throughout the service member’s
time in the CF becoming more specialized as they rise in rank and deployment

19

This means that for every 100 individuals who were not exposed to a PMIE and are flourishing,
only 63 individuals who were exposed to a PMIE are flourishing. For every 100 individuals who
were not exposed to a PMIE that are languishing, 238 individuals who were exposed to a PMIE
are languishing.
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requirements change. This would suggest that the R2MR training is a frequent and
consistent part of every members’ career while in the CF and yet, a significant proportion
of CFMHS respondents (16%) reported having received no MHT in the 5 years prior to
survey administration. As part of the administration of the mental health and resilience
training section, MHT was defined for participants as any “psychologically oriented
training done in a group setting that is meant to help you cope better with stresses or
personal problems” (p. 207; Statistics Canada, 2014) so respondents would have
understood the types of programs and training the questions referred to. Based on the
questions that made up the MHT section, this result would mean that 16%, or over 11,000
individuals in the whole of the CF, were never deployed [even though the inclusion
criteria required that they have been deployed in support of the mission to Afghanistan],
did not advance in rank, undertook no professional development training, and did not
receive any routine unit, trade specific, or other work-related training in the preceding 5
years; all areas into which the R2MR has been incorporated. While it is possible that
these individuals may actually not have received any MHT during the recall timeframe,
confirmation is not possible as the CF does not currently maintain registration lists for
these courses (Zamorski, Rusu, Guest, & Fikretoglu, 2018). An alternative explanation
might be that these respondents did receive R2MR training but may not have recognize it
as MHT training and, as such, failed to report having received training. Support for this
interpretation could be seen in the results of the only R2MR effectiveness study
conducted to date (Carleton et al., 2018). This study, involving a municipal police force,
found that there were no statistically significant differences in mental health knowledge,
resilience, or stress levels between levels determined prior to R2MR training and those at
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either 6- or 12-month follow-up testing points. Attitudes around mental health stigma did
significantly improve immediately following training, however, by 6- and 12-month
follow-ups these improvements had dissipated. Since the primary objectives of the
R2MR program was to increase mental health literacy and reduce stigma, that these
results were either not found or were not maintained could be seen as reinforcing the
interpretation that the memory of receiving the training had waned and more work needs
to be done to improve R2MR to maximize its efficacy. Specific research within the CF
itself will be required to determine if the results from a police force are also applicable to
a military sample. Finally, establishing an ongoing attendance record for the mental
health and resilience training programs will also help ensure that the programs’ messages
are successfully delivered to all members of the CF in the future.
CF training around ethics and ethical decision making
A review of the content of ethics instruction provided to CF members and the
ethical decision-making model they are trained to utilize in potentially ethically
challenging situations lead to the conclusion that neither adequately prepares service
members for exposure to PMIE when they are deployed. Specifically, the DND and CF
Code of Values and Ethics (Department of National Defence, 2012), the central document
that codifies the requisite values, obligations, and behaviours members of both the DND
and CF are to conform to, is missing the chapter specifically relating to appropriate
values and ethics during operations (i.e., when CF members are deployed). This critical
chapter has been absent since the DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics came into
force in June 2012, since which the CF has been engaged in numerous peace support
operations and humanitarian aid missions, as well as the recent combat mission to
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Afghanistan. Without the direction that this chapter is meant to provide CF members are
required to employ the remaining chapters of the DND and CF Code of Values and
Ethics, as well as Duty with Honour: The profession of arms in Canada (Canadian
Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003), and related key
doctrines to guide their behaviour while on operations. These documents are often of
little applicability in the complex, time limited situations that arise in deployment
situations in general, let alone the kinds of nuanced situations that can potentially lead to
a moral injury for those involved.
Similarly, the ethical decision-making model that CF members are taught as part
of the Defence Ethics Program (DEP) is also too cumbersome and time consuming to
work in an operational environment; a conclusion arrived at by others regarding previous
iterations of the DEP and its decision-making process as well (e.g., Sanschagrin, 2006;
Woodgate, 2004). The major impediments to applying the DEP decision-making process
to operational environments are the following. First, the model requires that all the
relevant information about the situation be available to the CF member at the time they
need to make their decision, so they can appropriately weigh the respective advantages
and disadvantages of all possible option alternatives and then select the ‘right one.’ In
operational environments such as combat operations, service members may need to make
these kinds of decisions in seconds, if not instantaneously, to avoid serious injury or
death, making the kind of step-by-step decision-making process taught by the DEP
inapplicable and potentially harmful. As well, in situations involving PMIEs, the
required information on which they are to base their decision may not become available
until after the decision has been made (e.g., does the bundle the person running at me
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with contain a bomb or a baby?) Second, the model is only applicable to situations where
the CF member involved can affect the outcomes, so it is inapplicable to situations that
are out of the member’s control due to either restrictive rules of engagement, or situations
that have already occurred and, as such, cannot be changed (e.g., the child soldier or
abuse of a minor scenarios in Chapter 2).
That the chapter relating to values and ethics in operations is currently missing
from the central reference document for the CF provides stakeholders with a unique
opportunity. Rather than having to attempt to revise and update an existing chapter to
make it fit with the modern realities of military deployments, a completely new chapter
can be written specifically designed to address the morally and ethically complex realities
that service members may encounter in the field, whether they be on peace-support
operations or are once again engaged in a combat role.
Potential directions for future research
Research regarding moral injury is still in its early stages thus there are several
avenues still needing to be explored. One of these relates to how an individual’s role in
the military, or role during a particular deployment, might affect what an individual
would consider a potentially morally injurious event (PMIE) as well as how they may
present with a moral injury. For example, a doctor who must provide medical care to a
captured enemy combatant who is known to have been responsible for the deaths of
members of the doctor’s team. As a doctor, he or she is bound both by their Hippocratic
oath to help the sick, and by the Geneva conventions as a military officer (see Table 1.1,
point 8 relating to the treatment of the sick and injured, and point 9 relating to treatment
of prisoners of war), irrespective of her or his own beliefs about how this individual
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should be treated (or not treated). According to Litz (Litz et al., 2009), a PMIE involves
the perpetrating of, failing to prevent, bearing witness to, or learning about acts that
transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations. What may make the issue
reflected in the preceding example a PMIE may not be that the doctor behaved
unethically or immorally by treating the enemy combatant, but rather that they did not
behave unethically or immorally and refuse to treat the enemy combatant (as their core
beliefs regarding justice may have required they do) and now they feel guilt or shame
about having done so, or perhaps they may even feel guilty about having considered not
treating the individual and thereby violated their various oaths.
Related to this question is how proximity to the outcomes of one’s potentially
morally injurious actions may affect the experience and development of a MI; this
proximity may be physical or psychological. With regards to physical proximity, much
of the recent research into moral injury has been conducted with members of the Army or
Marines who were deployed to either Iraq or Afghanistan in combat roles; roles that
would allow these individuals to directly observe the results of their actions. Compare
this level of exposure to that of members of an air force who would (hypothetically) fly
into a combat zone, drop a bomb, then exit the area again; beyond potentially seeing the
bomb explode, they generally would not directly witness the person-level effects of their
actions. In the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, members of the navy would likely be the
most distally connected with the results of their actions being that these conflicts occurred
in land-locked areas. The topic of inquiry is not the branch of service per se, while this
may be the easiest variable to group respondents according to, but rather their distance
from the results of their actions (e.g., an army surgeon would be located away from the
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actual combat, and a naval aviator may still drop bombs in a land war). With the
increasing use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV; “drones”) in combat situations, the
idea of psychological distance from one’s actions may be best exemplified in the role of a
drone pilot. Drone pilots can operate their UAV from hundreds if not thousands of
kilometres away through a satellite uplink viewing the UAV’s surroundings and
behaviour on a video screen, similar to a video game. This allows the operator to act,
react, and witness the results of these actions in (near) real-time, however, they are not
physically present in the same way as a fighter pilot conducting a similar combat mission
would be. Questions around how this possible psychological distance from their actions
might affect the drone pilots’ view of the moral repercussions of their actions (e.g.,
killing) and how this might relate to their development of moral injury also will require
further research.
One important question that underlies most future studies relating to moral injury
relates to establishing how exposure to PMIE is connected to the eventual development of
a moral injury (MI). As was stated earlier, if an individual develops a moral injury, they
must have been exposed to a PMIE, however not everyone exposed to a PMIE will
develop a moral injury; the conversion rate is unknown. As is the case with most
conversion research, to determine this rate will require longitudinal studies be conducted
that follow individuals who report having been exposed to a PMIE to see who goes on to
later develop a MI and when. The results of these studies would be informative to
researchers in a number of ways. First, they would allow researchers to determine
potential risk and protective factors relating to MI development. Second, knowledge of
the natural conversion rates would allow predictions to be made regarding future mental
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illness and treatment requirements for those currently deployed to environments where
PMIE may be common. The best conduct of this research would necessitate that
standardized measures be used to determine both exposure to a PMIE (e.g., the MIES or
MIQ-M; Currier, Holland, Drescher, & Foy, 2015; Nash et al., 2013) as well as a
screening for the presence of a MI (e.g., EMIS-M, or MISS-M; Currier et al., 2017;
Koenig et al., 2017, 2018) so that results can be compared across studies. Unlike with
other disorders and diseases where the outcome of interest is another point on the course
of a disease and thus is as such out of the researcher’s control (e.g., the progression from
mild-cognitive impairment to dementia; Mitchell & Shiri-Feshki, 2009), the actual injury
in a moral injury is caused by the individual’s realization that a moral transgression has
occurred (Litz et al., 2009), which can be effected by the researcher’s actions through the
Hawthorne effect (or observer) effect. Repeated administrations of a standardized MI
screening measure, as would be typical in a longitudinal conversion study, may cause
participants to think about their experiences more than they might have if they had not
been part of the study. This increase in thoughts relating to the PMIE (e.g., ‘The
researcher keeps asking me if I feel guilt or shame about what I did when I was deployed.
Did I do something that I should be guilty or ashamed about?’) may lead them to realize
that their moral beliefs may have been transgressed and, in turn, potentially alter the
natural course of MI development for that individual invalidating the predictive aspects
of the research study. How a longitudinal conversion study should be designed where
part of the conduct of the research itself may affect the study’s outcome, is a question that
is deserving of study on its own.
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In conclusion, the results of the examinations conducted herein lend credence to
the belief that potentially morally injurious events are a very real threat to the continued
good mental health and functioning of the world’s militaries, whether they are deployed
for combat or on peace support operations. As a result, further research into both the
assessment and treatment of moral injury as well as best practices for pre-deployment
training and preparation are required as it is unlikely that warfighting will revert to the
more ordered form of the past again.
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Appendix A
Adult Mental Health Continuum – Short Form (MHC-SF)
Please answer the following questions about how you have been feeling during the last
month. Place a checkmark in the box that best represents how often you have
experienced or felt the following:

Emotional
well-being

During the past month, how
often did you feel …
1

Happy?

2

Interested in life?

3

Satisfied with life?

4

That you had something
important to contribute to
society?
That you belonged to a
community (like a social
group, or your
neighbourhood)?

Social well-being

5

6

7
8

9

Psychological well-being

10

11

12

13

14
1

Never

Once
or
twice

About
once
a
week

2 or 3
times
a
week

Almost
every
day

Every
day

That our society is
becoming a better place for
people like you?
That people are basically
good?
That the way our society
works makes sense to
you?
That you liked most parts
of your personality?
Good at managing the
responsibilities of your
daily life?
That you had a warm and
trusting relationship with
others?
That you had experiences
that challenged you to
grow and become a better
person?
Confident to think or
express your own ideas
and opinions?
That your life has a sense
of direction or meaning to
it?

Adapted from Keyes, 2009. Used with permission
Note: The left-most column is not included on the actual questionnaire; it is included here
to indicate which questions relate to each of the three spheres of well-being assessed by
the MHC-SF.

MORAL INJURY IN CF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN

182

Appendix B
Effect of PMIE exposure on PMH category - Flourishing
Characteristic

Any PMIE

PMH - Flourishing
AOR
PMIE Exposure
Not exposed
Reference
Exposed
0.63 ***
Sociodemographic
Sex
Male
Reference
Female
0.89
Age (years)
19-24
2.06
25-34
1.26
35-44
0.99
45-54
1.07
55 and over
Reference
Marital Status
Married or Common-law
Reference
Widowed, Separated, or Div.
0.57 ***
Single (never married)
0.65 ***
Education
Less than SS graduation
Reference
SS graduate
0.91
Some post-secondary
1.26
Post-secondary graduation
1.12
> Post-secondary graduation
2.00 **
Military Factors
Component
Regular Forces
Reference
Reserve Forces
0.98
Rank Group
Junior NCM
0.56 ***
Senior NCM
0.81
Officer
Reference
MHT in last 5 years
Any Mental Health Training
1.42 ***
Deployment Related
Total number of days deployed (days)
< 120 days
Reference
121-240 days
1.02
241-360 days
1.15
Over 361 days
0.93

Accidentally caused
serious injury or death of
another person

95% CI

AOR

95% CI

0.54 - 0.74

Reference
0.66 *

0.48 - 0.91

0.71 - 1.12

Reference
0.94

0.72 - 1.24

1.10 - 3.83
0.79 - 2.12
0.62 - 1.59
0.66 - 1.74

2.14 *
1.32
1.05
1.06
Reference

1.10 - 4.16
0.79 - 2.24
0.64 - 1.73
0.64 - 1.75

0.44 - 0.73
0.53 - 0.80

Reference
0.58 ***
0.68 ***

0.43 - 0.76
0.54 - 0.85

0.64 - 1.32
0.83 - 1.92
0.78 - 1.61
1.21 - 3.30

Reference
1.05
1.38
1.35
2.53 ***

0.72 - 1.53
0.90 - 2.12
0.92 - 1.99
1.47 - 4.36

0.84 - 1.14

Reference
0.94

0.79 - 1.11

0.44 - 0.70
0.65 - 1.02

0.55 ***
0.84
Reference

0.43 - 0.72
0.66 - 1.08

1.16 - 1.73

1.41 **

1.12 - 1.77

0.81 - 1.27
0.87 - 1.53
0.70 - 1.23

Reference
1.11
1.28
0.95

0.86 - 1.43
0.92 - 1.77
0.70 - 1.29
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Characteristic

Purposely injured,
tortured, or killed
someone

PMH - Flourishing
AOR
PMIE Exposure
Reference
Not exposed
0.68 ***
Exposed
Sociodemographic
Sex
Reference
Male
0.92
Female
Age (years)
2.36 *
19-24
1.44
25-34
1.11
35-44
1.09
45-54
Reference
55 and over
Marital Status
Reference
Married or Common-law
0.58 ***
Widowed, Separated, or Div.
0.67 ***
Single (never married)
Education
Reference
Less than SS graduation
1.06
SS graduate
1.38
Some post-secondary
1.35
Post-secondary graduation
2.54 ***
> Post-secondary graduation
Military Factors
Component
Reference
Regular Forces
0.94
Reserve Forces
Rank Group
0.55 ***
Junior NCM
0.84
Senior NCM
Reference
Officer
MHT in last 5 years
1.44 **
Any Mental Health Training
Deployment Related
Total number of days deployed (days)
Reference
< 120 days
121-240 days
1.12
241-360 days
1.28
Over 361 days
0.98
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Saw atrocities or
massacres

95% CI

AOR

95% CI

0.56 - 0.84

Reference
0.75 **

0.63 - 0.94

0.67 - 1.20

Reference
0.92

0.70 - 1.21

1.21 - 4.60
0.85 - 2.42
0.67 - 1.84
0.66 - 1.81

2.16 *
1.33
1.07
1.07
Reference

1.11 - 4.22
0.79 - 2.25
0.65 - 1.78
0.64 - 1.79

0.44 - 0.76
0.54 - 0.84

Reference
0.58 ***
0.67 ***

0.44 - 0.76
0.54 -00.84

0.72 - 1.56
0.89 - 2.14
0.92 - 2.00
1.47 - 4.37

Reference
1.04
1.35
1.33
2.50 ***

0.70 - 1.53
0.97 - 2.08
0.90 - 196
1.45 - 4.32

0.79 - 1.12

Reference
0.94

0.79 - 1.11

0.43 - 0.72
0.66 - 1.08

0.56 ***
0.86
Reference

0.43 - 0.73
0.67 - 1.11

1.12 - 1.78

1.43 **

1.13 - 1.80

0.87 - 1.44
0.92 - 1.76
0.72 - 1.33

Reference
1.12
1.30
0.98

0.87 - 1.44
0.94 - 1.80
0.92 - 1.33

MORAL INJURY IN CF MEMBERS DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN

Characteristic

Unable to respond due to
ROE

PMH - Flourishing
AOR
PMIE Exposure
Reference
Not exposed
0.68 ***
Exposed
Sociodemographic
Sex
Reference
Male
0.86
Female
Age (years)
2.27 *
19-24
1.37
25-34
1.04
35-44
1.03
45-54
Reference
55 and over
Marital Status
Reference
Married or Common-law
0.56 ***
Widowed, Separated, or Div.
0.67 ***
Single (never married)
Education
Reference
Less than SS graduation
0.98
SS graduate
1.27
Some post-secondary
1.21
Post-secondary graduation
2.16 **
> Post-secondary graduation
Military Factors
Component
Reference
Regular Forces
0.93
Reserve Forces
Rank Group
0.43 ***
Junior NCM
0.81
Senior NCM
Reference
Officer
MHT in last 5 years
1.43 **
Any Mental Health Training
Deployment Related
Total number of days deployed (days)
Reference
< 120 days
121-240 days
1.00 **
241-360 days
1.10
Over 361 days
0.89
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Seen injured
women/children unable
to help

95% CI

AOR

95% CI

0.58 - 0.79

Reference
0.66 ***

0.56 - 0.77

0.66 - 1.12

Reference
0.89

0.69 - 1.16

1.17 - 4.39
0.82 - 2.30
0.63 - 1.72
0.61 - 1.72

2.21 *
1.14
1.07
1.02
Reference

1.16 - 4.22
0.82 - 2.29
0.65 - 1.74
0.62 - 1.70

0.43 - 0.73
0.54 - 0.83

Reference
0.57 ***
0.68 ***

0.43 - 0.74
0.55 - 0.84

0.67 - 1.44
0.82 - 1.97
0.83 - 1.78
1.27 - 3.65

Reference
0.99
1.29
1.24
2.31 **

0.68 - 1.45
0.83 - 1.99
0.45 - 1.82
1.36 - 3.92

0.79 - 1.10

Reference
0.94

0.80 - 1.11

0.42 - 0.69
0.64 - 1.03

0.51 ***
0.80
Reference

0.40 - 0.67
0.63 - 1.01

1.14 - 1.79

1.43 **

1.14 - 1.79

0.78 - 1.28
0.81 - 1.51
0.66 - 1.19

Reference
1.00
1.10
0.89

0.78 - 1.28
0.82 - 1.51
0.66 - 1.20
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Characteristic

Felt responsible for the
death of Canadian or
allied personnel
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Difficulty distinguishing
between combatants and
non-combatants

PMH - Flourishing
AOR
95% CI
AOR
95% CI
PMIE Exposure
Reference
Reference
Not exposed
0.63
***
0.49
0.82
0.68 ***
0.59 - 0.79
Exposed
Sociodemographic
Sex
Reference
Reference
Male
0.92
0.71 - 1.19
0.84
0.64 - 1.09
Female
Age (years)
2.18 *
1.13 - 2.21
2.24 **
1.14 - 4.38
19-24
1.39
0.83 - 2.32
1.37
0.81 - 2.33
25-34
1.05
0.64 - 1.72
1.05
0.63 - 1.75
35-44
1.03
0.62
1.73
1.02
0.60 - 1.73
45-54
Reference
Reference
55 and over
Marital Status
Reference
Reference
Married or Common-law
0.56 ***
0.43 - 0.73
0.56 ***
0.43 - 0.73
Widowed, Separated, or Div.
0.68 ***
0.55 - 0.84
0.57 ***
0.54 - 0.83
Single (never married)
Education
Reference
Reference
Less than SS graduation
1.00
0.68 - 1.46
1.02
0.70 - 1.49
SS graduate
1.31
0.84 - 2.03
1.30
0.84 - 2.01
Some post-secondary
1.27
0.86 - 1.86
1.28
0.88 - 1.87
Post-secondary graduation
2.32 **
1.36 - 3.94
2.25 **
1.33 - 3.80
> Post-secondary graduation
Military Factors
Component
Reference
Reference
Regular Forces
0.93
0.79 - 1.09
0.95
0.81 - 1.12
Reserve Forces
Rank Group
0.52 ***
0.40 - 0.66
0.50 ***
0.40 - 0.64
Junior NCM
0.77 *
0.60 - 0.98
0.76 *
0.60 - 0.97
Senior NCM
Reference
Reference
Officer
MHT in last 5 years
1.43 **
1.15 - 1.79
1.48 ***
1018 - 1.85
Any Mental Health Training
Deployment Related
Total number of days deployed (days)
Reference
Reference
< 120 days
121-240 days
1.00
0.78 - 1.28
1.01
0.79 - 1.29
241-360 days
1.09
0.80 - 1.49
1.11
0.82 - 1.51
Over 361 days
0.87
0.65 - 1.18
0.91
0.67 - 1.22
Note: AOR = Adjusted Odds Ratio, Div. = Divorced, MHT = Mental Health Training,
NCM = Non-Commissioned Member, PMH = Positive Mental Health, PMIE =
Potentially Morally Injurious Event, ROE = Rules of Engagement, SS = Secondary
School. * 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ** 0.001 < p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
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Appendix C
Effect of PMIE exposure on PMH category – Moderate
Characteristic

Any PMIE

PMH - Moderate
AOR
PMIE Exposure
Reference
Not exposed
1.46 ***
Exposed
Sociodemographic
Sex
Reference
Male
1.15
Female
Age (years)
0.60
19-24
0.94
25-34
1.18
35-44
1.01
45-54
Reference
55 and over
Marital Status
Reference
Married or Common-law
1.68 ***
Widowed, Separated, or Div.
1.40 **
Single (never married)
Education
Reference
Less than SS graduation
1.19
SS graduate
0.80
Some post-secondary
0.95
Post-secondary graduation
0.48 **
> Post-secondary graduation
Military Factors
Component
Reference
Regular Forces
1.06
Reserve Forces
Rank Group
1.59 ***
Junior NCM
1.18
Senior NCM
Reference
Officer
MHT in last 5 years
0.72 ***
Any Mental Health Training
Deployment Related
Total number of days deployed (days)
Reference
< 120 days
121-240 days
1.03
241-360 days
0.90
Over 361 days
1.11

Accidentally caused
serious injury or death of
another person

95% CI

AOR

95% CI

1.24 - 1.70

Reference
1.20

0.86 - 1.67

0.91 - 1.44

Reference
1.06

0.81 - 1.39

0.32 - 1.11
0.57 - 1.54
0.74 - 1.89
0.62 - 1.64

0.63
0.97
1.18
1.07
Reference

0.32 - 1.23
0.57 - 1.64
0.71 - 1.98
0.64 - 1.79

1.30 - 2.16
1.13 - 1.72

Reference
1.64
1.34

1.25 - 2.16
1.07 - 1.68

0.82 - 1.72
0.52 - 1.23
0.65 - 1.38
0.29 - 0.81

Reference
1.05
0.76
0.81
0.40 ***

0.71 - 1.56
0.49 - 1.19
0.54 - 1.20
0.23 - 0.70

0.90 - 1.24

Reference
1.10

0.92 - 1.31

1.26 - 2.01
0.93 - 1.49

1.57 ***
1.13
Reference

1.21 - 2.04
0.87 - 1.45

1.12 - 1.77

0.72

0.57 - 0.92

0.82 - 1.30
0.67 - 1.20
0.83 - 1.47

Reference
0.95
0.82
1.09

0.73 - 1.22
0.59 - 1.13
0.79 - 1.48
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Characteristic

Purposely injured,
tortured, or killed
someone

PMH - Moderate
AOR
PMIE Exposure
Reference
Not exposed
1.23 *
Exposed
Sociodemographic
Sex
Reference
Male
1.08
Female
Age (years)
0.60
19-24
0.92
25-34
1.14
35-44
1.05
45-54
Reference
55 and over
Marital Status
Reference
Married or Common-law
1.63 ***
Widowed, Separated, or Div.
1.34 **
Single (never married)
Education
Reference
Less than SS graduation
1.05
SS graduate
0.76
Some post-secondary
0.81
Post-secondary graduation
0.40 ***
> Post-secondary graduation
Military Factors
Component
Reference
Regular Forces
1.09
Reserve Forces
Rank Group
1.57 ***
Junior NCM
1.13
Senior NCM
Reference
Officer
MHT in last 5 years
0.72 **
Any Mental Health Training
Deployment Related
Total number of days deployed (days)
Reference
< 120 days
121-240 days
0.94
241-360 days
0.82
Over 361 days
1.07
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Saw atrocities or
massacres

95% CI

AOR

95% CI

1.02 - 1.56

Reference
1.24 *

1.04 - 1.49

0.83 - 1.42

Reference
1.09

0.83 - 1.42

0.31 - 1.17
0.54 - 1.58
0.68 - 1.92
0.63 - 1.77

0.63
0.97
1.17
1.06
Reference

0.32 - 1.23
0.57 - 1.16
0.70 - 1.95
0.63 - 1.78

1.24 - 2.14
1.07 - 1.69

Reference
1.64 ***
1.34 *

1.24 - 2.15
1.07 - 1.69

0.71 - 1.55
0.49 - 1.19
0.54 - 1.21
0.23 - 0.70

Reference
1.06
0.78
0.82
0.41

0.72 - 1.58
0.50 - 1.21
0.5 - 1.22
0.23 - 0.71

0.91 - 1.30

Reference
1.09

0.92 - 1.31

1.21 - 2.04
0.87 1.46

1.56 ***
1.05
Reference

1.20 - 20.4
0.86 - 1.43

0.57 - 0.91

0.72 **

0.56 - 0.91

0.73 - 1.21
0.59 - 1.13
0.78 - 1.46

Reference
0.94
0.80
1.06

0.73 - 1.21
0.58 - 1.11
0.77 - 1.45
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Characteristic

Unable to respond due to
ROE

PMH - Moderate
AOR
PMIE Exposure
Reference
Not exposed
1.34 ***
Exposed
Sociodemographic
Sex
Reference
Male
1.16
Female
Age (years)
0.57
19-24
0.93
25-34
1.18
35-44
1.09
45-54
Reference
55 and over
Marital Status
Reference
Married or Common-law
1.71 ***
Widowed, Separated, or Div.
1.33 *
Single (never married)
Education
Reference
Less than SS graduation
1.11
SS graduate
0.79
Some post-secondary
0.88
Post-secondary graduation
0.46 **
> Post-secondary graduation
Military Factors
Component
Reference
Regular Forces
1.11
Reserve Forces
Rank Group
1.66 ***
Junior NCM
1.17
Senior NCM
Reference
Officer
MHT in last 5 years
0.71 **
Any Mental Health Training
Deployment Related
Total number of days deployed (days)
Reference
< 120 days
121-240 days
1.07
241-360 days
0.95
Over 361 days
1.19
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Seen injured
women/children unable
to help

95% CI

AOR

95% CI

1.14 - 1.58

Reference
1.44 ***

1.22 - 1.70

0.89 - 1.51

Reference
1.13

0.87 - 1.46

0.29 - 1.11
0.55 - 1.58
0.71 - 1.97
0.54 - 1.83

0.58
0.93
1.16
1.09
Reference

0.30 - 1.12
0.55 - 1.56
0.70 - 1.91
0.65 - 1.93

1.31 - 2.24
1.07 - 1.67

Reference
1.69 ***
1.33 *

1.30 - 2.22
1.07 - 1.66

0.75 - 1.64
0.51 - 1.24
0.59 - 1.31
0.27 - 0.78

Reference
1.10
0.79
0.86
0.43 **

0.75 - 1.63
0.50 - 1.23
0.58 - 1.29
0.25 - 0.74

0.94 - 1.31

Reference
1.10

0.93 - 1.30

1.29 - 2.13
0.91 - 1.50

1.69 ***
1.18
Reference

1.32 - 2.17
0.92 - 1.52

0.56 - 0.90

0.71 **

0.56 - 0.89

0.82 - 1.38
069 - 1.32
0.88 - 1.62

Reference
1.07
0.95
1.18

0.82 - 1.38
0.69 - 1.31
0.87 - 1.61
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Felt responsible for the
death of Canadian or
allied personnel
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Difficulty distinguishing
between combatants and
non-combatants

PMH - Moderate
AOR
95% CI
AOR
95% CI
PMIE Exposure
Reference
Reference
Not exposed
1.34
*
1.02
1.75
1.35 ***
1.16 - 1.58
Exposed
Sociodemographic
Sex
Reference
Reference
Male
1.10
0.85 - 1.43
1.19
0.92 - 1.54
Female
Age (years)
0.59
0.30 - 1.15
0.58
0.30 - 1.13
19-24
0.92
0.55 - 1.56
0.93
0.55 - 1.58
25-34
1.17
0.71 - 1.96
1.17
0.70 - 1.97
35-44
1.08
0.54
1.83
1.09
0.64 - 1.86
45-54
Reference
Reference
55 and over
Marital Status
Reference
Reference
Married or Common-law
1.72 ***
1.31 - 2.25
1.71 ***
1.31 - 2.24
Widowed, Separated, or Div.
1.33 *
1.07 - 1.66
1.34 **
1.08 - 1.67
Single (never married)
Education
Reference
Reference
Less than SS graduation
1.09
0.74 - 1.62
1.08
0.73 - 1.596
SS graduate
0.78
0.50 - 1.22
0.78
0.50 - 1.22
Some post-secondary
0.85
0.57 - 1.27
0.84
0.57 - 1.26
Post-secondary graduation
0.44 **
0.25 - 0.75
0.44 **
0.26 - 0.76
> Post-secondary graduation
Military Factors
Component
Reference
Reference
Regular Forces
1.11
0.94 - 1.31
1.09
0.92 - 1.29
Reserve Forces
Rank Group
1.71 ***
1.33 - 2.19
1.74 ***
1.35 - 2.23
Junior NCM
1.22
0.95 - 1.57
1.23
0.96 - 1.58
Senior NCM
Reference
Reference
Officer
MHT in last 5 years
0.71 **
0.56 - 0.89
0.69 **
0.44 - 0.87
Any Mental Health Training
Deployment Related
Total number of days deployed (days)
Reference
Reference
< 120 days
121-240 days
1.07
0.83 - 1.39
1.06
0.82 - 1.38
241-360 days
0.96
0.70 - 1.32
0.95
0.68 - 1.31
Over 361 days
1.21
0.89 - 1.64
1.17
0.86 - 1.59
Note: AOR = Adjusted Odds Ratio, Div. = Divorced, MHT = Mental Health Training,
NCM = Non-Commissioned Member, PMH = Positive Mental Health, PMIE =
Potentially Morally Injurious Event, ROE = Rules of Engagement, SS = Secondary
School. * 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ** 0.001 < p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
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Appendix D
Effect of PMIE exposure on PMH category – Languishing
Characteristic

Any PMIE

PMH - Languishing
AOR
PMIE Exposure
Reference
Not exposed
2.38 **
Exposed
Sociodemographic
Sex
Reference
Male
0.88
Female
Age (years)
0.21
19-24
0.26
25-34
0.37
35-44
0.66
45-54
Reference
55 and over
Marital Status
Reference
Married or Common-law
1.66
Widowed, Separated, or Div.
2.21 **
Single (never married)
Education
Reference
Less than SS graduation
0.62
SS graduate
0.88
Some post-secondary
0.69
Post-secondary graduation
1.02
> Post-secondary graduation
Military Factors
Component
Reference
Regular Forces
0.81
Reserve Forces
Rank Group
3.57 **
Junior NCM
1.89
Senior NCM
Reference
Officer
MHT in last 5 years
0.77
Any Mental Health Training
Deployment Related
Total number of days deployed (days)
Reference
< 120 days
121-240 days
0.71
241-360 days
0.73
Over 361 days
0.84

Accidentally caused
serious injury or death of
another person

95% CI

AOR

95% CI

1.36 - 4.17

Reference
3.29 ***

1.78 - 6.10

0.37 - 2.12

Reference
0.99

0.39 - 2.54

0.04 - 1.18
0.07 - 1.01
0.10 - 1.35
0.18 - 2.44

0.14 *
0.23 *
0.32
0.59
Reference

0.20 - 0.91
0.06 - 0.91
0.09 - 1.17
0.16 - 2.17

0.87 - 3.15
1.23 - 3.96

Reference
1.75
2.16 *

0.89 - 3.43
1.15 - 4.07

0.25 - 1.54
0.33 - 2.30
0.29 - 1.63
0.24 - 4.22

Reference
0.58
0.67
0.55
0.68

0.24 - 1.41
0.26 - 1.75
0.23 - 1.29
0.14 - 3.34

0.52 - 1.27

Reference
0.89

0.55 - 1.43

1.49 - 8.59
0.81 - 4.39

4.02 **
1.88
Reference

1.46 - 11.08
0.69 - 5.14

0.46 - 1.32

0.80

0.44 - 1.47

0.36 - 1.39
0.31 - 1.71
0.73 - 1.88

Reference
0.69
0.69
0.85

0.33 - 1.47
0.23 - 1.80
0.36 - 2.03
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Characteristic

Purposely injured,
tortured, or killed
someone

PMH - Languishing
AOR
PMIE Exposure
Reference
Not exposed
2.62 ***
Exposed
Sociodemographic
Sex
Reference
Male
1.06
Female
Age (years)
0.10 *
19-24
0.18 *
25-34
0.26 *
35-44
0.53
45-54
Reference
55 and over
Marital Status
Reference
Married or Common-law
1.69
Widowed, Separated, or Div.
2.18 **
Single (never married)
Education
Reference
Less than SS graduation
0.55
SS graduate
0.67
Some post-secondary
0.53
Post-secondary graduation
0.66
> Post-secondary graduation
Military Factors
Component
Reference
Regular Forces
0.89
Reserve Forces
Rank Group
3.95 **
Junior NCM
1.88
Senior NCM
Reference
Officer
MHT in last 5 years
0.80
Any Mental Health Training
Deployment Related
Total number of days deployed (days)
Reference
< 120 days
121-240 days
0.66
241-360 days
0.68
Over 361 days
0.79
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Saw atrocities or
massacres

95% CI

AOR

95% CI

1.49 - 4.60

Reference
1.71 *

1.06 - 2.76

0.41 - 2.75

Reference
1.00

0.39 - 2.56

0.02 - 0.63
0.05 - 0.69
0.70 - 0.96
0.14 - 1.92

0.13 *
0.22 *
0.29
0.53
Reference

0.02 - 0.85
0.05 - 0.89
0.08 - 1.09
0.14 - 2.04

0.86 - 3.33
1.15 - 4.13

Reference
1.75
2.15 *

0.89 - 3.46
1.14 - 4.05

0.22 - 1.38
0.25 - 1.83
0.22 - 1.31
0.14 - 3.24

Reference
0.59
0.73
0.56
0.70

0.23 - 1.51
0.27 - 1.99
0.22 - 1.40
0.14 - 3.42

0.55 - 1.42

Reference
0.88

0.55 - 1.43

1.45 - 10.70
0.70 - 5.02

3.89 **
1.83
Reference

1.42 - 10.62
0.69 - 4.91

0.44 - 1.44

0.79

0.43 - 1.43

0.32 - 1.39
0.26 - 1.76
0.33 - 1.89

Reference
0.67
0.65
0.79

0.32 1.40
0.25 - 1.73
0.33 - 1.91
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Characteristic

Unable to respond due to
ROE

PMH - Languishing
AOR
PMIE Exposure
Reference
Not exposed
2.24 ***
Exposed
Sociodemographic
Sex
Reference
Male
1.05
Female
Age (years)
0.17 *
19-24
.23 *
25-34
0.32
35-44
0.61
45-54
Reference
55 and over
Marital Status
Reference
Married or Common-law
1.63
Widowed, Separated, or Div.
2.31 **
Single (never married)
Education
Reference
Less than SS graduation
0.61
SS graduate
0.91
Some post-secondary
0.66
Post-secondary graduation
0.90
> Post-secondary graduation
Military Factors
Component
Reference
Regular Forces
0.83
Reserve Forces
Rank Group
3.73 **
Junior NCM
1.96
Senior NCM
Reference
Officer
MHT in last 5 years
0.91
Any Mental Health Training
Deployment Related
Total number of days deployed (days)
Reference
< 120 days
121-240 days
0.65
241-360 days
0.68
Over 361 days
0.75
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Seen injured
women/children unable
to help

95% CI

AOR

95% CI

1.42 - 3.53

Reference
1.82 **

1.16 - 2.86

0.43 - 2.56

Reference
0.95

0.40 - 2.30

0.03 - 0.95
0.06 - 0.89
0.09 - 1.17
0.16 - 2.29

0.18
0.23 *
0.31
0.61
Reference

0.03 - 1.04
0.06 - 0.90
0.08 - 1.15
0.16 - 2.31

0.83 - 3.20
1.26 - 4.23

Reference
1.59
2.27 **

0.81 - 3.11
1.25 - 4.13

0.25 - 1.53
0.34 - 2.40
0.28 - 1.59
0.21 - 3.88

Reference
0.61
0.88
0.60
0.82

0.24 - 1.51
0.33 - 2.34
0.26 - 1.51
0.19 - 3.52

0.53 - 1.32

Reference
0.83

0.53 - 1.32

1.47 - 9.51
0.79 - 4.84

4.00 **
2.10
Reference

1.56 - 10.25
0.84 - 5.24

0.45 - 1.46

0.81

0.45 - 1.46

0.33 - 1.30
0.29 - 1.61
0.33 - 1.70

Reference
0.67
0.70
0.76

0.34 - 1.32
0.30 - 1.65
0.34 - 1.71
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Characteristic

Felt responsible for the
death of Canadian or
allied personnel
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Difficulty distinguishing
between combatants and
non-combatants

PMH - Languishing
AOR
95% CI
AOR
95% CI
PMIE Exposure
Reference
Reference
Not exposed
2.81
***
1.58
4.99
2.10 ***
1.36 - 3.23
Exposed
Sociodemographic
Sex
Reference
Reference
Male
0.91
0.38 - 2.20
1.11
0.46 - 2.70
Female
Age (years)
1.18 *
0.03 - 0.99
0.17
0.03 - 1.01
19-24
0.22 *
0.06 - 0.83
0.23 *
0.06 - 0.91
25-34
0.30
0.08 - 1.10
0.31
0.08 - 1.18
35-44
0.57
0.15
2.14
0.59
0.15 - 2.31
45-54
Reference
Reference
55 and over
Marital Status
Reference
Reference
Married or Common-law
1.62
0.83 - 3.19
1.60
0.81 - 3.17
Widowed, Separated, or Div.
2.27 **
1.25 - 4.12
2.29 **
1.26 - 4.19
Single (never married)
Education
Reference
Reference
Less than SS graduation
0.61
0.24 - 1.54
0.58
0.23 - 1.45
SS graduate
0.87
0.33 - 2.30
0.87
0.33 - 2.28
Some post-secondary
0.62
0.25 - 1.50
0.60
0.25 - 1.46
Post-secondary graduation
0.78
0.18 - 3.46
0.85
0.20 - 3.68
> Post-secondary graduation
Military Factors
Component
Reference
Reference
Regular Forces
0.83
0.52 - 1.33
0.81
0.51 - 1.28
Reserve Forces
Rank Group
4.12 **
1.59 - 10.67
4.29 **
1.67 - 11.03
Junior NCM
2.22 **
0.88 - 5.61
2.28
0.91 - 5.69
Senior NCM
Reference
Reference
Officer
MHT in last 5 years
0.89
0.43 - 1.42
0.76
0.42 - 1.37
Any Mental Health Training
Deployment Related
Total number of days deployed (days)
Reference
Reference
< 120 days
121-240 days
0.65
0.33 - 1.29
0.65
0.33 - 1.29
241-360 days
0.71
0.30 - 1.65
0.68
0.29 - 1.60
Over 361 days
0.76
0.34 - 1.72
0.73
0.32 - 1.65
Note: AOR = Adjusted Odds Ratio, Div. = Divorced, MHT = Mental Health Training,
NCM = Non-Commissioned Member, PMH = Positive Mental Health, PMIE =
Potentially Morally Injurious Event, ROE = Rules of Engagement, SS = Secondary
School. * 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ** 0.001 < p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
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Administrative Experience:
Journal Reviewer (ad hoc):
Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment, & Trauma
Military Behavioral Health
Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice, and Policy
Disability and Rehabilitation
Geriatrics and Aging

2018 – Present
2018 – Present
2018 – Present
2011 – Present
2009 – 2010

Professional Affiliations:
Society for Military Psychology (APA Div. 19), Student Affiliate
Trauma Psychology (APA Div. 56), Student Affiliate
American Psychology-Law Society (APA Div. 41), Student Affiliate
Canadian Geriatrics Society, Associate
Clinical Neuropsychology (APA Div. 40), Student Affiliate

2016-pres.
2016-pres.
2004-2017
2006-2010
2001-2007

Professional Development and Additional Training:
Operational Stress Injury/Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (OSI/PTSD)
• Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale for DSM-5 (CAPS-5) Clinician Training, on-line CME,
Veterans Health Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs [USA] (July 25, 2017)
• Impact of Deployment-Related Risk and Resilience Factors on Post-Deployment Mental
Health, on-line CME, Veterans Health Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs
[USA] (June 28, 2017).
• Ethics and Professionalism – Moral Distress Series Part II: The Role of Courage and
Culture, on-line CME, Veterans Health Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs
[USA] (June 23, 2017).
• Resilience to Trauma and PTSD, on-line CME, Veterans Health Administration, Department
of Veterans Affairs [USA] (December 8, 2014).
• Pharmacological Treatment of PTSD and Comorbid Disorders (Updated), on-line CME,
Veterans Health Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs [USA] (July 8, 2014).
• Cognitive Behavioral Psychotherapies for PTSD, on-line CME, Veterans Health
Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs [USA] (June 10, 2014).
• Overcoming barriers to PTSD treatment engagement, on-line CME, Veterans Health
Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs [USA] (March 27, 2014).
• Couples and PTSD, on-line CME, Veterans Health Administration, Department of Veterans
Affairs [USA] (March 4, 2014).
• Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault during military service, on-line CME, Veterans
Health Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs [USA] (February 14, 2014).
• Working together to address Domestic Violence among Veterans, on-line CME, CME
Institute of Physicians Postgraduate Press, Inc. (January 24, 2014).
• Aging and PTSD, on-line CME, Veterans Health Administration, Department of Veterans
Affairs [USA] (January 22, 2014).
• Anger, Aggression, and PTSD (2010 VA/DoD Clinical Practice Guideline for PTSD), on-line
CME, Veterans Health Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs [USA] (January 15,
2014).
• Combat Stress Injuries, on-line CME, Veterans Health Administration, Department of
Veterans Affairs [USA] (December 5, 2013).
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Cognitive Processing Therapy (2010 VA/DoD Clinical Practice Guideline for PTSD), on-line
CME, Veterans Health Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs [USA] (December 3,
2013).
Understanding military culture when treating PTSD, on-line CME, Veterans Health
Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs [USA] (November 29, 2013).
What is PTSD?, on-line CME, Veterans Health Administration, Department of Veterans
Affairs [USA] (November 29, 2013).
Substance Abuse, Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, and Violence, on-line CME, Medscape,
LLC (May 28, 2008).
Traumatic Brain Injury: Diagnosis, Outcome, and Rehabilitation, Rotman Research Institute
Conference. Toronto, Ontario (1999).

Clinical Research
• Test construction, University of Western Ontario, London, ON (Winter 2016)
• Investigator Training Program (ITP), 1-day Workshop, Pfizer, St. Joseph’s Health Care
London, London, Ontario (October 3, 2008).
• The Art and Science of Questionnaire Design, University of Western Ontario – Schulich
School of Medicine and Dentistry, London, Ontario (February 11, 2008).
• Power Analysis, University of Western Ontario – Schulich School of Medicine and Dentistry,
London, Ontario (October 15, 2007).
• Budgeting for Research Proposals, University of Western Ontario – Schulich School of
Medicine and Dentistry, London, Ontario (April 30, 2007).
Mental Health/General Medicine
• Transforming Clinical Challenges in Mental Health., Executive LinksInc. (June 4, 2013)
• Crucial Conversations Training, VitalSmarts L.C. (Nov – Dec 2009)
• Highlights of the American Geriatrics Society 2006 Annual Scientific Meeting, on-line CME,
Medscape, LLC (April 17, 2007).
• Treatment Resistant Depression: A guide for effective psychopharmacology, on-line CME,
Medical Education Collaborative [MEC] (September 24, 2001).
• Recurrent Depression: Current Perspectives, on-line CME, Medical Education Collaborative
[MEC] (September 30, 2000).
Forensic Psychology
• Bipolar Disorder and Aggression, on-line CME, Medscape, LLC (July 9, 2009).
• Violence in Schizophrenia rare in the absence of substance abuse, on-line CME, Medscape,
LLC (June 16, 2009).
• Terrorism and trauma… The new reality, 9th Annual Forensic Conference, Forensic
Psychiatry Program, Schulich School of Medicine and Dentistry, London, Ontario (October
12, 2007).
• Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R), 2-day Workshop, Darkstone Research Group,
Whitby Mental Health Centre, and Multi-Health Systems, Whitby, Ontario, (February 22 23, 2007).
• Static-99 Pilot Online Course, Justice Institute of British Columbia (Jan. 17 - Feb.18, 2005)
• Research, Applications, Public Policy, and Law, Centre for Addiction and Mental Health –
Law and Mental Health Conference, Toronto, Ontario (November, 2003).
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Teaching
• Communication of science concepts outside the bubble, University of Western Ontario,
London, ON (June 9, 2017)
• Developing your own course – Aligning outcomes and assessments, University of Western
Ontario, London, ON (June 9, 2017)
• Introduction to the scholarship of teaching and learning, University of Western Ontario,
London, ON (March 27, 2017)
• Successful graduate student-supervisor relationship, University of Western Ontario, London,
ON (March 27, 2017)
• Teaching Assistant Training program, University of Western Ontario, London, ON (January
13, 2017)
• Wrapping up the term – marking and proctoring strategies, University of Western Ontario,
London, ON (November 25, 2016)
• Threshold concepts: Teaching troublesome knowledge in the disciplines, University of
Western Ontario, London, ON (November 25, 2016)
• Navigating the sea of e-learning tools, University of Western Ontario, London, ON
(November 25, 2016)
• Negotiating office hours, University of Western Ontario, London, ON (October 17, 2016)
• Teaching dossiers: What to include and why, University of Western Ontario, London, ON
(July 6, 2015)
• Professionalism: Networking at academic conferences, University of Western Ontario,
London, ON (July 6, 2015)
• Using social media effectively in the university classroom, University of Western Ontario,
London, ON (July 6, 2015)
• Designing your own course: Components of a great syllabus, University of Western Ontario,
London, ON (July 6, 2015)

